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Scheidler v. NOW/Operation Rescue v. NOW
(04-1244) / (04-1352)
Ruling Below: (National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 91 Fed. Appx. 510 (2004), cert
granted, 73 USLW 3623, 73 USLW 3570).
The National Organization for Women ("NOW") and two health clinics sued individuals,
Operation Rescue and other organizations protesting abortion at the clinics, alleging violations of
federal laws against extortion under the Hobbs Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"). A jury found for NOW, and their judgment was affirmed by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Defendants then faced a nationwide injunction, preventing
them from protesting abortion at clinics. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case back to the Seventh Circuit, holding that the injunction was void, as defendants had not
obtained property from plaintiffs and thus had not committed extortion. On remand, the Seventh
Circuit found that the Supreme Court's decision did not address whether defendants' alleged acts
or threats of violence could justify an injunction. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court in
an attempt to finally and completely strike down limits against their protests.
Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court's failure to address the issue of acts or threats
of violence in its earlier ruling stating that abortion protests did not amount to extortion under the
federal Hobbs Act and RICO statute left room for suits on those grounds to limit such protests.
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, Inc., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
Joseph M. SCHEIDLER, et al., Defendants-Appellants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
Decided February 26, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
ORDER:
This case comes to us on remand from the
Supreme Court of the United States.
In 1986, the National Organization for
Women (NOW) and two health clinics that
perform abortions ("plaintiffs"), filed this
class action alleging that defendants, a
coalition of antiabortion groups called the
Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN), Joseph
Scheidler, and other individuals and
organizations that oppose abortion, engaged
in conduct amounting to a pattern of
extortion in violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S. C. §§ 1961-68 (RICO). ...
After the Court in NOW I remanded the
case, the district court conducted a seven-
week trial, at which the plaintiffs introduced
evidence of hundreds of acts committed by
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the defendants or others acting in concert
with PLAN which, the plaintiffs contended,
constituted predicate acts under RICO. In
response to special interrogatories, the jury
found that the defendants or others
associated with PLAN committed 21
violations of federal extortion law (the
Hobbs Act, 18 USC. § 1951), 25 violations
of state extortion law, 25 instances of
attempting or conspiring to commit either
federal or state extortion, 23 violations of
the Travel Act, 18 USC. § 1952, 23
instances of attempting to violate the Travel
Act, and four "acts or threats of physical
violence to any person or property." On this
basis, the jury awarded damages to the two
named clinics, and the district court issued a
permanent nationwide injunction prohibiting
the defendants from conducting blockades,
trespassing, damaging property, or
committing acts of violence at the class
clinics. The defendants appealed a number
of issues relating to the conduct of the trial
and the issuance of the injunction. We
affirmed the district court's judgment in all
respects.
The defendants then filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, which the Court granted
with respect to two of the three questions
presented by the petition. Scheidler v. Nat'l
Org. for Women, Inc., 535 US 1016 (2002).
Specifically, the Court limited its grant of
certiorari to the following questions:
1. Whether the Seventh Circuit
correctly held, in acknowledged
conflict with the Ninth Circuit,
that injunctive relief is available
in a private civil action for
treble damages brought under
[RICO].
2. Whether the Hobbs Act,
which makes it a crime to
obstruct, delay, or affect
interstate commerce "by
robbery or extortion" and which
defines "extortion" as "the
obtaining of property from
another, with [the owner's]
consent," where such consent is
"induced by the wrongful use of
actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear"-criminalizes
the activities of political
protesters who engage in sit-ins
and demonstrations that
obstruct the public's access to a
business's premises and
interfere with the freedom of
putative customers to obtain
services offered there.
In its opinion, the Court explained that it
granted certiorari to determine "whether
petitioners committed extortion within the
meaning of the Hobbs Act" and "whether
respondents, as private litigants, may obtain
injunctive relief in a civil action" under
RICO. Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women,
Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 397 (2003) (NOW II).
The Court held that "petitioners did not
commit extortion because they did not
'obtain' property from respondents as
required by the Hobbs Act," and this
determination "renders insufficient the other
bases or predicate acts of racketeering
supporting the jury's conclusion that
petitioners violated RICO." It therefore
"reversed without reaching the question of
the availability of private injunctive relief
under § 1964(c) of RICO," and held that
"without an underlying RICO violation, the
injunction issued by the District Court must
necessarily be vacated."
On remand to this court . . [p]laintiffs argue
that, although the Court in NOW II disposed
of the 117 extortion-based predicate acts
under RICO, the defendants did not petition
for a writ of certiorari on the four predicate
acts involving "acts or threats of physical
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violence to any person or property" and,
accordingly, the Court did not decide
whether these acts alone could support the
district court's injunction. In response,
defendants contend that the Hobbs Act does
not outlaw "physical violence" apart from
extortion and robbery, and therefore the
Supreme Court's holding that the defendants
did not commit extortion precludes a finding
that the four acts or threats of violence might
independently support the injunction. We
remand to the district court to address this
issue-which never before in this litigation
has been the subject of full briefing or
judicial consideration-in the first instance.
Although "an order limiting the grant of
certiorari does not operate as a jurisdictional
bar," Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 US.
235, 246 (1981), the Supreme Court has
consistently adhered to its Rule 14.1(a),
which provides that "only the questions set
out in the petition, or fairly included therein,
will be considered by the Court." Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 US.
184, 202. (2002); Glover v. United States,
531 U.S. 198, 205 (2001). Given the Court's
general refusal to decide issues outside the
questions presented by a petition for a writ
of certiorari, we will not presume that in this
case it went beyond the scope of its grant of
certiorari, which it characterized as "whether
petitioners committed extortion within the
meaning of the Hobbs Act," to hold sub
silentio that the four acts or threats of
physical violence found by the jury cannot
support the injunction. We note that the
Court's opinion in NOW II makes no
mention of these four predicate acts, and the
parties' briefs before the Court reference
these acts only in passing in footnotes. To
conclude that the Court found these four
predicate acts insufficient to support the
district court's injunction would therefore
require that we find both that the Court went
beyond the scope of its grant of certiorari,
and that it did so with respect to an issue not
briefed by the parties and not discussed in its
opinion. We decline to draw such a
conclusion.
Instead, we remand to the district court to
determine whether the four predicate acts
involving "acts or threats of physical
violence to any person or property" are
sufficient to support the nationwide
injunction that it imposed. As part of this
inquiry, the court may find it necessary to
interpret the language of the Hobbs Act,
which provides that "whoever in any way or
degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do,
or commits or threatens physical violence to
any person or property in furtherance of a
plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both." 18 US.C. § 1951(a). Specifically,
the court may need to determine whether the
phrase "commits or threatens physical
violence to any person or property"
constitutes an independent ground for
violating the Hobbs Act or, rather, relates
back to the grounds of robbery or extortion.
In the alternative, the court may conclude
that the proper interpretation of § 1951(a) is
immaterial, if it decides that the four acts or
threats of physical violence found by the
jury are not sufficient standing alone to
support the nationwide injunction. As the
parties' . . . submissions offer only a
preliminary discussion of these issues, and
neither this court nor the district court has
addressed them previously, we consider it
best to remand the case to the district court,
We therefore REMAND this case to the
district court for further proceedings
consistent withNOWIIand this order.
Remanded.
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"High Court to Again Hear Case on
Abortion Clinic Protesters"
Los Angeles Times
June 29, 2005
David G. Savage
Before leaving for its summer recess, the
Supreme Court announced Tuesday that it
would take up, for the third time, a long-
running dispute between aggressive anti-
abortion protesters and the National
Organization for Women.
At issue is whether the protesters can be
sued under the federal antiracketeering law
with conspiring to shut down abortion
clinics.
The new abortion protest case is an old one
for the court. It began in the mid-1980s, a
time of bombings, break-ins and fires at
abortion clinics around the nation. NOW's
lawyers maintained that a small group of
protesters-including Joseph Scheidler and
the Pro-Life Action League-were
conspiring to shut down the clinics and were
using illegal means to do it.
NOW sued the group under the federal
antiracketeering law and, after a seven-week
trial, a jury in Chicago found the protesters
guilty of multiple acts of extortion, threats,
conspiracy and violence.
Besides awarding damages, a
down a nationwide order
protesters from trespassing
abortion clinics.
judge handed
that barred
on or near
The protesters, who denied that they had
engaged in violence, appealed to the
Supreme Court, contending that NOW's suit
violated their free-speech rights under the
Ist Amendment. The justices turned away
their claim.
The protesters then argued that they could
not be sued as racketeers because they were
not seeking to extort money from clinics.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument
in a 1994 ruling.
But two years ago, the high court switched
course and ruled that protesters could not be
guilty of extortion under federal law because
they were not trying to take over abortion
clinics. The federal extortion law was
intended to deal with mobsters who used
threats and violence to take over legitimate
businesses.
Although the high court's ruling was seen as
likely to end the case, the U.S. appeals court
in Chicago refused to cancel the nationwide
order against abortion protesters. Its judges
said "acts or threats of physical violence"
were enough to keep the suit alive.
This year, lawyers for Scheidler asked the
Supreme Court to take up the case for the
third time. They said the judges in Chicago
had shown a "flagrant disregard" for the
high court's earlier ruling. The court said it
would hear the case of Scheidler vs. NOW
in the fall.
Jay Sekulow, counsel for the American
Center for Law and Justice, said the case
offered "a critically important opportunity to
remove a dark cloud that has been hanging
over the pro-life community for nearly 20
years."
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But Nancy Keegan, president of NARAL
Pro-Choice America, said the case offered
another reminder about the importance of
Supreme Court justices. Will they "support
violence, vandalism and intimidation, or will
they side with the American women?" she
asked.
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"Another Round in RICO Abortion Case"
SCOTUSblog
June 8, 2005
Lyle Denniston
The nation's longest-running fight over
abortion-now in its 19th year-will have at
least one more round. The Supreme Court
may decide later this month whether that
round will be in the Court itself, or in a U.S.
District Court in Chicago. Filed in 1986, the
case brought by abortion rights advocates
seeking to use the 1970 RICO anti-
racketeering law to stop clinic blockades is
back at the Court for the third time.
Before the Court at its closed-door meeting
on June 16 are two new appeals: Scheidler,
et at, v. National Organization for Women,
et al. (docket 04-1244) and Operation
Rescue v. NOW, et al. (04-1352). (The
case was originally scheduled to be
considered June 9, but has now been reset
for the 16th.)
There are several issues raised, but they
come down to a claim that the 7th Circuit in
its most recent ruling failed to follow the
Supreme Court's 2003 decision in this case
by sending the dispute back to District Court
for one further proceeding.. The leaders of
the Pro-Life Action Network (in 04-1244)
and Operation Rescue contend that the
Supreme Court brought the whole case to a
halt in 2003, and now the Circuit Court is
wasting everybody's time and resources by
prolonging it.
Although most of the public and judicial
attention to the case has focused on the
once-novel notion that RICO could be used
to put a stop to anti-abortion forces' attempts
to shut down abortion clinics, there now
lurks in the case a major issue of criminal
law. That is whether the federal Hobbs Act
(18 U.S.C. 1951) criminalizes only extortion
and robbery, or whether it also sweeps more
broadly and bans acts of violence or threats
of violence that obstruct interstate
commerce, whether or not those acts or
threats involve extortion or robbery.
If, ultimately, that broadening were to occur,
it could make the Hobbs Act-a law enacted
in 1946 to curb labor-management
racketeering-into a sweeping federal anti-
violence law.
The Supreme Court very likely would be
interested in that issue, and, no doubt, so
would the Justice Department. The problem
at this stage, however, is that the 7th
Circuit's latest ruling-while suggesting that
the Hobbs Act could be read that broadly-
stressed that it was not deciding that issue,
and noted that that question could disappear
after the new round in District Court.
The Supreme Court, though, could hear part
of the case without getting to that issue
itself, if it confined its review to clarifying
the scope of its 2003 ruling. That may well
be the decisive issue as the Justices on
Thursday ponder a grant or denial of review.
This marathon case has long been
considered a titanic struggle in the sidewalk
wars over abortion. Attorneys for NOW and
for a nationwide class of abortion clinics
won a major legal breakthrough when the
Supreme Court, in its first ruling in the case
in 1994, ruled that RICO could be used as a
challenge to clinic blockades. That sent the
case to trial, resulting in $276,000 in
damages against anti-abortion
413
demonstrators, plus a nationwide injunction
against their blockades.
But, in the second trip to the Supreme Court,
the Justices by an 8-1 vote on February 26,
2003, found insufficient evidence of
extortion-under either the Hobbs Act or
state extortion law-to serve as predicate
criminal acts for a RICO violation. As part
of that ruling, the Court wiped out the
nationwide injunction,
The central issue that has arisen since then is
whether the Supreme Court meant to end the
case right there, eliminating all bases for a
RICO violation and thus for an injunction.
But the 7th Circuit, in an order on remand
from the Supreme Court on February 26,
2004, and a refusal on January 28 of this
year to reconsider that order, said part of the
clinics' case remains alive.
There were four acts of violence or threats
of violence found by the jury that were not
among those at issue before the Supreme
Court in 2003, the Circuit Court found.
Thus, the District Court should first consider
whether those would supply an independent
basis for a new, narrower injunction against
the blockaders.
"The only remaining question," it said, "is
whether any injunction is appropriate to
redress the four acts of physical violence
that the jury found had taken place and that
were not encompassed within the Supreme
Court's ruling. This does not open Pandora's
Box. It merely resolves the final loose ends
in this long-running litigation in a manner
that is fair to both sides and that
acknowledges the need to resolve all
properly presented issues."
Three judges who wanted en banc rehearing
argued that the Supreme Court in 2003 had
held that there was no extortion, and that
should mean that "no Hobbs Act violation
possibly exists."
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"Abortion Foes Must Face
New Battle in Federal Court"
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
February 27, 2004
Patricia Manson
Disappointing activists who thought the
highest court in the land had sided with
them, Chicago's federal appeals court has set
the stage for another round in a legal battle
between anti-abortion protesters and the
clinics they target.
The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on
Thursday directed a judge to determine
whether four acts or threats of physical
violence attributed to protesters were
enough to support an injunction barring anti-
abortion activists around the nation from
engaging in certain tactics.
U.S. District Judge David H. Coar imposed
the injunction after a jury in 1998 found that
a coalition of anti-abortion groups had used
force and intimidation in a long-running
campaign against clinics that offer abortion
services.
The injunction bars the Pro-Life Action
Network and other entities and individuals
from interfering with the right of any clinic
in the United States at which abortions are
performed to conduct its business.
The injunction also bars the same parties
from interfering with the right of any patient
to obtain services at those clinics.
Coar entered a judgment in which he trebled
the $85,926.92 in damages that the jury
found had been caused to the business and
property of two clinics as a result of the
protesters' actions.
The clinics-Delaware Women's Health
Organization Inc. and Summit Women's
Health Organization Inc.-were among the
plaintiffs that had filed suit accusing anti-
abortion protesters of violating federal
racketeering law.
Also a named plaintiff in the nationwide
class-action lawsuit was the National
Organization for Women Inc.
The plaintiffs brought suit in 1986 alleging
that certain members of the anti-abortion
movement had employed tactics that
amounted to extortion in a bid to shut down
facilities where abortions are performed.
Those tactics included illegally blocking
clinic entrances, destroying equipment and
threatening doctors and patients, the suit
alleged.
Defendants in the suit included PLAN and
anti-abortion activists Joseph Scheidler and
Timothy Murphy.
U.S. District Judge James F. Holderman
dismissed the suit in 1991 and the 7th
Circuit affirmed that decision the following
year. National Organization for Women Inc.
v. Scheidler, 986 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992).
But the U.S. Supreme Court revived the suit
with a ruling that the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
does not require proof that a defendant acted
with an economic motive. National
Organization for Women Inc. v. Scheidler,
510 US. 249 (1994) (NOW 1).
The case was reassigned to Coar when it
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was returned to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois.
Following a seven-week trial, a jury found
that the defendants or others acting in
concert with PLAN were guilty of four acts
or threats of violence as well as 117
additional acts that constituted predicate acts
under RICO.
The case went back up to the 7th Circuit
after Coar entered judgment against the
defendants and issued the injunction.
In 2001, the appeals court refused to strike
down the injunction after holding that
private parties as well as the government
may seek such injunctions under RICO, 18
U.S.C. § 1961. National Organization for
Women Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 987 (7th
Cir. 2001).
Last year, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that
the protesters did not commit extortion
because they had not obtained property from
the abortion providers as required by the
Hobbs Act, 18 US.C. secl951. Scheidler v.
National Organization for Women, 537 U.S.
393 (2003) (NOW II).
PLAN's position before the high court was
supported by groups concerned about the
effect that injunctions such as the one
entered by Coar might have on social and
political protest. These groups included
People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference and Concerned Women for
America.
After the case went back to the 7th Circuit,
PLAN and the other defendants remaining in
the suit contended that the injunction could
not stand because the Supreme Court's
ruling on the extortion issue covered all of
the predicate acts found by the jury.
But NOW and the clinics argued that the
Supreme Court had addressed only the 117
extortion-based acts and had not decided
whether the other four acts were sufficient to
support the injunction.
On Thursday, the 7th Circuit agreed with
NOW.
In an unpublished order, a three-judge panel
of the 7th Circuit said it was sending the
case back to U.S. District Court for a ruling
on whether the four acts or threats of
physical violence called for continuing the
nationwide injunction.
Panel members were Judges Ilana Diamond
Rovner, Diane P. Wood and Terence T.
Evans. National Organization for Women
Inc., et al. v. Joseph M Scheidler, et al.,
Nos. 99-3076, 99-3336, 99-3891, 99-3892
and 01-2050.
Fay Clayton of Chicago, an attorney for
NOW and the clinics, said she was pleased
that the 7th Circuit had directed Coar to
explore the matter of the four predicate acts.
"It's a very good opinion," Clayton said.
"It's exactly what we had requested."
Clayton rejected what she said was the
protesters' position that the Supreme Court
had ruled on an issue-whether those four
acts or threats are a sufficient basis for the
injunction-that was never brought before
it.
But Chicago attorney Thomas L. Brejcha Jr.,
who represented the protesters, said the high
court had considered those four alleged acts
in ruling in favor of his clients.
"I don't think you could read the last two
paragraphs of the Supreme Court decision
and think there was anything left in the
416
case," Brejcha said.
Murphy also said he was disappointed with
the 7th Circuit's order. "I was convicted of
things that I did not do at events that I was
not at," said Murphy, who like the other
defendants claimed witnesses for the
plaintiffs falsely accused protesters of
engaging in violent acts. "So the whole
thing is kind of Kafka-esque."
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"Racketeering for God"
Slate Magazine
December 4, 2002
Dahlia Lithwick
Tonight you'll hear on the news that
Scheidler v. NOW is a seminal abortion
case. You'll see protesters with signs, and
chanting, and even a little shoving. You'll
see footage of pro-life activist Joe Scheidler
and his colleagues asking why people who
kill babies and maim women are innocents
while abortion protesters are persecuted as
racketeers and bankrupted in court. You'll
see attorney Fay Clayton, and NOW
President Kim Gandy on the steps of the
high court, insisting that women seeking
abortions were physically brutalized by pro-
life protesters in the 1980s. You may even
get to hear Operation Rescue protesters,
heckling with such pithy lines as:
Babykiller! and Liar! (One of my great
frustrations about this case is that, with 30
years to invent better jeers, both sides of this
debate keep shouting the same banal sound
bites.) My eternal gratitude to the first
Fraygrant who comes up with something
more original than, What about the dead
babies or, It's my body.
If you were to base your opinion of today's
case on what you see on the news tonight,
you would come away thinking that the high
court heard one hell of an abortion case
today and that the future of abortion stands
in the balance as it hasn't since the court
decided Roe v. Wade in 1973. Actually,
what the court heard today was rather a
tedious little case about statutory
interpretation. It may have real
consequences for free speech in this country
but will impact abortion law not at all. It's a
testament to how utterly bonkers both sides
in this debate have become, that they alone
can't see that.
In the mid-'80s, Operation Rescue members
joined with other pro-life activists to create
the Pro-Life Action Network, or PLAN, led
by Joe Scheidler, Randall Terry, Timothy
Murphy, and others. PLAN sought to
aggressively interfere with clinic workers
and abortion-seekers through missions,
ranging from prayer vigils and leafleting to
violent attacks or threats of violence against
individual abortion clinics. It is undisputed
in this case that in at least some incidents,
clinic staff and patients were violently
assaulted (pinned against a glass wall until it
broke, etc.), although PLAN's attorney, Roy
T. Englert, seems to take the position that
since there were only four truly violent
incidents (as opposed to 30, alleged by
NOW), this violence is a-OK.
NOW, adopting a new strategy in 1986,
filed suit against PLAN for violating the
federal racketeering statute "the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act."
RICO provides better penalties than garden-
variety trespass statutes. NOW's theory was
that PLAN's missions represented a pattern
of extortion that differs very little from a
Tony Soprano-type shakedown, except with
less leather jackets. NOW lost in both the
trial court and at the 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals but prevailed in the Supreme Court
in 1994, when the court unanimously held in
NOW v. Scheidler that it was not necessary
under RICO that the extortionists in question
benefit financially from their racketeering.
So the case went back to the trial court in
Chicago, where a jury found for NOW and a
judge awarded $257,780 in damages against
PLAN and issued a permanent national
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injunction prohibiting PLAN from
trespassing on or committing violence at
abortion clinics. PLAN appealed to the 7th
Circuit and lost, then appealed to the
Supreme Court, where we find ourselves
today. The only issues before the court:
Does RICO allow private parties to seek
injunctive relief? And can extortion "which
requires that the racketeer in question obtain
property through the wrongful use of actual
or threatened force "be used to prosecute
political protesters?
Englert opens on this point: Since when is
stopping people from accessing abortion
clinics obtaining property under the law?
Were the civil rights boycotts of racist white
merchants' extortion? When Carry Nation
trashed saloons with hammers, was that
extortion?
Justice John Paul Stevens, presiding again
today because Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist is benched while recovering from
leg surgery, points out that those people
weren't charged with extortion. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor asks, Aren't we
talking about acts that constitute criminal
offenses?
Englert replies "so cheerfully that it makes
my teeth hurt "Oh yes! Yes they were
trespassing!" O'Connor points out that it
was more than trespassing; in some cases,
the PLAN missions involved assault.
Englert agrees, again cheerfully. Maybe it
was assault, he tells her, but it was not
extortion.
Englert goes on to explain that there is no
property being obtained in these cases, so
extortion cannot be found. Justice David
Souter suggests that if strangers take control
of your property, they have obtained it. No,
says Englert, control is not property.
Property is property.
Stevens pulls a Socratic shaming tactic out
from his law school years, quizzing Englert
on an 1890 New York case involving work
stoppage. When counsel admits that the
case is not coming to mind, Stevens cites the
case name. Englert again admits that he's
blanking on the reference. People shift
uneasily.
This also has nothing to do with the future
of abortion.
Solicitor General Ted Olson, who filed a
brief that supports NOW's position only
somewhat more than PLAN's, has 10
minutes to argue in favor of stretching the
racketeering statutes past any plausible
meaning. This is perhaps no surprise since
his bosses would like nothing better than to
use RICO (and FISA, and Bahamian
maritime law) to prosecute any suspect in
the war on terror who can't be prosecuted
under normal criminal statutes.
Justice Anthony Kennedy wonders whether
any time any protester trespasses for any
reason, he's committed a Hobbs Act
violation. Olson responds that if the aim is
to shut down a clinic, then the protester has
obtained control of that property.
Justice Antonin Scalia wonders whether this
construction of the word obtained doesn't
sail too close to the wind of First
Amendment rights. And Olson, sailing too
close to the wind of Scalia, tries to argue
that even in civil rights cases, if the aim was
to shut down a business through protest,
then yes, there was extortion. This response
gives at least an inkling of why
organizations such as People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals have sided with the
Operation Rescue crowd in this case. If you
can't throw a little blood or toss a few pointy
sledge hammers, what good is a protest
anyhow?
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The final attorney is NOW's representative,
Fay Clayton, who is in the unenviable
position of arguing against what looks like
free political speech. She and Justice Scalia
do a few rounds on whether the RICO
statute authorizes a private party to seek an
injunction, and let me just note that I'd rather
be pinned against a glass wall by Operation
Rescue members than have to debate
statutory interpretation with Antonin Scalia.
Still, when Justice Stephen Breyer suggests
that perhaps this issue was left ambiguous in
the statute due to congressional mistake, and
Clayton responds that Even if it was a
mistake, this is a bill passed by Congress
and signed by the president. This is the bill
we interpret, Scalia jumps in to agree. I'm
with you on that! He exclaims. Clayton
laughs. I know you are, Justice Scalia.
Even the justices who seem most supportive
of Clayton's case appear skeptical of her
claim that the property being taken here
includes clinic workers, clinic operators, and
visitors to the clinic. Justice Breyer is
incredulous. A woman's right to seek
services is property? he asks. She's not just
going shopping, replies Clayton. She has an
appointment.
Clayton argues that there is a clear line
demarking protest and seizing property: If
my clients at NOW went into the Augusta
Golf Course and started tearing up the green,
that's extortion. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg tries to bring up Carry Nation
again, but Scalia interrupts to smirk, Carry
Nation, that notorious extortionist.
Souter tries to draw a different principled
distinction between obtaining property and
protest: The civil-rights protesters
boycotting lunch counters didn't seek to
close businesses. They sought to change
them. PLAN protesters try to close down
clinics.
Outside there's lots of terrible roaring and
gnashing of terrible teeth (and hurling of
tired insults), but all this has nothing to do
with anyone's right to choose, unless the
right at issue is to choose to protest
violently, which as I've suggested once
before strikes me as thuggery rather than
protected political speech.
I will take just one more second to note,
however, that the next time I pronounce a
term the lamest ever or opine on the chief
justice's likelihood of living injury-free for
the next 20 years or offer wacked-out,
sports-book-type odds on either of the
above, kindly take me out back and thrash
me. This would not constitute racketeering.
It would be for my own good.
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"High Court Hears RICO Challenge"
Washington Post
December 5, 2002
Charles Lane
Civil disobedience, including methods such
as those used by the Rev. Martin Luther
King Jr. and his followers, is threatened by
the government's application of organized-
crime laws to antiabortion protesters who
staged aggressive blockades and sit-ins at
women's health centers in the 1980s and
'90s, attorneys for the protesters told the
Supreme Court yesterday.
"Classic protest actions venerated in
American history would be crimes," Roy
Englert, who represents leaders of the Pro-
Life Action League, told the court. Englert's
clients, along with Operation Rescue, were
found liable in 1998 by a Chicago jury for
acts of coercion and violence that violated
federal racketeering and extortion laws. The
jury awarded more than $ 250,000 in
damages to clinics in Milwaukee and
Delaware, and a federal judge later ordered a
permanent nationwide halt to the protests.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th
Circuit in Chicago upheld the verdict and
the injunction in 2001, and the antiabortion
activists appealed to the Supreme Court.
An attorney for abortion rights supporters
told the court that upholding the verdict and
the injunction would not chill nonviolent
protest, but would prevent the authors of a
violent campaign of intimidation from
escaping unpunished.
"We ask the court not to turn the clock back
on 50 years of [anti-racketeering] law," Fay
Clayton, an attorney for the National
Organization for Women (NOW), told the
court.
As it comes to the court, the case turns on
issues of federal statutory law; the court
rejected the protesters' appeal based on the
First Amendment to the Constitution.
Englert argued yesterday that the 7th Circuit
misread extortion law when it ruled that
denying doctors and patients access to the
clinics was equivalent to forcing them to
hand over their property. And Englert said
the lower court misread racketeering law by
giving private parties such as the clinics a
right to ask a federal judge for an order
barring further protests.
But with demonstrators from both sides of
the abortion debate pacing near the imposing
white steps of the Supreme Court, and with
issues of political speech clearly, if
indirectly, implicated, all the elements of an
emotional confrontation were in place.
The Supreme Court upheld the use of anti-
racketeering laws against the antiabortion
activists in 1994, ruling that the statutes
could be applied even to groups that act out
of non-economic motives. The laws were
particularly potent because they permit
plaintiffs to sue for treble damages.
That year, however, Congress passed a law
that makes a repeat of the most aggressive
antiabortion demonstrations unlikely. The
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
(FACE) specifically bans the use of force,
threats or blockades to interfere with access
to reproductive health care, including
abortions.
Looking ahead, a victory for NOW could
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empower institutions facing aggressive
protests by advocates of non-abortion-
related causes, such as animal rights groups
or anti-globalization activists, to deal with
the protesters essentially as gangsters.
They could sue in federal court under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), alleging that the
protesters committed extortion under the
Hobbs Act, which makes it a federal crime
to coerce someone into giving up his or her
property if that obstructs interstate
commerce. They could also ask a federal
judge to order the protesters to cease
operating nationwide.
Representing the federal government,
Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson told
the court that it should uphold the 7th
Circuit's broad interpretation of extortion,
saying the protesters had disrupted the
clinics' right to control their businesses,
which, he said, "is a well-recognized and
longstanding right of property."
He agreed with the protesters, however, that
the clinics, as private parties, could not seek
a court order against them; RICO reserves
that power for the attorney general, Olson
said.
Several justices seemed troubled that
defining the antiabortion protesters' conduct
in this case-which even the protesters
concede violated various state laws-as
federal extortion might place too powerful a
legal club in the hands of those who may
want to eliminate controversial but sincere
civil disobedience.
"I'm rather concerned about this problem,"
Justice Stephen G. Breyer said.
"This threatens to bring us constantly into
the difficult situation where we have to
figure out whether the definition sails too
close to the wind for First Amendment
purposes," Justice Antonin Scalia said.
Clayton said the key distinction was whether
protesters used violence-which, she said,
the antiabortion protesters did, but the civil
rights protesters of the 1960s did not.
"If NOW went down to the Augusta
National Golf Club to tear up the greens and
said they wouldn't stop until the club
admitted a woman, they'd be violating the
Hobbs Act," Clayton argued.
Clayton seemed to win a measure of
sympathy from Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, who interrupted Englert to
remind him that "in some cases there were
assaults," so "to paint a picture that what
we're talking about is pure speech . . . that is
not the case."
Englert insisted throughout the argument
that his clients could not deny having broken
laws against trespassing and other offenses,
but that their actions did not rise to the level
of extortion because they had not actually
taken property.
Englert noted that "activists of all stripes"
were supporting his clients in friend-of-the-
court briefs, including such groups as People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, which
has staged aggressive protests at fast-food
restaurants, and School of the Americas
Watch, which has been involved in
demonstrations against U.S. foreign policy.
A decision in the cases, Scheidler v. NOW,
No. 01-1118, and Operation Rescue v.
NOW, No. 01-1119, which have been
consolidated, is expected by the end of June.
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House v. Bell
(04-8990)
Case Below: (House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668 (6th. Cir. 2004), cert. granted 125 S. Ct. 2991, 73
U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2005) (No. 04-8990)).
Paul Gregory House was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1985 murder. The case against
him was built on a great deal of circumstantial evidence. Forensic evidence and two apparent
confessions by the victim's husband now call that conviction into question. The District Court
rejected his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on procedural grounds. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed in an 8-7 vote. Six of the dissenters believed that House had proved his innocence. The
majority concluded that the case against House was still strong enough to prevent reaching the
conclusion that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in
light of the new evidence."
Questions Presented:
1) Did the majority below err in applying this Court's decision in Schlup v. Delo to hold that
Petitioner's compelling new evidence, though presenting at the very least a colorable claim of
actual innocence, was as a matter of law insufficient to excuse his failure to present that evidence
before the state courts-merely because he had failed to negate each and every item of
circumstantial evidence that had been offered against him at the original trial?
2) What constitutes a "truly persuasive showing of actual innocence" pursuant to Herrera v.
Collins sufficient to warrant freestanding habeas relief?
Paul Gregory HOUSE, Petitioner-Appellant,
V.
Ricky BELL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
Decided October 6, 2004
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted]
OPINION: neighbor, Carolyn Muncey, and sentenced
him to death.
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Paul House appeals from the This court granted a certificate of
district court's denial of a writ of habeas appealability as to all issues. However,
corpus, 28 U.S. C. § 2254. A Tennessee House has limited his brief to a discussion of
jury found House guilty of the murder of a only two claims: 1) Whether the manner in
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which the Tennessee courts applied the state
law doctrine of waiver during House's post-
conviction proceedings constitutes an
adequate and independent state procedural
bar to his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims; and 2) assuming that the Tennessee
courts properly deemed House's claims to be
waived, whether that waiver should be
excused on the grounds that House has
established his actual innocence under
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 130 L. Ed 2d
808, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995). After the
Tennessee Supreme Court declined a request
by an en banc panel of this court to answer
certified questions relating to issues of state
law, House v. Bell, 311 F.3d 767 (6th Cir.
2002), this court is again faced with the
same claims.
Having considered the arguments of the
parties regarding the two claims that are
before us, we affirm the district court's
denial of the writ for the reasons set forth
below.
I.
Because factual determinations by state
courts are entitled to a presumption of
correctness, 28 US.C. § 2254(e)(1), we will
describe the factual circumstances
surrounding the murder for which House
was convicted by quoting from the
Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion denying
him relief in his direct appeal:
The victim of the homicide was Mrs.
Carolyn Muncey, who lived with her
husband and two young children on
Ridgecrest Road in rural Union County,
Tennessee....
In March 1985 appellant Paul Gregory
House was released from a prison in Utah
and moved to the rural community in which
the Muncey family lived....
. . . He was shown to have had one prior
conviction for aggravated sexual assault, a
charge to which he pled guilty on March 16,
1981 in Salt Lake County, Utah. Apparently
he was placed on parole in that state, and
supervision of his parole was transferred to
Tennessee when he returned to this state.
He was approximately twenty-three years
old at the time of the homicide in this case.
Mrs. Muncey disappeared from her home in
the late evening of Saturday, July 13, 1985.
Her badly beaten body was found on the
following afternoon at about 3 p.m., lying
partially concealed in a brush pile about 100
yards from her home....
When the body of Mrs. Muncey was
discovered the next afternoon, she was
dressed in her nightgown, housecoat and
underclothing. Her body was badly bruised,
and there were abrasions and blood giving
every evidence that she had been in a fierce
struggle. Apparently a severe blow to her
left forehead had caused her death. It
appeared, however, that she had also been
partially strangled. A pathologist testified
that the blow to her left forehead caused a
concussion and hemorrhage to the right side
of the brain from which she died, probably
one or two hours after being struck. He
testified that she probably would have been
unconscious after having been struck. He
estimated the time of her death at between 9
p.m. to 11 p.m. on Saturday, July 13, but
emphasized that this was at best a rough
estimate.
Appellant never confessed to any part in the
homicide, and the testimony linking him to
it was circumstantial. There was evidence
showing that he knew Mr. and Mrs. Muncey
and had been with them socially on a few
occasions.. ..
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[Two witnesses saw appellant along the road
where the body was found. They later
became suspicious, returned to the sight, and
then found the body. Appellant originally
denied having left Turner's trailer at all that
night.]
* * *
On Sunday afternoon various witnesses
observed that appellant had numerous
scratches and bruises on his arms, hands and
body, there being an especially significant
bruise on the knuckle of his right ring finger.
Appellant explained that these injuries had
been sustained innocently earlier during the
week, but when Ms. Turner was called as a
witness, she said that she had not observed
them prior to the evening of July 13.
Appellant also told investigators that he was
wearing the same clothes on Sunday, July 14
as he had been wearing the previous
evening. It was later discovered, however,
that a pair of blue jeans which he had been
wearing on the night of the murder was
concealed in the bottom of the clothes
hamper at Ms. Turner's trailer. These
trousers were bloodstained, and scientific
evidence revealed that the stains were
human blood having characteristics
consistent with the blood of Mrs. Muncey
and inconsistent with appellant's own blood.
Scientific tests also showed that fibers from
these trousers were consistent with fibers
found on the clothing of the victim. There
were also found on her nightgown and
underclothing some spots of semen stain
from a male secretor of the same general
type as appellant.
Some of the most damaging evidence
against appellant was given by his girl
friend, Ms. Turner. She at first told
investigators that he had not left the trailer
during the course of the evening of July 13.
Later, however, she modified this testimony
to state that he had been in the trailer until
about 10:45 p.m. at which time he left to
take a walk. When he returned an hour or so
later, he was panting, hot and exhausted. He
was no longer wearing either his blue jersey
or his tennis shoes. The shoes were later
found in an area different from the place
where appellant told her he had lost them.
Appellant told Ms. Turner that he had
thrown away the navy blue tank top because
it had been torn when he was assaulted by
some persons who tried to kill him. It was
after the appellants return to the trailer that
Ms. Turner first noticed the bruises and
abrasions on his hands referred to
previously.
* * *
Although the evidence against appellant was
circumstantial, it was quite strong.
Particularly incriminating was the testimony
that he had emerged from an embankment
where the body was found, wiping his hands
on a dark cloth, without disclosing to anyone
the presence of the body. Damaging also
were the discovery of his bloodstained
trousers and the testimony of Ms. Turner,
which a trier of fact could have found
sufficient to demolish his alibi and to
demonstrate that he had been in a heavy
struggle near the time when the homicide
must have occurred. A classic case for
determination by a jury was presented, and
the evidence clearly is sufficient to support
the conviction.
Following the sentencing hearing, the jury
imposed the death penalty....
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II.
The first issue House has raised on appeal
involves his contention that both the
Tennessee courts and the district court erred
when they concluded that his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel were
procedurally barred.
[T]he district court was correct when it
determined that House's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims had been
procedurally defaulted [because they had not
been raised in a timely manner by petitioner
or his attorney.]
III.
We now turn to House's other claim. House
argues that even if his ineffective assistance
of counsel claims have been procedurally
defaulted, he has established his actual
innocence of the crime for which he was
convicted, a showing which, if made,
revives his ineffectiveness claims. In Schlup
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808,
115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), the Supreme Court
held that a petitioner must show either cause
and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice in
order to obtain habeas review of an
otherwise procedurally defaulted claim.
House seeks to invoke the miscarriage of
justice exception here. With respect to a
miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must
demonstrate that "a constitutional violation
has probably resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent of the crime."
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. . . . The Court
cautioned that this exception is rare and
should be applied only in the extraordinary
case, concluding that, "to establish the
requisite probability [that a petitioner is
actually innocent], the petitioner must show
that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him
in the light of the new evidence." Id., 513
US. at 327.
Because the district court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on this issue, there is
testimony about events beyond that which
was presented during the original trial.
House contends that this new evidence is
sufficient to establish his actual innocence.
We will summarize that evidence and the
district court's response to it before
explaining why, in our view, House has
failed to show that it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him.
House testified for the first time at the
evidentiary hearing. He offered this version
of the night of murder: "I went for a walk. I
got jumped, ran around, came back." He
went on to explain that the terrain was hilly
and that it was dark[.]
As the factual summary of the Tennessee
Supreme Court attests, [the more detailed]
version of events is relatively consistent
with the one presented by Donna Turner
during the trial. When asked why he
initially lied to investigators by telling them
he had not left the trailer at all, House
responded, "I was on parole. I didn't want to
draw attention to myself."
In short, House's testimony merely restates a
scenario presented to the jury that had
convicted him. Moreover, the district court,
which had the opportunity to assess House's
demeanor, found his testimony to be less
than credible.
During the evidentiary hearing, House
devoted considerable time to the trial
testimony of Billy Ray Hensley, the witness
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who saw House near the spot where the
body was discovered. Specifically, House
introduced maps and photographs in order to
show that Hensley could not have seen what
he purported to see from the place where he
claimed to have been.
On cross-examination, Hensley conceded
that he could not have seen House while he
was actually "down in the embankment."
He would have first seen him at the top of
the bank. Defense counsel also tried to
bring out some inconsistencies in Hensley's
statements concerning precisely when and
where he first saw House....
The exhibits introduced by House during the
evidentiary hearing were designed to show
that Hensley could not have seen House
coming up the embankment. However, even
if we accept House's contention that Hensley
could not have seen him until he emerged
onto the road, it is undisputed that House
was seen in the general vicinity of the body
carrying a black rag. Moreover, trial
counsel effectively cross-examined Hensley
regarding his inconsistent statements about
when and where he saw House. Thus, in our
view, House's attack on Hensley's testimony
advances his cause little, if at all.
In addition to presenting his own version of
events while attempting to cast doubt on the
accuracy of Hensley's testimony, House
takes aim at the physical evidence that
linked him to the crime.
* * *
[There was a great deal of evidence and
expert testimony suggesting that physical
evidence, particularly the victim's blood
samples and the appellant's blue jeans, had
been mishandled.] With respect to the
blood, the court determined:
Without question, one or more
tubes of Mrs. Muncey's blood
spilled at some time. It is likely
the spillage occurred prior to
the receipt of the evidence by
[the] laboratory hired by Mr.
House's trial attorney. Based
upon the evidence introduced
during the evidentiary hearing,
however, the court concludes
that the spillage occurred after
the FBI crime laboratory
received
evidence.
and tested the
. . . The enzyme deterioration,
as well as Mr. Muncey's alleged
confession and the blood
spillage, does not negate the
fact that Agent Scott saw what
appeared to be bloodstains on
Mr. House's blue jeans when
the jeans were removed from
the laundry hamper at Ms.
Turner's trailer and that the
blood was in fact from Mrs.
Muncey.
Memorandum Opinion, February 16, 2000,
at 45-46.
As indicated in the passage above, House
not only presented evidence to the district
court that undermined the case against him,
he also offered an alternative theory of the
crime: that Mr. Muncey killed his wife.
At the evidentiary hearing, House produced
witnesses who testified about Mr. Muncey's
alcoholism and also his physical abuse of his
wife. One acquaintance, Kathy Parker,
testified that "[Mrs. Muncey] was constantly
with black eyes and busted mouth." A
friend, Hazel Miller, testified that Mr.
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Muncey told her that he was going to get rid
of his wife a few months before her death.
In the district court, Mr. Muncey
acknowledged that he "smacked" his wife at
least once.
As for the day of the murder, Mr. Muncey
was supposed to have helped to dig a grave.
He had gone over to his father's place,
helped to work on some cars, and then dug
the grave. However, rather than go home,
he decided to attend the weekly dance at the
C & C Recreation Center, where, according
to his testimony, he stayed until midnight.
When he arrived home, he found his wife
missing.
Kathy Parker told the district court that Mr.
Muncey visited her on a Friday in 1985 after
the murder. Friends were sitting around
drinking when Mr. Muncey "started crying
and going on and rambling off." According
to Parker, he was "talking about what
happened to his wife and how it happened
and he didn't mean to do it, but I don't know
exactly what all was said." She went on,
"He said they had been into an argument and
he slapped her and she fell and hit her head
and it killed her and he didn't mean for it to
happen." According to Parker, Mr. Muncey
was drunk when he made this confession.
After hearing it, Parker claimed, "I freaked
out and run him off." The next day Parker's
mother took her to the courthouse to tell
someone about the confession. However,
she "never did really get to talk to anybody."
When the district court asked her about the
motivation behind her testimony in the
evidentiary hearing, she replied, "An
innocent man is in jail."
On cross-examination, Parker testified that
she had tried to come forward but no one
seemed interested. She had had seven or
eight beers on the night of the confession.
Parker's sister, Penny Letner, also testified
to having heard such a confession from
Little Hube. Once again, she recalled that
he was "pretty well blistered." According to
Letner, Mr. Muncey confessed to killing his
wife when he returned home[.] ...
Letner had not been drinking. She was
frightened by the talk and left the party. As
a young mother of 19, she testified that she
had been too scared to report the confession.
Based upon the statements of Letner and
Parker, House posits the following scenario:
When Mr. Muncey got home,
he and his wife resumed their
fight. He hit her at least once
and she fell. When he checked,
he found that he had killed her.
He took her body down by a
creek running near their home
and hid it with some brush and
branches.
Whether Mr. Muncey ever went
back to the dance is uncertain.
Constable Wallace, who was
providing security at the dance,
testified that he never saw Mr.
Muncey return after he left
around 10:30 p.m. Mr. Muncey
claimed during the hearing that
he never left the dance until it
broke up some two or more
hours later.
Petitioner's Brief at 33-34. House also
points out that Dennis Wallace did not think
that Mr. Muncey seemed upset when he
reported his wife's disappearance or when
the body was recovered. Also, the morning
after the murder, Mr. Muncey asked a
neighbor, Artie Lawson, to tell people that
he was at the dance. Since she had not
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attended it herself, Ms. Lawson declined.
Her daughter, Mary Atkins, testified that she
not only saw Little Hube at the dance, but
that she saw him hit his wife.
The district court discounted the testimony
of Letner and Parker, finding their testimony
lacking in credibility[.] . . . Instead, the
court credited the testimony of Laura
Muncey Tharp, the victim's daughter, who
testified at both the trial and evidentiary
hearing:
* * *
According to Ms. Tharp, her
parents got along fine. They
argued, but she did not recall
any physical pushing or hitting.
If they argued, she could hear
them if she was in her bedroom.
The family did not have air
conditioning in the home. She
did not hear any arguments that
night.
The court found Ms. Tharp a
very credible witness. She had
no reason to lie. Her testimony
during the evidentiary hearing
was consistent with her trial
testimony.
Memorandum Opinion, February 16, 2000,
at 12-13.
As the preceding recitation makes clear,
House has mounted a concerted attack on
his conviction. Indeed, it is fair to say that
he has presented a colorable claim of actual
innocence. However, as the Supreme Court
has made clear, that is not the standard that
we are bound to apply. To prevail, House
must do more than raise questions about the
reliability of portions of trial testimony or
the manner in which physical evidence was
handled or analyzed; he must show "that it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him in the light of the
new evidence." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
Moreover, in weighing the new evidence we
review the factual findings of the district
court for clear error. Campbell v. Coyle,
260 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2001).
The following facts that implicate House are
undisputed: he lied to investigators about
his whereabouts on the night of the murder;
he gave inconsistent versions of the origins
of the scratches and bruises on his hands and
arms; he was seen near where the body was
discovered on the day after the murder; he
lied about what he was wearing on the night
of the murder; blue jeans belonging to
House, spattered with blood mixed with
mud, were found at the bottom of Ms.
Turner's laundry hamper; House has a deep
voice and Laura Muncey testified that the
man who came to the trailer on the night of
the murder had a deep voice; and, according
to Ms. Sutton, the blood and mud found
together on House's blue jeans had been
mixed together, which "certainly eliminates
the possibility of any stains being created by
contamination in an evidence container."
We note that the fact that mud may not have
been present at the crime scene, and may
have been scarce in the surrounding area,
cannot be taken as proof that there was no
mud anywhere on the route between Ms.
Turner's trailer and the scene of the crime.
With respect to House's theory that Mr.
Muncey committed the murder, we defer to
the finding of the district court that Ms.
Letner and Ms. Parker, who allegedly heard
Mr. Muncey's confession, were not credible.
Furthermore, the content of Ms. Letner's
testimony, indicating that Mr. Muncey killed
his wife upon returning to the trailer, is
belied by the presence of the children in the
trailer, who heard no such confrontation, and
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the lack of any signs of a struggle. House's
theory that a deep laceration cutting across
Mrs. Muncey's head was caused when she
fell and hit her head is inconsistent with the
testimony of Dr. Carabia, who indicated that
the laceration could only have resulted from
a violent blow. The fact that Mr. Muncey
may have asked his neighbor to say that she
saw him at the dance during the time of the
murder is insufficient to tip the balance in
favor of House's theory.
Regarding House's attacks on the scientific
evidence that incriminated him, he has
succeeded in showing that the semen
attributed to him during the trial was that of
Mr. Muncey and that, at some point, the
blood evidence appears to have been
mishandled, resulting in spillage. However,
the fact that the semen found on the victim's
clothing came from her husband and not
from House does not contradict the evidence
that tends to demonstrate that he killed her
after journeying to her home and luring her
from her trailer, nor does the lack of any
physical evidence of sexual contact
contradict the notion that the murderer lured
Mrs. Muncey from her home with a sexual
motive. As for the mishandling of the blood
evidence, the theory that the blood on
House's jeans came from the vials of blood
gathered at Mrs. Muncey's autopsy is based
upon a speculative theory regarding enzyme
degradation that was contradicted by other
testimony in the record, and an analysis of
the blood stain pattern does not demonstrate
that the stains could not have resulted from
Mrs. Muncey's murder. The lack of any
blood spatter on House's shoes is
inconclusive as well, because it is not clear
when House took his shoes off. Finally, the
district court's conclusion that "the spillage
occurred after the FBI crime laboratory
received and tested the evidence" cannot be
characterized as clearly erroneous. The only
unchallenged blood evidence, the testimony
indicating that the blood and mud on
jeans were mixed, tends to support
conclusion that House committed
murder.
the
the
the
Despite his best efforts, the case against
House remains strong. We therefore
conclude that he has fallen short of showing,
as he must, that it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him in light of the new evidence.
IV.
All of the issues before us having been
decided, the judgment of the district court is
affirmed.
DISSENT:
MERRITT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I
regard this as the rare or extraordinary case
in which the petitioner through newly
discovered evidence has established his
actual innocence of both the death sentence
and underlying homicide. The Court's
opinion, like the Attorney General's
argument for the State, regards as
"undisputed" old evidence and inferences
that are now contradicted by other evidence
in the case. It fails to describe adequately
the persuasive case of actual innocence that
the petitioner's newly discovered evidence
raises. Nor does it adequately describe the
legal standards to be applied.
This dissent will first describe the
constitutional standards applicable in "actual
innocence" cases such as this one. There are
four actual innocence theories applicable in
this case based on the body of newly
discovered evidence presented at the federal
habeas hearing: (1) a "free-standing,"
substantive, so-called "Herrera" actual
innocence claim, (2) a procedural, or
"gateway," so-called "Schlup" actual
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innocence claim, (3) the more limited
"gateway" claim that the petitioner is
"actually innocent of the death penalty"
because the new body of evidence shows
that petitioner is not now eligible for the
death penalty because the rape aggravator
has been disproved, and (4) a free-standing,
substantive "actual innocent of the death
penalty" claim. It will then outline the
evidence in detail and apply the standards in
four parts, as follows:
First, at the state trial in Maynardville,
Union County, Tennessee, in 1986, and in
its argument to uphold the death verdict in
the Tennessee Supreme Court, the State
relied on rape as the motive for the
kidnapping and the murder of Carolyn
Muncey. There was no other motive
offered. It relied on a semen specimen on
her nightgown as proof that House tried to
rape her. Newly discovered DNA evidence
now conclusively establishes that the semen
was her husband's. There is now absolutely
no evidence of sexual assault. The new
evidence disproves the motive the jury
accepted as the basis for the kidnapping and
murder and the aggravating circumstances
the jury found as its basis for the death
penalty.
Second, besides the semen evidence, the
State introduced at the trial one other piece
of highly incriminating scientific evidence:
evidence of Carolyn Muncey's blood on
House's blue jeans worn on the night of the
murder. At the 1999 federal habeas hearing,
the State's case was undermined by the
State's own medical examiner, Dr. Cleland
Blake. As "Consultant in Forensic
Pathology" for the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation for 22 years, Dr. Blake has
testified for the prosecution in the past in
hundreds of cases. Four vials of blood were
extracted at the time Carolyn Muncey was
autopsied. Dr. Blake, the State's medical
examiner, testified at length that he had no
doubt that the blood on House's pants was
spilled from one of these four vials of blood
shipped to the lab by local law enforcement
agents-spilled either accidentally or
intentionally. There is no explanation
besides spillage for the fact that one of the
four vials of blood was empty. The new
body of evidence shows conclusively that
the vials of blood were not properly handled
and shipped by law enforcement and that the
blood that spilled from the vials cannot
otherwise be accounted for.
Third, testimony from five new witnesses
offered at the habeas hearing implicates Mr.
Muncey in his wife's murder. . . .
Fourth, the evidence completely undermines
the reliability of the testimony of Billy Ray
Hensley, the witness who said that on
Sunday afternoon before the victim's body
was found, he saw House coming up the
embankment on Ridgecrest Road where the
body was later found that day. Based on his
own testimony and an examination of the
record, it would have been impossible for
Hensley to see House as he claimed.
. . . Local law enforcement officials from the
Sheriffs office testified that immediately
after the murder they had two suspects,
House and the victim's husband, Hubert
Muncey, called "Little Hube." Mr. Muncey
grew up and was well-known in the local
community. Although "Little Hube" had a
history of severe domestic abuse, the local
police chose House as the murder suspect
when he told them two days after the body
was found that he had just recently moved
into the local Luttrell community and that he
had a sexual assault conviction in Utah and
after they had developed other incriminating
evidence.
In its opinion in 1987, affirming House's
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conviction, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
noted the semen evidence and rape as the
motive for the homicide. It noted that
House had "never confessed to any part in
the homicide, and the testimony linking him
to it was circumstantial." The Court also
observed that the Munceys "had been having
marital difficulties and that she had been
contemplating leaving him." The case
comes down to the question of whether the
newly discovered evidence undermining the
case against House and incriminating Mr.
Muncey is sufficiently strong-despite the
uncertainties that remain-to preclude a
rational juror from finding guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and to make the execution
of House "constitutionally intolerable."
1. Standards for Actual Innocence Claims
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 130 L. Ed. 2d
808, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), is the only
Supreme Court case that has discussed and
compared the standards to be applied in
three of the four different types of actual
innocence claims that may be asserted in
habeas: (1) "free standing," (2) "gateway"
and (3) "innocent of the death penalty"
gateway claims. There, in an opinion for six
members of the Court, Justice Stevens wrote
that it is "firmly established in our legal
system, that the line between innocence and
guilt is drawn with reference to a reasonable
doubt," and that "the analysis [of actual
innocence claims] must incorporate the
understanding that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt marks the boundary
between guilt and innocence." Id. at 328.
This starting point is a major factor for all
types of actual innocence claims. For such
claims, this factual analysis is always a
"probabilistic determination" about the
behavior of a reasonably instructed juror.
Id. at 329.
1. Gateway, Actual Innocence Claims.-In
Schlup, 513 US. at 316, the Court stated
that for substantive, free-standing claims
where the "conviction was the product of a
fair trial," the "evidence of innocence would
have had to be strong enough to make an
execution 'constitutionally intolerable."
Yet, when a claim of innocence is coupled
with an assertion of constitutional error at
trial, the "conviction may not be entitled to
the same degree of respect." Id. Thus, the
"evidence of innocence need carry less of a
burden." Id. In Schlup, as in House's
gateway claim in the instant case, the claim
of constitutional error at the original trial
was ineffective assistance of counsel; and
the actual innocence claim was used as a
"gateway" to overcome procedural default in
order to reinstate the ineffective assistance
claim and render it again cognizable. For
such gateway or procedural claims, the
Schlup opinion holds that a petitioner must
demonstrate that "it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have found
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. at 327.
2. Gateway Innocent of the Death Penalty
Claims.-The Court in Schlup discussed and
left intact the standard for claims of
"innocent of the death penalty" (claims that
the evidence of aggravating circumstances at
the sentencing phase of the case is
insufficient to render the defendant eligible
for the death penalty)-a standard
announced in the previous case of Sawyer v.
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269,
112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). In such "innocent of
the death penalty" claims governed by
Sawyer, the question is always whether the
petitioner's proof of innocence is sufficient
to overcome a procedural default and render
a defaulted constitutional claim again
cognizable. Quoting Sawyer, the Court said
that claims of actual innocence of the death
penalty at the sentencing phase "must focus
on those elements which render the
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defendant guilty of the death penalty" and
show "by clear and convincing evidence"
that "no reasonable juror would have found
the petitioner eligible for the death penalty"
beyond a reasonable doubt. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 323. This is the standard applicable
to the question of innocence of the rape-
homicide aggravator found by the jury at
House's trial. If found, it would make
House's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim at the penalty phase of the case
cognizable.
3. Free-standing Actual Innocence
Claims.-In Herrera v. Collins, 506 US.
390, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203, 113 S. Ct. 853
(1993), the Supreme Court did not spell out
a standard for free-standing substantive
claims of actual innocence in cases which
presuppose a fair trial. Instead, it merely
noted that the required "threshold showing"
would be "extraordinarily high." 506 U.S. at
417. In a concurring opinion, Justice White
sets out a very demanding standard:
. . . To be entitled to relief,
however, petitioner would at the
very least be required to show
that based on proffered newly
discovered evidence and the
entire record before the jury that
convicted him, "no rational
trier of fact could [find] proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. "
As laid out below, the White standard is
appropriate to apply in free-standing actual
innocence claims. Justice White's proposed
standard borrows language from Jackson, in
which the Court established the test
governing habeas review of claims of
insufficient evidence. In Jackson, the Court
found that due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment requires "that no
person shall be made to suffer the onus of a
criminal conviction except upon sufficient
proof-defined as evidence necessary to
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable
doubt of the existence of the element of the
offense," 443 US. at 316....
With free-standing actual innocence claims,
petitioners are not claiming that their trial
violated constitutional due process
requirements due to insufficient evidence.
Instead Herrera claims are to provide relief
to one who faces the death penalty and can
make a truly persuasive case of innocence.
In order to prevent what the Supreme Court
describes as "constitutionally intolerable,"
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316, courts must
consider newly discovered evidence in
addition to the trial record. The proof
established at the original trial must be
examined in light of what is newly proffered
to determine if all the available evidence
would support conviction. The White
standard is appropriate for use in free-
standing actual innocence cases as it is a
very high standard that will only be met in
exceptional cases where new evidence has
unquestionably undermined the case against
the petitioner. It also forces courts to make
an objective determination regarding what a
fact finder could find rather than what a
hypothetical juror would find.
Utilizing Justice White's standard would
permit courts to adequately address the rare
case of actual innocence without becoming
bogged down by non-meritorious claims.
Justice O'Connor in Herrera noted the
Court's concern that if the standard for free-
standing actual innocence cases is set too
low, "federal courts will be deluged with
frivolous claims of actual innocence." 506
U.S. at 426 (O'Connor, J., concurring)....
The inquiry as to whether any rational juror
could convict also seeks to make the
determination of actual innocence more
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objective. As the Supreme Court wrote,
describing the standard, "the use of the word
'could' focuses the inquiry on the power of
the trier of fact to reach its conclusion,"
whereas "the use of the word 'would' focuses
the inquiry on the likely behavior of the trier
of fact." Id. Whether a rational fact finder
would have the ability to convict the
petitioner in light of all available, reliable,
and relevant evidence "requires a binary
response." Id. Either the evidence is
sufficient to support the conviction or it is
not. The analysis thus interferes with the
original trial determination only to the extent
necessary to ensure that a prisoner is not
executed when the available evidence
cannot support his conviction. This Court
should adopt Justice White's standard from
Herrera, and the writ should issue if in light
of newly discovered evidence, no rational
trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
4. Free-standing Innocent of the Death
Penalty Claims.-Although not discussed in
Schlup or other cases, for cases raising a
substantive, non-gateway claim that the
condemned prisoner is not eligible for the
death penalty at sentencing, the standard
should be the same as the White standard.
The petitioner must demonstrate no rational
fact finder examining the trial record and the
new evidence could impose the death
penalty. If he can disprove the aggravator
for which he was sentenced to death, it is
plainly unconstitutional for the sentence to
stand.
In my view ... the petitioner has carried his
burden of proof on all four theories. He has
clearly shown both that a reasonable juror
would have a substantive and serious doubt
as to his guilt and that the cumulative
evidence is insufficient to enable a rational
juror to convict House or sentence him to
death for the murder of Carolyn Muncey.
* * *
VI. Conclusion
Justice Scalia has referred to the question
before us of actual innocence as death
penalty's most "embarrassing question," a
question he hoped "with any luck we [the
Supreme Court] shall avoid ever having to
face" in a "convincing" case. Herrera v.
Collins, 506 US. at 428. Justice O'Connor
has referred to this "embarrassing question"
as a serious current problem: "If statistics
are any indication, the system may well be
allowing some innocent defendants to be
executed." Speech to Women Lawyers in
Minnesota, July 2, 2001.
This case and the few empirical studies that
we have reinforce Justice O'Connor's view
that the system is allowing some innocent
defendants to be executed.
High on the list of the causes for mistakes
are the kinds of errors we see in this case:
the misinterpretation or abuse of scientific
evidence, the adverse inferences drawn from
the prior record of a defendant, particularly
one who is a stranger in the local
community, the failure of counsel to
uncover (until it is too late) witnesses who
could exonerate the defendant, and the
existence of one or more other suspects with
a motive to commit the offense. Once the
initial trial and appeal have occurred, it is
clear from the studies that the state, and its
officials who have prosecuted, sentenced
and reviewed the case, are inclined to
persevere in the belief that the state was
right all along. They tend to close ranks and
resist admission of error. Intelligent citizens
who strongly believe in the reliability of the
capital sanction are also inclined to
persevere in the belief that a case raising the
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"embarrassing question" will never really
arise and close ranks with the state in
resisting the admission of error. This case is
a good example of how these errors can lead
to the execution of a defendant who is
actually innocent.
[Judge Ronald Gilman wrote a separate
dissent. Gilman believed that the evidence
presented a close case. While agreeing with
Judge Merritt's opinion that House had
passed through the Schlup "actually
innocence" gateway, Gilman did not believe
that the proof in favor of House was so
strong that an unconditional writ of habeas
corpus should be issued. Gilman instead
urged the issuance of a conditional writ that
would free House unless he were provided a
new trial by the state.]
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"Justices to Review Rules
for Death Case Appeals"
New York Times
June 29, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court on Tuesday accepted an
appeal from a Tennessee death row inmate
who contends that DNA evidence proves his
innocence of the murder for which he was
convicted and sentenced to death 20 years
ago.
The case will provide the court's first
occasion, in the years since exonerations
based on DNA have become widespread, to
reconsider the standards for reopening death
penalty cases to present claims of innocence.
Those standards, developed by the court in a
series of cases in the early 1990's, are nearly
impossible to meet.
The court's action on Tuesday came a day
after the formal conclusion of the 2004-2005
term. The justices granted review in three
new cases to be argued in the next term,
which begins Oct. 3, while turning down
several cases that might have given them an
opportunity to elaborate on their two
decisions on Monday about government
displays of the Ten Commandments.
The justices were not actually on the bench,
and there was no word of Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist's possible retirement
plans.
The Tennessee inmate, Paul Gregory House,
came within one vote of persuading a federal
appeals court to reopen his case last October
when the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, denied his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a vote
of 8 to 7. Of the seven dissenters, six
concluded that he had proved his innocence,
while the remaining judge said Mr. House
was entitled, at least, to a new trial.
His Supreme Court appeal, filed by the
federal defender's office in Knoxville, Tenn.,
is supported by a brief filed by the Innocence
Project, a legal clinic in New York that has
been a leader in the effort to use DNA
evidence to challenge findings of guilt. Its
brief said that the project's methods had
proved the innocence of 155 people, in part
by using DNA to refute seemingly airtight
scientific evidence that the prosecution used
to persuade the jury.
In Mr. House's case, the prosecution had
claimed to the jury, based on blood typing,
that semen stains found on the clothing of the
murder victim were his. But DNA testing 15
years later showed that the stain was not Mr.
House's semen but that of the victim's
husband.
Since the prosecution's theory of the case was
that Mr. House, a previously convicted sex
offender, had murdered the victim after raping
her, the new evidence shows that he was
wrongly convicted, his lawyers maintain. In
addition, the prosecution presented the
evidence of rape as the "aggravating factor"
for the jury to consider in deciding whether to
sentence Mr. House to death.
Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, one of the dissenting
judges on the Sixth Circuit, said in his opinion
that "without any evidence of rape, the state
has lost its motive, its theory of the case and
the aggravating circumstance on which the
state and the jury relied for its death verdict."
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The majority, however, concluded that the
fact that Mr. House did not rape the victim, a
neighbor named Carolyn Muncey, did not
prove that he did not murder her, and that the
case against him remained strong. "We
therefore conclude that he has fallen short of
showing, as he must, that it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him in light of the new evidence,"
the majority said in an opinion by Judge Alan
E. Norris.
All eight of the judges in the majority were
appointed by Republican presidents, while all
seven of the dissenting judges were appointed
by Democrats.
Mr. House's Supreme Court appeal, House v.
Bell, No. 04-8990, argues that the split on the
appeals court mirrors general confusion
among the federal appeals courts over how to
evaluate similar claims of innocence on the
basis of newly discovered evidence.
The. Supreme Court's precedents set a high
procedural threshold for presenting claims in
federal court that were never made during the
course of state court appeals. Under a 1995
decision, Schlup v. Delo, inmates seeking
federal court review in such a circumstance
must pass through a procedural "gateway" by
establishing that the federal court's failure to
hear the case would be a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice." Such an exception to
the usual procedural barriers should be "rare"
and confined to an "extraordinary case," the
court said.
Mr. House's lawyers argue that the justices
should clarify that in deciding whether this
standard has been met, and that a court should
look at the evidence from the perspective of
the jury and ask whether a juror, confronted
with the new evidence, would have
reasonable doubt about the verdict even if the
new evidence did not completely dismantle
the prosecution's case.
The Innocence Project's brief argues that
objective scientific proof like DNA evidence
should be given extra weight, especially when
it refutes a "false fact" the prosecution has
previously presented to jurors.
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"Execution May Occur Despite Votes of 7 Judges"
New York Times
October 7, 2004
Adam Liptak
"We are faced," Judge Ronald Lee Gilman
wrote, dissenting in a death penalty case
yesterday, "with a real-life murder mystery,
an authentic 'who-done-it' where the wrong
man may be executed."
But Judge Gilman was the only one of 15
judges of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, who
thought the case presented anything like a
close question.
Eight other judges said the defendant, Paul
Gregory House, should be executed. Six
said he was not guilty and should be freed
immediately. The vote, with Judge Gilman
alone saying that Mr. House merely
deserves a new trial, was 8 to 7. Unless the
Supreme Court intervenes or Mr. House dies
first from the multiple sclerosis he has, he
will be executed.
Closely divided appeals court decisions are
common. But judges tend to differ on
questions of law. Yesterday's decision,
which turned on sharply divergent
interpretations of the same evidence where a
man's life is at stake, was quite unusual.
"This is unprecedented," said Eric M.
Freedman, a law professor at Hofstra
University. "A case in which six judges find
that the defendant didn't do the crime is
more than just a legal curiosity. In any
rational legal universe, there is now at least
reasonable doubt about the defendant's
guilt."
Mr. House was convicted of murdering a
neighbor, Carolyn Muncey, in Union
County, Tenn,, in 1985. The prosecution
argued that he had first raped her, saying
that semen found on her clothing matched.
his blood type. The jury cited the rape as a
reason for imposing death.
But DNA testing, which was not available at
the time, has proved that the semen was that
of Mrs. Muncey's husband, Hubert.
At a recent Federal District Court hearing to
determine whether Mr. House should be
allowed to reopen his case, witnesses
testified that Mr. Muncey was an alcoholic
who beat his wife. Two witnesses said he
had confessed to killing his wife while
drunk. A third witness said he had asked her
to supply him with an alibi for the murder.
Three others also implicated Mr. Muncey,
who denied the accusations.
The judges in the majority discounted all of
this.
"The lack of any physical evidence of sexual
contact," Judge Alan E. Norris wrote for the
majority, does not "contradict the notion that
the murderer lured Mrs. Muncey from her
home with a sexual motive."
The witnesses who said they had heard Mr.
Muncey's confession were not credible, the
majority said, because they had not come
forward until recently. And the testimony of
the witness who said Mr. Muncey had asked
her to provide him with an alibi was
"insufficient to tip the balance in favor of
House's theory," Judge Norris wrote.
Six dissenting judges took a different view.
438
"Without any evidence of rape," Judge
Gilbert S. Merritt wrote for that group, "the
state has lost its motive, its theory of the
case and the aggravating circumstance on
which the state and the jury relied for his
death verdict."
"There is no reasonable basis," Judge
Merritt continued, "for disbelieving the six
witnesses who now incriminate Mr. Muncey
as the perpetrator of the crime."
this."
A spokeswoman for the Tennessee attorney
general declined to comment.
The court divided yesterday along strictly
political lines. Every judge in the majority
was appointed by a Republican president,
including four appointed by President Bush
in the last two years. Every dissenting
judge, including Judge Gilman, was
appointed by a Democratic president.
"House has
that he is
wrongdoing
concluded.
released."
shown that is highly probable
completely innocent of any
whatever," Judge Merritt
"House should be immediately
Stephen M. Kissinger, a lawyer for Mr.
House, said his client would ask the
Supreme Court to hear an appeal. He said
he was optimistic.
"I've practiced law for 20 years," Mr.
Kissinger said, "and this is far and away the
best innocence claim I've ever seen." He
added that he had gained acquittals for
people "who had claims half as good as
Only Judge Gilman found the
excruciatingly difficult.
case
"Was Carolyn Muncey killed by her down-
the-road neighbor Paul House, or by her
husband, Hubert Muncey?" Judge Gilman
asked. "At the end of the day, I am in grave
doubt."
He said that doubt required at least a new
trial.
"Under the circumstances where we face the
execution of a man," he wrote, "I believe
that our system of justice demands no less."
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"Did He Kill Her? Doubts, Denial and a Death Penalty Case"
The Tennessean
October 17, 2004
Dwight Lewis
It was a question I had to ask the bearded
man:
"Did you kill Carolyn Muncey?"
"No," answered Paul Gregory House.
"Never even thought about it. Had no
reason to. She was a nice person."
Then I asked him: "You've been locked up
since July 1985. How does it feel being
incarcerated for a crime that you and some
others say you didn't commit?"
"It really doesn't feel good," House, a 42-
year-old state death row inmate replied. "It
makes me quite angry, in fact."
I had taken a trip to the state's Riverbend
Maximum Security Prison in west Nashville
Wednesday to interview the condemned
prisoner who was convicted in 1986 of
murdering Carolyn Muncey, a wife and
mother, in Union County.
Before Wednesday, I had never met House
but wrote a column in this space last Sunday
saying he was still on death row despite the
fact that six of the 15 judges on the U.S. 6th
Circuit Court of Appeals said House is not
guilty of Carolyn Muncey's murder and
should be freed immediately. A seventh
judge on the court of appeals said in a
dissenting opinion that House should at least
have a new trial.
"I would like to be set free, but I would
accept a new trial," House told me as he sat
in a wheelchair in a visiting room in
Riverbend's infirmary. House suffers from
multiple sclerosis and cannot walk on his
own. His attorney, federal public defender
Stephen M. Kissinger of Knoxville, has said
he is afraid House won't live long enough to
see his case appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
"They have found so much stuff over the
years that makes you wonder what are all
those Republicans on the 6th Circuit Court
of Appeals thinking about," House added.
He was referring to the fact that the eight
judges on the Sixth Circuit who voted to
uphold his death penalty were all appointed
by Republican presidents.
Since House's conviction in 1986 for
Muncey's 1985 murder, which he was
accused of committing during an attempted
rape, DNA has shown that the semen
evidence used to help convict House was
really that of her husband, Hubert Muncey.
The physical evidence of blood tying House
to Carolyn Muncey's murder has also been
rebutted.
"It's been like hell," House said, referring to
his almost 20 years in Tennessee's prison
system.
As I sat talking to House, I couldn't help but
think about another death row case on which
I had reported back in 1978. It was the case
of inmate Richard Austin. Then-Tennessean
editor John Seigenthaler had gotten word
that Austin, a professional pool shark out of
Memphis, might not be guilty of the heinous
crime of hiring a "hit man" to murder a
police informant. As a result, Seigenthaler
asked me and the late Tennessean reporter
Nat Caldwell to look into the case.
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Upon doing so, we discovered that Austin's
lawyer, Robert 1. Livingston, despite his
client's claim of innocence, refused to call
the actual trigger man, Jack Charles
Blankenship, as a witness during Austin's
trial.
In an interview in July 1978, Blankenship
told Caldwell and me that he told Livingston
before the trial that Austin was not in any
way involved in the murder.
Blankenship was allowed by prosecutors in
the case to plead guilty to the murder of
Julian Watkins, in which he was hired for
$1,000. He was sentenced to life.
In 1997, the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned Austin's original
sentence and ordered that he receive a new
trial. A second jury imposed the death
sentence once again and Austin, now 65,
remains on Tennessee's death row.
Why can't Paul Gregory House at least get a
new trial in light of the new evidence
showing that he did not murder Carolyn
Muncey? Surely, state officials wouldn't
want to see any innocent man executed.
"The new evidence discloses that Mr.
Muncey, with a flood of tears, confessed to
two women friends after the murder that he
had killed his wife," U.S. 6th Circuit Court
of Appeals Judge Gilbert Merritt of
Nashville wrote in a dissenting opinion in
House's appeals case. "He told a third
woman that he was going to 'get rid' of
Carolyn a few weeks before the murder.
"He asked a fourth woman to provide him
with an alibi on the night of the murder and
gave testimony about his whereabouts that
night at the time of the murder that has now
been contradicted by a local law
enforcement officer. The state offered no
evidence that any of these witnesses was
biased in favor of House or prejudiced
against Mr. Muncey."
Merritt later added in his opinion: "The case
comes down to the question of whether the
newly discovered evidence undermining the
case against House and incriminating Mr.
Muncey is sufficiently strong-despite the
uncertainties that remain-to preclude a
rational juror from finding guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and to make the execution
of House 'constitutionally intolerable.'"
"Mr. House, let me ask you again, did you
kill Carolyn Muncey?" I said.
"No, I did not," he answered Wednesday. "I
am just a poor, innocent man sitting on
death row."
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Oregon v. Guzek
(04-928)
Ruling Below: (Oregon v. Guzek, 336 Ore. 424, 86 P.3d 1106 (2004), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
1929, 161 L.Ed. 2d 772, 73 U.S.L.W. 3630 (U.S. Apr. 25, 2005) (No. 04-928)).
Randy Guzek was convicted along with two others in a 1987 robbery and double murder. He has
been convicted three times for the crime and three times sentenced to death. The first two death
sentences were vacated for reasons explained more fully in the opinion below. During his third
sentencing phase, Guzek sought to introduce evidence of an alibi covering the time of the
murders. The Oregon Supreme Court vacated the third death sentence because the trial court
erred in its instructions to the jury on sentencing options. In giving guidance for remand, the
state court instructed that the alibi evidence is admissible in mitigation under Or. Rev. Stat. §
163.150(1) and the Eighth Amendment. Guzek filed a petition for certiorari seeking to overturn
Oregon's death penalty. That petition was rejected. The United States Supreme Court will
consider Oregon's separate petition regarding the presentation of alibi evidence.
Question Presented: Does a capital defendant have a right under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution to offer evidence and argument in the penalty
phase that would allow the jury to consider residual or lingering doubt from the guilt phase?
STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff on Review,
V.
RANDY LEE GUZEK, Defendant on Review.
Supreme Court of Oregon
Decided March 4, 2004
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted]
OPINION:
RIGGS, J.
This case is before us on automatic and
direct review of a judgment that imposed a
sentence of death for aggravated murder.
This court previously affirmed defendant's
conviction of two counts of aggravated
murder, State v. Guzek, 310 Ore. 299, 304,
797 P.2d 1031 (1990) (Guzek 1), but twice
vacated his sentence of death and remanded
for further penalty-phase proceedings, as
discussed below. On this third review, the
state concedes-and we agree-that the trial
court erred in failing to instruct the jury on
the "true-life" sentencing option and that this
court again must vacate the sentence of
death. Accordingly, as discussed further
below, we vacate the sentence of death and
remand to the trial court for further
proceedings. In the discussion that follows,
we also address issues of law that are likely
to arise on retrial, if the state again pursues a
death sentence. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 310
Ore. 1, 21-22, 791 P.2d 836 (1990) (court
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addressed issues likely to arise on remand
despite already having determined that
remand was necessary).
I. FACTS
The following facts are taken from this
court's opinion in Guzek , 310 Ore. at 301-
02, and from the record from defendants
third penalty-phase proceeding. The
victims, Rod and Lois Houser, knew
defendant because he had been a high school
acquaintance of their niece, who lived with
them in rural Deschutes County. Defendant
and the niece had dated. After the niece
ended their relationship, defendant acted
with hostility toward her-in her words,
"stalking" her-prompting Rod Houser to
warn defendant away from the Housers'
home.
In June 1987, defendant and two associates
planned to burglarize a particular residence
and kill its occupant. When the three men
arrived at that residence, however, they were
thwarted by the presence of too many
people. One of defendant's associates
suggested that they target the Housers' home
instead. The three men then went to
defendant's home, obtained a rifle and a
pistol, and went to the Housers' home with
the intention of killing the Housers and
stealing their property.
When Rod Houser answered defendant's
knock at the door, one of defendant's
associates, at defendant's prompting, shot
Rod Houser repeatedly, killing him.
Defendant then found and shot Lois Houser
three times, killing her. The three men then
ransacked the home and stole a great deal of
personal property. The Housers' niece was
not at home at the time.
The Housers' two daughters went to their
parents' home two days later, worried
because they had not been able to reach their
parents by telephone. The daughters
discovered their parents' bodies inside the
ransacked home. Later, the daughters saw
and identified their parents' belongings in
defendant's possession. As noted, defendant
ultimately was convicted of two counts of
aggravated murder and sentenced to death.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Beginning with defendant's first appeal, we
describe the procedural history of this case
in some detail, because that history provides
important background information for much
of the discussion that follows. First, we note
that, after defendant's first penalty-phase
trial, in an unrelated case on remand from
the United States Supreme Court, this court
concluded that the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires that a
penalty-phase jury consider and answer a
general mitigation question, to ensure that
the jury has the opportunity to give effect to
any mitigating evidence relevant "outside or
beyond" particular statutory issues
submitted to the jury. State v. Wagner, 309
Ore. 5, 13, 786 P.2d 93, cert den, 498 US
879, 112 L. Ed. 2d 171, 111 S. Ct. 212
(1990) (Wagner II). Because the court in
defendant's case had not submitted a general
mitigation question to the jury, this court
vacated defendant's sentence and remanded
the case for a new penalty-phase proceeding.
Guzek , 310 Ore. at 3 05-06.
The next year, another decision of the
United States Supreme Court again affected
defendant's penalty-phase proceedings.
According to the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment in effect at the time of
defendant's crimes, the introduction of
"victim-impact" evidence in the penalty
phase of a capital trial constituted cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. See Booth v. Maryland, 482
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U.S. 496, 509, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d
440, rehearing den, 483 US 1056, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 820, 108 S. Ct. 31 (1987) (so
holding). However, in 1991, the Supreme
Court overruled Booth in part, concluding
that that decision had "deprived the State of
the full moral force of its evidence" in a
death-penalty case. Payne v. Tennessee, 501
US. 808, 825, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed.
2d 720, rehearing den, 501 US. 1277, 115
L. Ed 2d 1110, 112 S. Ct. 28 (1991). The
Supreme Court held in Payne that the Eighth
Amendment did not erect a per se bar to
victim-impact evidence. Id. at 827. In the
wake of Payne, the state offered, and the
trial court admitted, victim-impact evidence
against defendant in his second penalty-
phase proceeding. Defendant again received
a sentence of death,
On review of that second death sentence,
defendant argued that the victim-impact
evidence that the state had introduced
against him was not relevant to any of the
questions that the jury was required to
consider under the applicable death-penalty
statutory scheme, ORS 163.150(I)(b)
(1989). This court agreed and remanded the
case for further proceedings. State v. Guzek,
322 Ore. 245, 270, 906 P.2d 272 (1995)
(Guzek Il).
After a third penalty-phase proceeding,
defendant again was sentenced to death.
That sentence is before us now.
III. TRUE-LIFE SENTENCING OPTION
In his third penalty-phase proceeding,
defendant moved to have the trial court
instruct the jury on the true-life sentencing
option. To that end, he expressly waived all
ex post facto guarantees that otherwise
would have protected him from retroactive
application of the true-life option. The trial
court denied defendant's motion and did not
instruct the jury regarding true life.
After a jury again sentenced defendant to
death, this court explained that a criminal
defendant may waive protection from ex
post facto laws, including the protection
against the application of a later-enacted
version of the death-penalty statutory
scheme. State v. McDonnell, 329 Ore. 375,
388, 987 P.2d 486 (1999).... Accordingly,
as the state recognizes, the trial court's
decision not to instruct the jury regarding
the true-life sentencing option was
reversible error. We therefore must vacate
defendant's sentence of death and remand
for further proceedings.
IV. ISSUES LIKELY TO
REMAND
ARISE ON
Defendant raises other issues on review.
Below, we address some of those issues,
which are likely to arise on remand.
Specifically, we address . . . the
admissibility of certain evidence that the
trial court excluded during defendant's third
penalty-phase proceeding that defendant
again might offer in a subsequent penalty-
phase proceeding.
* * *
[A. The prohibition against ex post facto
laws contained in Article , section 21, of the
Oregon Constitution precludes the
admission on remand of "any aggravating
evidence" against defendant under current
versions of Oregon statute. The victims'
"right to be heard" under Article I, section
42, of the Oregon Constitution supersedes
any protection afforded defendant under
Article I, section 21.
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B. If evidence is offered in the penalty
phase to impeach the testimony of state
witnesses, the trial court must determine
whether that evidence has a nonhearsay
purpose. If so, it cannot be excluded on the
basis of the hearsay rule alone.]
C. Exclusion of Alibi Evidence
We now turn to defendant's argument that
the trial court erred in excluding his alibi
evidence during his third penalty-phase
proceeding.
According to the state's case, the Housers
were murdered in the early morning hours of
June 28, 1987. At his third penalty-phase
proceeding, defendant sought the admission
of two items of evidence that tended to show
that he could not have been at the Housers'
home at that time: (1) the transcript of
defendant's grandfather's testimony,
admitted during the guilt phase, that
defendant had been with him from 9:00 p.m.
on June 28 until 2:00 a.m. on June 29, 1987;
and (2) the testimony of defendant's mother
that defendant had been at her home from
shortly after 2:00 a.m. on the morning of
June 29, 1987, and that, when she awoke at
4:20 a.m. on the same day, defendant was
sleeping on a loveseat at her house. The
trial court excluded that evidence,
apparently on relevance grounds.
On review, defendant argues that the trial
court erred in excluding that evidence
because it was "mitigating evidence"
relevant to the fourth question under ORS
163.150(1)(b), that is, "whether the
defendant should receive a death sentence."
ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). The state responds
that the trial court properly excluded that
evidence because alibi evidence, by
definition, is relevant to only a defendant's
guilt of the crime charged and, therefore, is
not relevant to sentencing.
Because the analysis of their relevance is
different, we address separately the two
different types of alibi evidence that
defendant sought to present to the jury. The
transcript of defendant's grandfather's
testimony-like the transcript of any other
witness's testimony-was relevant and
subject to consideration in the penalty phase,
regardless of its substance, because it was
"previously offered and received" during the
trial on the issue of guilt. ORS
163.150(1)(a); see also ORS 138.012(2)(b)
(if reviewing court vacates death penalty,
transcript of all testimony, all exhibits, and
other evidence properly admitted in prior
guilt and penalty-phase proceedings deemed
admissible in remanded penalty-phase
proceeding). The trial court therefore erred
in sustaining the state's objection to
admission of that evidence.
We turn to the question of the relevance of
defendant's remaining alibi evidence-
specifically, his mother's testimony. The
state begins its argument with the
unassailable premise that capital penalty-
phase proceedings occur only if a jury has
found a defendant guilty of the substantive
offense. From that, the state urges that we
infer that evidence of innocence is irrelevant
to the penalty-phase proceeding. However,
as is clear from this court's case law, as well
as decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, the question of relevance of a capital
defendant's proffered evidence in a penalty-
phase proceeding is not that simple. Its
relevance is, instead, a matter of statutory
construction in the context of federal
constitutional requirements. . ..
We begin by setting out the relevant parts of
the death-penalty statutory scheme. ORS
163.150(1) (a) provides, in part:
"In the [penalty-phase]
proceeding, evidence may be
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presented as to any matter that
the court deems relevant to
sentence including, but not
limited to, * * * mitigating
evidence relevant to the issue in
paragraph (b)(D) of this
subsection[]"
(Emphasis added.) ORS 163.150(1)(b)
provides, in part:
"Upon the conclusion of the
presentation of the evidence, the
court shall submit the following
issues to the jury:
"(D) Whether the defendant
should receive a death
sentence."
The jury instructions accompanying
163.150(1)(b) are set out in
163.150(1)(c), which provides:
"(A) The court shall instruct the
jury to consider, in determining
the issues in paragraph (b) of
this subsection, any mitigating
circumstances offered in
evidence, including but not
limited to the defendant's age,
the extent and severity of the
defendant's prior criminal
conduct and the extent of the
mental and emotional pressure
under which the defendant was
acting at the time the offense
was committed.
"(B) The court shall instruct the
jury to answer the question in
paragraph (b)(D) of this
subsection 'no' if, after
considering any aggravating
ORS
ORS
evidence and any mitigating
evidence concerning any aspect
of the defendant's character or
background, or any
circumstances of the offense and
any victim impact evidence as
described in paragraph (a) of
this subsection, one or more of
the jurors believe that the
defendant should not receive a
death sentence."
(Emphasis added.)
Our task here is to determine whether
defendant's proffered evidence constitutes
"mitigating evidence" that is "relevant" to
the question set out in ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D), that is, "whether
defendant should receive a death sentence.".
At the outset, we note that the wording of
ORS 163.150(1) (c) (B)-instructing the jury
to consider "any" mitigating evidence
concerning "any" aspect of the defendant's
character or background, or "any"
circumstances of the offense-suggests, on
its face, that the statutory category of
"mitigating evidence" is quite broad and,
possibly, unlimited. It likely would follow
under such a reading that defendant's
mother's testimony would qualify as
"mitigating evidence" under the statutory
provisions, because it arguably relates to
circumstances surrounding the offense that
mitigate in defendant's favor (that is,
defendant's argument that he had not been
involved in the crime).
However, we must read the applicable text
in its proper context, PGE, 317 Ore. at 611,
which, here, most notably includes earlier
versions of the statutory scheme and its
development through successive
legislatures. As this court has explained
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before (and as discussed further below),
ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was enacted in 1989
and originally provided:
"If constitutionally required,
considering the extent to which
the defendant's character and
background, and the
circumstance of the offense may
reduce the defendant's moral
culpability or blameworthiness
for the crime, whether a
sentence of death be imposed."
Or Laws 1989, ch 790, § 135b (emphasis
added). Also in 1989, the legislature created
a statutory jury instruction pertaining to all
four questions set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b),
now set out at ORS 163.150(1)(c)(A).
In 1991, the legislature amended ORS
163.1-50(1)(b)(D) to reflect its current
wording, that is. "whether the defendant
should receive a death sentence." Or Laws
1991, ch 885, § 2. Also in 1991, the
legislature enacted the jury instruction
specifically accompanying ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D), set out as ORS
163. 150(1)(c)(B), in the following form:
"In determining the issue in
subparagraph (D) of paragraph
(b) of this subsection, the court
shall instruct the jury to answer
the question 'no' if one or more
of the jurors find there is any
aspect of the defendant's
character or background, or any
circumstances of the offense,
that one or more of the jurors
believe would justify a sentence
less than death."
Or Laws 1991, ch 885, § 2.
* * *
Turning to the original version of ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D), the above-emphasized
phrase, "if constitutionally required,"
clarified that the requirement that a trial
court instruct a jury respecting consideration
of relevant evidence admitted under that
statutory provision hinged on whether a
constitutional provision required
consideration of the evidence. The case law
construing ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) clearly
explains the constitutional source at issue, as
well as the intended scope of relevant
"mitigating evidence" under the statutory
scheme in its current form, as discussed
below.
In State v. Stevens, 319 Ore. 573, 580-82,
879 P.2d 162 (1994), this court reviewed the
legislative history of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D),
from its enactment in 1989 through its
amendment in 1991. In short, the court
explained that the legislature originally had
enacted that statute in light of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S. Ct.
2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989), which had
invalidated a three-question statutory death-
penalty scheme on the ground that it did not
allow the jury to consider fully the effect of
the defendant's mitigating evidence
regarding his diminished mental capacity.
Stevens, 319 Ore. at 580-81. More
specifically, in Penry, the Court held that,
under the Eighth Amendment, a jury "must
be able to consider and give effect to any
mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's
background and character or the crime."
Stevens, 319 Ore. at 581 (quoting Penry,
492 U.S. at 328).
The court in Stevens further explained that,
shortly after the legislature enacted ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D) in 1989, this court held in
Wagner II, 309 Ore. at 18-19, that that
statute did not satisfy the Eighth Amendment
directive set out in Penry. Wagner II, 309
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Ore. at 18-19. Consequently, the legislature
in 1991 amended ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) to
its present form (that is, "whether the
defendant should receive a death sentence")
and enacted the corresponding jury
instruction set out in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B).
Stevens, 319 Ore. at 581-82. The court in
Stevens specifically noted that, in amending
ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) in 1991, the
legislature intended to codify-and indeed
precisely adopted-this court's proffered
wording from Wagner II. Stevens, 319 Ore.
at 582.
After reviewing the development of ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D) through its 1991
amendment, the legislative history of that
statute, the Supreme Court's decision in
Penry, and this court's decision in Wagner
11, this court in Stevens concluded:
"The passage of the original
fourth question after Penry and
the modification of that
question following Wagner II
make it clear that the legislature
intended the scope of the
statutory fourth question to be
co-extensive with the scope of
the fourth question held in
Penry and Wagner II to satisfy
the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
Accordingly, cases dealing with
the Eighth Amendment fourth
question and with the evidence
relevant to that question inform
our inquiry as to the scope of
the evidence that is relevant
under the statute."
319 Ore. at 582-83 (emphasis added). See
also Guzek II, 322 Ore. at 258 (citing
Stevens for proposition that, in enacting
fourth question, legislature was "attempting
to bring Oregon's death penalty scheme in
compliance with Penry"). The court in
Stevens then went on to examine Supreme
Court decisions that discussed the phrase
"mitigating evidence relevant to a
defendant's background and character or the
circumstances of the crime," 319 Ore. at 583
(internal quotation marks omitted), as those
decisions related to the evidentiary issue in
Stevens.
In sum, this court concluded in Stevens that,
in using the phrase "any aspect of the
defendants character or background, or any
circumstances of the offense" in the jury
instruction set out in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B),
the legislature intended to limit the
admission of "mitigating evidence" in
penalty-phase proceedings so as to satisfy
the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the
legislature intended to ensure the
admissibility of such evidence that the
Eighth Amendment requires that a penalty-
phase jury consider. The remaining
question, then, involves a determination
whether the alibi evidence that defendant
proffered at his third penalty-phase
proceeding-specifically, his mother's
testimony-fell within that federal
constitutional category....
We begin our discussion with the plurality
decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98
S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed 2d 973 (1978), which
was a precursor to Penry. The defendant in
Lockett was charged with aggravated murder
resulting from a robbery of a pawnshop.
According to the state's evidence, the
defendant had participated with others in the
planning of the robbery; however, she had
remained in the car outside the pawnshop
during the robbery and ensuing murder of
the pawnbroker....
* * *
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The applicable statutory scheme required the
trial court to sentence the defendant to death
unless it found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that one or more of three statutory
mitigating factors applied, relating to the
potential existence of duress, coercion, or
provocation; the potential existence of
psychosis or mental deficiency; and the
potential role of the victim in the offense.
Finding that none of those factors applied
(particularly, the "psychosis or mental
defect" factor), the trial court sentenced the
defendant to death. 438 U.S. at 593-94.
Before the Supreme Court, the defendant
argued that the statutory scheme violated the
Eighth Amendment. After reviewing its
jurisprudence, a plurality of the Court stated:
"We conclude that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer, in all
but the rarest kind of capital
case, not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death."
438 US. at 604 (first emphasis in original;
second emphasis added). The plurality
added that "nothing in this opinion limits the
traditional authority of a court to exclude, as
irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the
defendant's character, prior record, or the
circumstances of [the] offense." Id. at 604 n
12.
The plurality then evaluated the statutory
scheme at issue in light of the foregoing rule
and concluded that, in permitting the
consideration of only three specific
mitigating factors, that scheme violated the
Eighth Amendment. Specifically, under the
scheme,
"the absence of direct proof that
the defendant intended to cause
the death of the victim is
relevant for mitigating purposes
only if it is determined that it
sheds some light on one of the
three statutory mitigating
factors. Similarly,
consideration of a defendant's
comparatively minor role in the
offense, or age, would generally
not be permitted, as such, to
affect the sentencing decision."
Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
In a companion case issued the same day,
Bell v. Ohio, 438 US 637, 98 S. Ct. 2977,
57 L. Ed 2d 1010 (1978), the same plurality
vacated a death sentence imposed on another
defendant under the same state statutory
scheme....
Before the Supreme Court, the defendant
argued that his youth, his cooperation with
the police, and "the lack of proof that he had
participated in the actual killing strongly
supported an argument for a penalty less
than death." Id. at 641-42. A plurality of
the Court agreed that, under Lockett, the
defendant's sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment because the statutory scheme
had precluded the trial court "from
considering the particular circumstances of
his crime and aspects of his character and
record as mitigating factors." Id. at 642.
Almost four years after Lockett and Bell, a
majority of the Supreme Court adopted and
applied the rule set out in those cases, that
is, that "the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer not
be precluded from considering, as a
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mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 110, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d I
(1982) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S, at 604).
In adopting that rule, the court noted that,
"in some cases, such evidence properly may
be given little weight." Id at 115.
Lockett and its progeny stand for the
proposition that, under the Eighth
Amendment, a court must allow a defendant
to present at sentencing, and a sentencer
must be able to consider, any evidence
relevant to any circumstances of the offense
that mitigates against imposition of the death
penalty. As demonstrated by Lockett and
Bell, that includes evidence that a defendant
played an insignificant role in the offense or
otherwise possessed a less culpable mens
rea, notwithstanding an earlier guilt finding
of intentional participation in capital murder.
Further, the Court's statement in Eddings,
455 U.S. at 110, that a sentencer is free to
accord a defendant's proffered mitigating
evidence little weight clarifies that evidence
that is not particularly trustworthy still is
admissible under the command of the Eighth
Amendment if it is relevant to a defendant's
character or record, or to the circumstances
of the offense.
[T]he ... factual distinction between Lockett
and Bell, on the one hand, and the case at
bar, on the other [a difference in the
underlying felonies of which they were
convicted], is of no consequence in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S. Ct. 2150, 60 L.
Ed. 2d 738 (1979), issued the year after
Lockett and Bell. The defendant in Green
had been convicted of murder, as had a
codefendant. Unlike the defendants in
Lockett and Bell, it appears that the
defendant in Green had been convicted of
the murder itself-that is, of the intentional
killing of the victim-rather than of more
limited, intentional participation in an
underlying capital felony. At sentencing,
the defendant sought to introduce testimony
of a third person that the codefendant had
stated to that person that the codefendant
had killed the victim after sending the
defendant on an errand. The defendant had
not sought to introduce that testimony
during the guilt phase of his trial. The trial
court excluded the evidence on hearsay
grounds, and the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed. 422 U.S. 95-96; Green v. State,
242 Ga 261, 272-73, 249 S.E.2d 1, 9-10
(1978).
In a brief per curiam, eight-to-one decision,
the Supreme Court reversed. The Court
stated:
"Regardless of whether the
proffered testimony comes
within Georgia's hearsay rule,
under the facts of this case its
exclusion constituted a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The
excluded testimony was highly
relevant to a critical issue in the
punishment phase of the trial,
and substantial reasons existed
to assume its reliability."
Id. at 97 (emphasis added). Thus, in Green,
the Supreme Court concluded that, under
Lockett, the defendant's evidence that he had
not participated in the murder was a relevant
circumstance of the offense that the
sentencer must consider, notwithstanding
that the defendant already had been
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convicted of the victim's murder.
As can be seen, the facts of Green appear to
be analogous to the facts at issue here. As in
Green, defendant here already had been
convicted of the murders of the victims, and,
notwithstanding those earlier convictions,
defendant sought to introduce evidence at
his third penalty-phase proceeding-which
he did not seek to introduce during the guilt
phase-that, if believed, would have shown
that he had not been present at the victims'
home at the time of the murders. Applying
the Court's reasoning in Green, we conclude
that such evidence was "highly relevant to a
critical issue" in the penalty phase, Green,
442 US. at 97, and therefore was required to
be considered by the jury under the Eighth
Amendment. It follows that that evidence
also qualified as "mitigating evidence"
under the statutory scheme set out in ORS
163.150(1)(a), (b)(D), and (c)(B).
Accordingly, the trial court erred in
excluding that evidence at defendant's third
penalty-phase proceeding, and, if the state
again pursues the death penalty on remand,
and if defendant again offers his alibi
evidence, that evidence shall be admissible.
[The court added in a footnote: We note
that, in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 US. 164,
172, 174, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 101 L. Ed. 2d
155, rehearing den, 487 U.S. 1263, 101 L.
Ed. 2d 976, 109 S. Ct. 25 (1988); id at 187-
88 (O'Connor, J., concurring), a plurality of
the Supreme Court strongly suggested, and
the concurrence would have held, that the
Eighth Amendment does not require an
instruction that a penalty-phase jury
consider any residual or lingering doubts
remaining from the guilt phase. However,
nothing in that decision lessened the
direction from Lockett, Bell, Eddings, and
Green that the Eighth Amendment does
require that a defendant be permitted to
introduce, and a jury be able to consider,
mitigating evidence relevant to any
circumstances of the offense, such as
evidence that would lessen the defendant's
culpability in the offense. Simply stated, a
"residual" or "lingering doubt[]" remaining
from the guilt phase, Franklin, 487 U.S. at
174, is qualitatively different from actual
"evidence" proffered during the penalty
phase.]
The sentence of death is vacated, and the
case is remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings.
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"Review Set for Evidence in Murder Trial's Penalty Phase"
New York Times
April 26, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
decide whether a convicted murderer has the
right, during the penalty phase of the trial, to
present evidence that casts doubt on the
jury's finding of guilt in an effort to avoid a
sentence of death.
The court accepted a death-penalty case
from Oregon to answer a question that has
divided the state and lower federal courts in
the years since an ambiguous Supreme
Court opinion addressed it in 1988. The
state is appealing a ruling by the Oregon
Supreme Court that gave a defendant the
right to present evidence of an alibi that, if
accepted in the penalty phase, would show
that he could not have been at the scene of
the double murder for which the jury had
just convicted him.
The Supreme Court's precedents make clear
that in a capital murder trial's penalty phase,
which has many attributes of a separate trial,
the defendant must be able to offer "any
aspect" of his personal background or of the
circumstances of the offense to show why a
death sentence would be inappropriate.
The one exception has been evidence
offered to demonstrate lingering doubt about
the guilty verdict itself. In its 1988 decision,
the Supreme Court held that a defendant did
not have a constitutional right to have the
judge instruct the jury that it should consider
any "residual" doubt about guilt when
deciding on a sentence.
But that decision, Franklin v. Lynaugh, did
not address the more basic question of
whether, aside from the eventual jury
instructions, the defendant had the right to
present such evidence to the jury in the first
place. That question, which has confused
the lower courts, is the issue the justices
have now agreed to decide in Oregon v.
Guzek, No. 04-928, the case they accepted
on Monday.
The defendant, Randy Lee Guzek, was
convicted in 1988 of murdering the aunt and
uncle of his former girlfriend. He was
sentenced to death, but the Oregon courts
vacated his death sentence in 1990 and again
in 1991, ordering new proceedings as the
result of United States Supreme Court
decisions in other death penalty cases. Each
time, Mr. Guzek was re-sentenced to death.
In 2004, the Oregon Supreme Court once
again overturned the death sentence, finding
several errors. It ruled that in any
subsequent hearing, Mr. Guzek should be
permitted to present transcripts of statements
from his mother and grandfather that were
admitted during the guilt phase.
Taken together, the two statements provided
an account of Mr. Guzek's whereabouts on
the night of the murder that, if credited,
made it highly unlikely that he had been at
the murder scene. The state court's 3-to-2
decision held that Mr. Guzek had a right to
present the evidence of his alibi under the
Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
and unusual punishment.
The issue in the case, which will not be
argued until next fall, might have some
bearing on the forthcoming death penalty
hearing for Zacarias Moussaoui, who
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pleaded guilty last week to taking part in the
conspiracy that led to the Sept. 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. While pleading guilty to a
capital offense, Mr. Moussaoui announced
his intention to contest the death penalty.
Judge Leonie M. Brinkema of Federal
District Court, who has presided over the
case, said Friday that access to high-level
Qaeda detainees could provide mitigating
evidence for Mr. Moussaoui and would be
"highly relevant to the sentencing phase."
Mr. Moussaoui has long claimed that these
witnesses, to whom the government has
denied him access, would exonerate him.
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"Justices to Review Loan Offsets: Court to Decide
Whether a 10-Year Limit Shields Student Debts"
Washington Post
April 26, 2005
Charles Lane
* * *
[T]he court announced that it will decide a
case about what kind of evidence capital
crime defendants may introduce to save
themselves from the death penalty.
Defendants who have been convicted of a
death-penalty offense face a second hearing
at which a jury must decide whether to
impose death or a lesser penalty. At these
sentencing hearings, the defense has a
constitutional right to introduce mitigating
evidence to persuade jurors to spare the
defendant's life.
At issue in the case the court agreed to hear
yesterday, Oregon v. Guzek, No. 04-928, is
whether the Constitution requires a state to
permit the defense to introduce claims that
the defendant is innocent as mitigating
evidence.
The court's ruling could have a significant
impact at a time when death penalty
opponents are seeking to heighten public
doubts about capital punishment based on
recent death row exonerations.
The prosecution's job at sentencing hearings
might become more difficult if the court
were to say that the defense has an absolute
right to try to reinforce "residual doubts"
among jurors who have already concluded
that a defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt-but not, perhaps, beyond
any doubt.
In a fragmented 1988 decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Constitution does not
require a trial judge to instruct a jury to
consider such evidence. Most courts have
interpreted that to mean that the defense has
no right to introduce the evidence on its
own.
But last year the Supreme Court of Oregon
ruled 3 to 2 that convicted double-murderer
Randy Lee Guzek must be allowed to
present testimony at his sentencing hearing
from his grandfather and mother, who
placed him elsewhere at the time of the
crimes.
In its appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
state of Oregon asked the court to intervene
"to establish a uniform interpretation of
whether the Eighth Amendment creates a
constitutional right to offer evidence and
argument of residual doubt in a penalty-
phase proceeding." The Eighth Amendment
bans "cruel and unusual punishments."
Oral argument will take place in the fall, and
a decision is likely by July 2006.
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"Sentence of Death Overturned Third Time"
Oregonian
March 5, 2004
Ashbel S. Green
Summary: The jury should have been
allowed to consider a "true life" sentence for
Randy Lee Guzek, the Oregon Supreme
Court rules.
The Oregon Supreme Court on Thursday
overturned the death sentence of a convicted
Deschutes County killer for the third time.
In a widely anticipated move, the court
followed its own 1999 precedent in saying
that the trial judge should have allowed
jurors to consider sentencing Randy Lee
Guzek to life in prison without parole.
Guzek was convicted in 1988 of killing Rod
and Lois Houser in their Terrebonne home
in 1987.
Prosecutors, although disappointed in the
outcome, were pleased by one part of the
ruling, which cleared up any question that
victims had a constitutional right to testify in
the penalty phase of a capital murder case.
"I think this case is a very strong step
forward for victims' rights in Oregon, and
we're real happy about that," said Deschutes
County District Attorney Michael T. Dugan.
Dugan said he had not decided whether to
again seek the death penalty for Guzek but
pointed out that three different 12-member
juries had voted unanimously that he should
die for his crimes.
"I am very mindful of the 36 jurors who
have made this decision in the past," Dugan
said.
Guzek was convicted with two other men of
killing the Housers during a late-night
burglary. Guzek, then 18, shot Lois Houser
three times with a handgun, chased her up a
staircase and shot her again as she huddled
inside a closet. He then ripped the rings off
her fingers.
Rod Houser was shot 20 times by Mark
Wilson, who is serving a life sentence for
the killing. Donald Cathey also is serving a
life sentence for participating in the crime,
although he did not kill anyone.
Guzek's first death sentence was overturned
in 1990 because the U.S. Supreme Court had
ruled that Oregon's death penalty statute
failed to allow defendants to present enough
evidence that they should not be executed.
Another jury sentenced Guzek to death in
1991, but the Oregon Supreme Court
reversed the sentence in 1995, saying that
the trial court improperly allowed testimony
about the effects of the killings on the
victims' relatives.
A jury sentenced Guzek to death for a third
time in 1997.
The third reversal stems from the trial
judge's refusal to allow the jury to consider
sentencing Guzek to "true life," meaning life
without the possibility of parole.
At the time Guzek killed the Housers, jurors
had two sentencing options in a death
penalty case: death or life with the
possibility of parole. The Legislature added
the "true life" option in 1989. Guzek sought
to have his 1997 jury consider true life, but
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the judge refused.
The Oregon Supreme Court first addressed
the issue in 1999, overturning the sentence
of Death Row inmate Michael McDonnell.
Like Guzek, McDonnell was first convicted
before the true-life option was available but
wanted the jury to consider it on retrial.
Since then, the court overturned the death
sentences of Robert Paul Langley and serial
killer Dayton Leroy Rogers on the same
grounds. Only McDonnell has been sent
back to Death Row. The Langley and
Rogers cases have been plagued by delays.
Langley awaits a new penalty phase in
Marion County. Rogers awaits a new
sentencing trial in Clackamas County.
Dugan said he had to consider the cost of
another trial but that he also wanted to talk
to the surviving members of the Housers'
family.
"One of the daughters who made the
discovery of her dead parents had substantial
mental breakdowns that led to her death last
year. She could never get over it," Dugan
said.
"So Guzek has one more victim to his
caseload here. I need to sit and talk with the
Housers. This has taken quite a toll on
them."
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Franklin v. Lynaugh
56 U.S.L.W. 4698
National Law Journal
August 22, 1988
Does the Eighth Amendment require Texas
courts to give explanatory jury instructions on
mitigating evidence in capital sentencing
cases? The court, 6-3, said no.
After the murder conviction of Donald Gene
Franklin, the trial court refused to give five
"special requested" jury instructions
submitted by Mr. Franklin that would have
told the jury that any evidence that they felt
mitigated against the death penalty should be
taken into account in answering the two
Special Issues required by the state death
penalty statute.
Justice White wrote for the court that the trial
court's refusal to give the requested special
instructions did not violate Mr. Franklin's
Eighth Amendment right to present mitigating
evidence.
"We find unavailing [petitioner's argument]
that the sentencing jury may not be precluded
from considering 'any relevant, mitigating
evidence,"' Justice White said. "Given the
awesome power that a sentencing jury must
exercise in a capital case, it may be advisable
for a State to provide the jury with some
framework for discharging these
responsibilities. And we have never held that
a specific method for balancing mitigating
and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing
proceeding is constitutionally required."
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Blackmun, filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Stevens filed a dissent that was joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall.
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Kansas v. Marsh
(04-1170)
Ruling Below: (State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 102 P.3d 445 (2004), cert granted 125 S.Ct.
2517, 73 USLW 3539).
Michael Marsh was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death under a Kansas
statute that specifically required the imposition of the death penalty if mitigating circumstances
did not outweigh aggravating circumstances. After Marsh's trial and sentencing, the Kansas
Supreme Court held in another case that the death penalty statute was unconstitutional if applied
to impose the death penalty when mitigating and aggravating circumstances were evenly
balanced. Marsh then appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the court could not
simply read into the law an exception for "tie" situations, and therefore the statute must be found
unconstitutional on its face. The court reconsidered its earlier ruling and agreed with Marsh,
reversing his capital murder conviction and declaring the death penalty statute unconstitutional.
Question Presented: Whether a state capital sentencing statute may provide for the imposition
of the death penalty when the sentencing jury finds an equal balance between mitigating and
aggravating evidence.
STATE of Kansas, Appellee
V.
Michael Lee MARSH II, Appellant
Supreme Court of Kansas
Decided December 17, 2004.
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
ALLEGRUCCI, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant, Michael
L. Marsh II, from convictions of capital
murder of Marry Elizabeth Pusch (M.P.),
first-degree premeditated murder of Marry
Ane Pusch (Marry), aggravated arson, and
aggravated burglary. Marsh has been
sentenced to death for the capital offense,
life imprisonment with a mandatory
minimum term of 40 years for the murder of
Marry, 51 months for aggravated arson, and
34 months for aggravated burglary. The
district court ordered the last three sentences
to be served consecutively.
On appeal, Marsh raises 18 issues arising
from the guilt phase of the trial and 16
issues from the penalty phase. We begin by
observing that there is a heightened scrutiny
of trial proceedings in a capital case. Beck
v. Alabama, 447 US. 625, 637-38 (1980).
However, because we conclude K.S.A. 21-
4624(e) is unconstitutional on its face,
precluding application of the death penalty,
we will not apply a heightened scrutiny
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standard of review to the remaining issues
on appeal.
We deem the following issues to be
controlling: (1) Is there substantial
competent evidence to support each of
Marsh's convictions? (2) Was evidence
improperly excluded by the district court?
(3) Is K.S.A. 21-4624(e) unconstitutional on
its face? (4) Is there substantial competent
evidence to support imposition of a hard 40
sentence for the premeditated murder of
Marry? and, (5) Is the hard 40 sentencing
scheme set forth in K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-
4635(a) unconstitutional?
FACTS
On the evening of June 17, 1996, Marry and
her 19-month-old daughter, M.P., were
murdered in their Wichita home. Marry
died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds
to her head and a knife wound to her heart.
The perpetrator or perpetrators apparently
did not physically harm M.P before setting
the house afire and leaving the child to die
in the ensuing conflagration. M.P. sustained
severe bums to her body, resulting in
multiple organ failure and death on June 23,
1996.
Fire investigators determined the fire was
intentionally started with an accelerant
applied to Marry's body. An autopsy
revealed Marry had been shot 3 times,
stabbed in the heart, and her throat slashed.
The county coroner concluded Marry had
died as a result of her wounds, with her body
set afire after death.
In the initial stages of investigation,
detectives interviewed Marry's husband,
Eric Pusch (Pusch), who mentioned having
spent most of June 17 with a friend, Michael
Marsh, before going to work at
approximately 4:30 p.m. as a delivery man
for a local Pizza Hut. This led the police to
interview Marsh.
A series of interviews with Marsh resulted
in his confession to shooting Marry and
abandoning M.P. when he fled the
residence. He told the detectives his motive
was to obtain money from the Pusch family.
According to Marsh, he planned to be in the
home when Marry and M.P. arrived, tie
them up, and wait until Pusch got home. He
would then threaten Pusch with harm to his
wife and child to obtain the money needed
for a trip to Alaska. Marsh indicated his
plan went awry when Marry and M.P.
arrived at the house earlier than he had
anticipated; he panicked and shot Marry.
Initially, he told detectives he could not
recall how many times he pulled the trigger;
subsequently, he indicated firing the gun
once. Marsh was equivocal regarding the
fire. At one point he indicated he probably
did set the fire; at another point he stated he
could not remember; and, finally, he denied
setting the fire. Marsh denied Pusch was in
any way involved in committing the crimes.
The jury found Marsh guilty of capital
murder of M.P., first-degree murder of
Marry, aggravated arson, and aggravated
burglary. At the penalty phase of the trial,
the State relied upon the following statutory
aggravating factors to support a death
sentence: (1) Marsh knowingly or purposely
killed or created a great risk of death to
more than one person; (2) he committed the
crime in order to avoid or prevent a lawful
arrest or prosecution; and (3) he committed
the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel manner. The jury found all three
aggravating circumstances existed and were
not outweighed by any mitigating
circumstances and unanimously agreed to a
sentence of death.
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At sentencing, the trial judge found
sufficient evidence to support the sentence
of death recommended by the jury....
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
[The court rejected Marsh's argument that
the evidence was insufficient to convict
him.]
THE EXCLUSION
EVIDENCE
OF MARSH'S
[The lower court erred in failing to consider
evidence suggesting a third party may have
been responsible for the crime. Therefore, a
new trial must be ordered.]
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF K.S.A. 21-
4624(e)
At the penalty phase of Marsh's trial, the
district court's jury instructions and verdict
forms followed the language of KS.A. 21-
4624(e) by requiring a death sentence if the
jury found aggravating circumstances were
not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
Under the authority of this provision,
Marsh's jury was directed that a tie must go
to the State. In the event of equipoise, i.e.,
the jury's determination that the balance of
any aggravating circumstances and any
mitigating circumstances weighed equal, the
death penalty would be required.
Since Marsh's sentencing proceeding, we
decided State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894
(2001).
In Kleypas, we first held that the weighing
equation in KS.A. 21-4624(e) as written was
unconstitutional under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. We avoided
striking the statute down as unconstitutional
on its face only by construing it to mean the
opposite of what it said, i.e., to require
aggravating circumstances to outweigh
mitigating circumstances. This reasoning
compelled us to vacate Kleypas' death
sentence and remand the case for
reconsideration of the death penalty under
proper instructions on the weighing
equation.
In Kleypas, after the majority determined
that KS.A. 21-4624(e) as written violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, it
added:
Our decision does not require that we
invalidate KS.A. 21-4624 or the
death penalty itself. We do not find
KS.A. 21-4624(e) to be
unconstitutional on its face, but
rather, we find that the weighing
equation impermissibly mandates the
death penalty when the jury finds
that the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are in equipoise.
"The legislative intent in passing the death
penalty act is obvious. KS.A. 21-4624
provides for a death sentencing scheme by
which a sentence of death is imposed for
certain offenses. By simply invalidating the
weighing equation and construing K.S.A. 21-
4624(e) to provide that if the jury finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more
of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in K.S.A. 21-4625 exists and,
further, that such aggravating circumstance
or circumstances outweigh any mitigating
circumstance found to exist, the defendant
shall be sentenced to death, the intent of the
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legislature is carried out in a constitutional
manner. So construed, we hold that K.SA.
21-4624 does not violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Our holding requires
that this case be remanded for the jury to
reconsider imposition of the death penalty."
Here, Marsh correctly notes, and the State
concedes, that Kleypas requires us to vacate
Marsh's death sentence and remand for
reconsideration of the death penalty under
proper instructions on the weighing
equation. Marsh makes the further
argument, however, that K.S.A. 21-4624(e)
is unconstitutional on its face and that the
portion of our Kleypas decision that saved
the statute through judicial construction
must be overruled. We agree.
After a discussion of applicable case law,
the Kleypas majority succinctly summarized
why K.S.A. 21-4624(e) as written did not
comport with the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments:
The legislature cannot mandate a
death sentence for any category of
murder. The legislature is limited to
defining who is eligible, within
constitutional limits, to receive the
death penalty. It is for the jury,
within permissible guidelines, to
determine who will live and who will
die. The issue is not whether the
penalty of death is per se cruel and
unusual punishment. Furman [v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238] did not hold
that the death penalty was cruel and
unusual punishment per se under the
Eighth Amendment. Here the issue,
as that before the Furman court, is
whether the process used to select
which defendant will receive the
irrevocable penalty of death
"comports with the basic concept of
human dignity at the core of the
[Eighth] Amendment." Gregg [v.
Georgia,] 428 U.S. 153, 183.
Is the weighing equation in K.SA.
21-4624(e) a unique standard to
ensure that the penalty of death is
justified? Does it provide a higher
hurdle for the prosecution to clear
than any other area of criminal law?
Does it allow the jury to express its
"reasoned moral response" to the
mitigating circumstances? We
conclude it does not. Nor does it
comport with the fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment. Last,
fundamental fairness requires that a
'tie goes to the defendant' when life
or death is at issue. We see no way
that the weighing equation in K.S.A.
21-4624(e), which provides that in
doubtful cases the jury must return a
sentence of death, is permissible
under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Since Kleypas was decided, there have been
no persuasive Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment cases helpful to a resolution of
the facial constitutionality questions.
Although Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 584
(2002), overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497
US. 639 (1990), which had been relied upon
by the Kleypas majority, it did so only on a
distinct point of law, i.e., whether a jury or a
judge must make the findings required on
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
In their dissents today, Justices Davis and
Nuss . . joined by Chief Justice McFarland,
argue first that equipoise will be rare. We
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cannot know this.
Second, they focus on cases that predate
Walton and analyze distinct statutory
language, asserting these decisions mean the
Constitution guarantees capital defendants
only an opportunity to have mitigating
evidence considered by the jury. These
cases, obviously, do not control.
Finally, our dissenting colleagues protest
that we should rely on language in Justice
Blackmun's Walton dissent to conclude that
a majority of the United States Supreme
Court has already implicitly decided that the
equipoise provision before us is
constitutional. Simply stated, that position
failed to draw a majority in Kleypas. . . . It
still fails to draw a majority for good reason.
. . . [W]e feel compelled to re-emphasize
that a majority of the United States Supreme
Court has never squarely addressed or
decided the facial constitutionality of the
equipoise provision before us. This remains
true, no matter how lower federal courts or
other state courts have interpreted the ruling
in Walton. . . . After full reconsideration, we
reject reliance on Justice Blackmun's Walton
dissent and continue to adhere to the
Kleypas majority's reasoning and holding
that K.S.A. 21-4624(e) as written is
unconstitutional under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
This brings us to the next issue: whether
Kleypas properly construed the statute to
reverse the effect of equipoise under the
weighing equation. As Justice Davis
recently emphasized, "'it is a fundamental
rule of statutory construction, to which all
other rules are subordinate, that the intent of
the legislature governs if that intent can be
ascertained. The legislature is presumed to
have expressed its intent through the
language of the statutory scheme it enacted.
When a statute is plain and unambiguous,
the court must give effect to the intention of
the legislature as expressed, rather than
determine what the law should or should not
be ...
. . . . In determining constitutionality, it is
the court's duty to uphold a statute under
attack rather than defeat it, and if there is
any reasonable way to construe the statute as
constitutionally valid, that should be done.
State v. Engles, 270 Kan. 531 (2001).
* * *
Applying these . . . canons in Kleypas, we
held that the unconstitutional weighing
equation in K.S.A. 21-4624(e) could be
construed to carry out the legislature's intent
to enact a constitutional death penalty
statute....
As articulated by the United States Supreme
Court, the rule of constitutional doubt is that
the Supreme Court will not strike down a
statute as unconstitutional if the statute can
be construed, in a manner consistent with
the will of Congress, to comport with
constitutional limitations....
. . . However, both the United States
Supreme Court and this court have
acknowledged that the power to construe
away constitutional infirmity is limited....
"We cannot press statutory construction 'to
the point of disingenuous evasion' even to
avoid a constitutional question." United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985). The
maxim cannot apply where the statute itself
is unambiguous. United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 US.
483, 494 (2001).
Our formulation of the avoidance doctrine is
similar to that of the federal courts....
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. . . The [avoidance] doctrine is not an
available tool of statutory construction if its
application would result in rewriting an
unambiguous statute. The court's function is
to interpret legislation, not rewrite it. State
v. Beard, 197 Kan. 275, 278 (1966).
* * *
. . . [T]he Kleypas majority erred in
substituting a weighing equation with
exactly the opposite effect of the equation
provided by the legislature. The holding
eviscerated the legislature's clear and
unambiguous intent regarding equipoise and
thus overstepped the judiciary's authority to
interpret legislation rather than make it.
Chief Justice McFarland's dissent, which
argues that the legislature apparently did not
mind the interference misses the point. . . .
The appropriate, limited judicial response to
the problem identified for the first time in
Kleypas was to hold K.SA. 21-4624(e)
unconstitutional on its face and let the
legislature take such further action as it
deemed proper.
. . . [T]he second holding of Kleypas-that
the equipoise provision could be rescued by
application of the avoidance doctrine-is
not salvageable under the doctrine of stare
decisis. That holding of Kleypas is
overruled. Stare decisis is designed to
protect well settled and sound case law from
precipitous or impulsive changes. It is not
designed to insulate a questionable
constitutional rule from thoughtful critique
and, when called for, abandonment. This is
especially true in a situation like the one
facing us here. Kleypas' application of the
avoidance doctrine was not fully vetted. It
is young and previously untested. Its
rewriting of K.S.A. 21-4624(e) was not only
clearly erroneous; as a constitutional
adjudication, it encroached upon the power
of the legislature.
Our decision today to confine the
application of the avoidance doctrine to
appropriate circumstances recognizes the
separation of powers and the constitutional
limitations of judicial review and rightfully
looks to the legislature to resolve the issue
of whether the statute should be rewritten to
pass constitutional muster. This is the
legislature's job, not ours. This decision
does more in the long run to preserve
separation of powers, enhance respect for
judicial review, and further predictability in
the law than all the indiscriminate adherence
to stare decisis can ever hope to do.
HARD 40 SENTENCE SUFFICIENCY
Marsh contends there was insufficient
evidence to support the district court's
finding of aggravating circumstances not
outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
Where the sufficiency of the evidence is
challenged for establishing the existence of
an aggravating circumstance in a hard 40
proceeding, the standard of review to be
applied is whether, after reviewing all the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the State, a rational factfinder could have
found the existence of the aggravating
circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence ....
[. . . Here, we agree with the district judge's
finding that] any one of the aggravating
circumstances was not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances. The district
court's imposition of the hard 40 sentence is
upheld.
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HARD 40 SENTENCE
CONSTITUTIONALITY
[The court rejected Marsh's argument that
the Kansas hard 40 sentencing scheme was
unconstitutional.]
CONCLUSION
We conclude K.S.A. 21-4624(e) is
unconstitutional on its face, thus rendering
moot guilt and penalty phase issues
dependent on imposition of the death
penalty. We have carefully considered all of
the issues of trial error raised by Marsh; we
hold those not discussed in this opinion
insufficient to constitute reversible error in
this case.
We affirm Marsh's convictions and
sentences for aggravated burglary and the
premeditated murder of Marry; we reverse
and remand for new trial Marsh's
convictions for the capital murder of M.P.
and aggravated arson.
Affirmed.
DAVIS, J., dissenting, joined by NUSS, J.:
I respectfully dissent from the majority's
holding that the weighing equation in K.S.A.
21-4624(e) is unconstitutional on its face. In
my opinion, K.S.A. 21-4624(e) was
constitutional when it was passed by the
Kansas Legislature and remains
constitutional today.
In State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 40 P.3d
139 (2001), the majority held that the . . .
weighing equation was unconstitutional but
attempted to salvage the death penalty by
rewriting the equation language to provide
that the aggravating circumstances must
outweigh the mitigating circumstances
before death may be imposed . . .
The majority, in this case, voids the entire
death penalty law because in the extremely
unlikely event that a jury would find that the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances
exactly equal the mitigating circumstances,
death must be imposed. The majority claims
that in such an unlikely event a tie must go
to the defendant. According to the majority,
because under the weighing equation
adopted by the Kansas Legislature the tie
goes to the State, the entire death penalty is
unconstitutional.
I . . I agree with the majority that the Kansas
Legislature consciously chose the weighing
equation but strongly disagree that the
language used is unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment. I may personally
disagree with the legislature's policy
decision that a tie goes to the State but I
cannot conclude that its enactment is
unconstitutional because of that language
unless the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court, supports such a conclusion. An
analysis of the United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence, as well as other decisions
addressing this point, does not support such
a conclusion and, in fact, supports the
opposite conclusion.
In the extremely unlikely event that the jury
does find the aggravating circumstances and
the mitigating circumstances to be exactly
equal, K.S.A. 21-4624(e), as written, does
mandate that the sentence be death.
However, a careful examination of the
United States Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence shows that this result does not
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violate the Eighth Amendment.
There is no question that the Eighth
Amendment imposes several requirements
with regard to capital sentencing. . . . In
order for a capital sentencing scheme to pass
constitutional muster, it must "genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty and must reasonably justify
the imposition of a more severe sentence on
the defendant compared to others found
guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462
US. 862, 877 (1983).
The Kansas Death Penalty Act narrows the
class of persons eligible for the death
penalty in two ways. First, it requires a
conviction of capital murder for death
penalty eligibility rather than simply
applying the death penalty to all first-degree
murders. Second, it narrows that eligibility
even further through the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors during
the penalty phase. Thus, the Kansas
Legislature has limited and channeled the
discretion of judges and juries "so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action" in accord with Gregg v.
Georgia.
Further, even though the Eighth Amendment
requires that jury discretion be guided, it
also requires that the sentencer be allowed to
retain sufficient discretion to consider all
relevant mitigating evidence, so that it can
ensure that "'death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case."' Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978). To this
end, the sentencer cannot "be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death. . . ." [I]t must be
noted that Kansas lists eight important
mitigating circumstances and puts no limit
on the number of such circumstances a
defendant may present. The jury is
instructed that it must consider and give
effect to this evidence.
Once these core principles are satisfied,
however, the Eighth Amendment requires no
more. Rather, the Supreme Court has made
it clear that within the above guidelines,
states are given wide latitude to adopt the
procedure through which these principles
are carried out. The majority opinion says
that the failure of the legislature to allow
death only when aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances is
unconstitutional.
In enacting its death penalty statute, Kansas
has chosen to follow the Florida system,
which provides for aggravating
circumstances which are then weighed
against any mitigators found to exist as set
forth above. See Stringer v. Black, 503 US.
222, 229-231 (1992). The Supreme Court
held that the Florida system satisfied
constitutional requirements in Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 US. 242 (1976).
In states which follow the Florida system,
i.e. "weighing states," questions have arisen
over the composition of the weighing
equation. The Supreme Court answered
those questions in a series of three cases:
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 108
(1990); Boyde v. California, 494 US. 370
(1990); and Walton v. Arizona, 497 US.
639 (1990).
Blystone and Boyde stand . . . for the
proposition that it is not unconstitutional for
a weighing equation to mandate death upon
certain findings, so long as the jury is
allowed to consider and give effect to all
relevant mitigating circumstances. They
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also confirm that a weighing equation which
mandates death upon the jury's finding that
aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances satisfies this
standard. They did not, however, address
whether other versions of the weighing
equation, specifically the weighing equation
used in KS.A. 21-4624(e), meet this
standard. That question was left for the next
"weighing equation" case, Walton....
. . . The Arizona weighing equation in
Walton provided that the sentencer (in that
case, a judge) was to weigh the aggravating
circumstances against the mitigating
circumstances and impose death if there
were ''no mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."
Although the words used are different,
Arizona, then and now, has interpreted this
weighing equation to mean exactly the same
as the one used in KSA. 21-4624(e): Death
is the penalty unless the aggravating
circumstances are outweighed by the
mitigating circumstances.
Further, one of the issues in Walton was the
same equipoise question faced in Kleypas
and now in this case, the validity of the
weighing equation under the Eighth
Amendment....
The Supreme Court of the United States
addressed Walton's argument that because
the Arizona statute provided that the court
must impose the death penalty if one or
more aggravating circumstances arc found
and the mitigating circumstances are
insufficient to call for leniency, this created
an unconstitutional presumption that death
was the proper sentence. The Court rejected
this contention....
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens dissented from this holding, arguing
that the fact that the Arizona statute required
death if the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances were in equipoise violated the
Eighth Amendment. The dissenting opinion
in Walton is the reason the majority in this
case holds K.S.A. 21-4624(e)
unconstitutional. Walton, however, rejected
the equipoise argument, holding just the
opposite of the majority opinion in this case.
Walton not only reaffirmed the holdings in
Blystone and Boyde that it is not a violation
of the Eighth Amendment to mandate death
upon certain findings, such as that the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors, but also extended that rationale to a
weighing equation such as that used in
Arizona which mandated death unless the
mitigating factors were sufficiently
substantial to call for leniency, that is, unless
aggravating factors were not outweighed by
the mitigating circumstances.
It is clear to me that the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Walton
answered the equipoise question....
Cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court since Blystone, Boyde, and Walton
have continued with the theme established in
those cases. In Harris v. Alabama, 513 US.
504, 512 (1995), the Supreme Court . . .
reiterated: "We have rejected the notion that
'a specific method for balancing mitigating
and aggravating factors in a capital
sentencing proceeding is constitutionally
required."' Similarly, in Buchanan v.
Angelone, 522 US. 269, 276 (1998), the
Court stated:
In the selection phase, our cases have
established that . . . the state may
shape and structure the jury's
consideration of mitigation so long
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as it does not preclude the jury from
giving effect to any relevant
mitigating evidence. Our consistent
concern has been that restrictions on
the jury's sentencing determination
not preclude the jury from being able
to give effect to mitigating evidence.
But we have never gone further and
held that the state must affirmatively
structure in a particular way the
manner in which juries consider
mitigating evidence." (Emphasis
added.)
Given the United States Supreme Court's
continued insistence that the Constitution
does not require a specific method for
balancing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and its specific approval of
Arizona's weighing equation which is
identical in practice to that in K.S.A. 21-
4624(e), I find it difficult to understand how
the majority [concludes] that KS.A. 21-
4624(e) is unconstitutional on its face....
There seems to be a general feeling among
the majority that the weighing equation
which mandates death in the highly unlikely
event that the jury finds the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances to be exactly equal
in weight is somehow "unfair." While it is
certainly within the province of this court to
interpret the Eighth Amendment, we cannot
do so in a vacuum. We cannot simply rely
on our own inchoate feelings, but instead
have a duty to examine, analyze, and apply
the United States Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the matter....
This is not to say that we should not strike
down statutes which clearly infringe on the
Constitution. However, when a court takes
such a step it is imperative that a clearly
articulated reason be given and that it be
explained how that reason fits into the
United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence
. . . The cases examined compel the opposite
conclusion from the majority's decision.
I respectfully dissent from the majority
opinion because I conclude that KS.A. 21-
4624(e), as passed by the Kansas Legislature
in 1994, was and is today constitutional
under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
NUSS, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Davis for the reasons discussed
in his dissenting opinion. I write a separate
dissent primarily to elaborate upon one of
his reasons: the controlling authority, over
the instant case's issue of death at equipoise,
of Walton v. Arizona, 497 US. 639 (1990).
. .. The [Walton] dissenters ... left no doubt
that they believed the plurality incorrectly
permitted the tie to go to the State. They
ended their analysis by "concluding that the
Constitution bars Arizona from placing upon
a capital defendant the burden of proving
that mitigating circumstances are
,sufficiently substantial to call for leniency'"
a phrase that the dissenters admitted was
interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court as
requiring the defendant to prove his
mitigating factors outweighed his
aggravating factors.
In my view, the four dissenters were correct
in their interpretation of their colleagues'
plurality opinion. The plurality conceivably
required a capital defendant to prove more
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than his or her mitigating factors
"outweighed" his or her aggravating factors;
rather, e.g., that they "substantially
outweighed" them. Today, however, we
need not try to determine the outer reaches
of the plurality opinion regarding the
defendant's burden of proof; rather, we need
only acknowledge that death at equipoise is
within [its] constitutional boundaries.
As Justice White concluded:
. . . So long as a State's method of
allocating the burdens of proof does
not lessen the State's burden to prove
every element of the offense
charged, or in this case to prove the
existence of aggravating
circumstances, a defendant's
constitutional rights are not violated
by placing on him the burden of
proving mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency.
Walton clearly controls the issue of death at
equipoise contained in the Kansas death
penalty statute, K.S.A. 21-4624.
Additionally persuasive, as Justice Davis
points out in his dissent, are the
interpretations of Walton by . .. the Arizona
Supreme Court....
Since Walton, the Arizona Supreme Court
has repeatedly interpreted its death penalty
statute to require the defendant to prove
mitigating factors which outweigh the
aggravating factors in order to avoid a
sentence of death....
. . . [A]fter Walton, Arizona has executed
capital defendants under the authority of its
interpretation of that statute, with 22
executions since 1992. Three of those
executions occurred after the Arizona
Supreme Court affirmed the defendants'
death penalty sentences (post-Walton), and
the United States Supreme Court denied
their petitions for writs of certiorari. One
should be leery of reading too much into
those denials, but one wonders: If the
Supreme Court believed that Arizona was
interpreting Walton in a way that violated a
petitioner's constitutional rights, would not
the Court have granted at least one petition
to stop one of those three executions?
... Marsh's argument that K.SA. 21-4624(e)
is facially unconstitutional because it
mandates death at equipoise should be
quickly dispatched by our court.
In conclusion, this court is bound by the
United States Supreme Court's plurality
holding in Walton until such time as that
Court . . . changes its mind. And Walton
mandates that the death at equipoise concept
contained in our death penalty statute, K.S.A.
21-4624, is constitutional.
McFARLAND, C.J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I agree with Justice
Davis that the weighing equation contained
in K.SA. 21-4624(e) is constitutional as
written. , . . Kleypas was a 4 to 3 decision,
consisting of a majority opinion and two
written dissents. None of the three opinions
took the position that the Kansas death
penalty law must be struck down as
constitutionally impermissible. The
majority opinion upheld the law with an
extremely minor judicial construction
relative to equipoise, with the three
468
dissenters upholding the law as written. In
the case before us, another 4 to 3 decision,
the majority concludes the death penalty is
fatally flawed and rejects the majority's
action in Kleypas which remedied the
perceived equipoise flaw. There has been
no change in relevant constitutional law as
expressed by the United States Supreme
Court. The only change has been the
composition of the Kansas Supreme Court
occasioned by the retirements of Justices
Larson, Six, Lockett, and Abbott. While
fidelity to the doctrine of stare decisis is not
an "inexorable command," we should be
highly skeptical of reversing an earlier
decision where nothing has changed except
the composition of the court....
Whatever one's opinion on the moral
validity of the death penalty, the fact
remains that in 1994, the legislature, acting
on behalf of the people of Kansas, passed
into law an act providing for the death
penalty as a possible punishment for a
narrow, clearly defined group of intentional
and premeditated murders. State v. Kleypas
was the first case to consider the validity of
that death penalty, and our decision was
eagerly awaited by the people of Kansas as a
test of whether the death penalty that the
legislature had enacted would ' pass
constitutional muster.
Through our opinion in Kleypas, we told the
legislature, and by extension the people of
Kansas, that the death penalty law it had
enacted was constitutional as construed by
this court....
. . . Our decision in Kleypas is a mere 3
years old, and nothing this court has said in
the interim has evidenced our intention to
abandon its underlying principles.
Similarly, there has been nothing in the
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court during that time to show that our
decision in Kleypas was incorrect.
Nor have "facts . .. so changed, or come to
be seen so differently, as to have robbed the
old rule [established by the Kleypas
decision] of significant application or
justification." Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. There has been no
significant change in the factual
underpinnings of our Kleypas decision, and
no change in facts that would cause its
central holding to be rendered obsolete.
The majority's decision today, by the barest
of margins, discards our 3-year old decision
in Kleypas, not because that decision has
become unworkable, or the laws or facts
underpinning it have changed, or a United
States Supreme Court decision mandates it,
but simply because this new majority has the
power to do so. ...
It is ironic that the majority, in its professed
desire to avoid usurping the power of the
legislature, does so by frustrating the
legislature's clear intent to pass a
constitutional death penalty. There is no
indication that the legislature, in passing the
Kansas death penalty law, was particularly
concerned that the sentence be death in the
event that the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances were exactly equal. . . . By
invalidating the Kansas death penalty law on
the basis of its application to a technical
event that is almost certain never to arise in
the real world, the majority opinion thwarts
the intention of the legislature, ostensibly, in
order to pay tribute to it.
The only currency and legitimacy this court
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possesses is the confidence of the public that
we will decide cases based on the consistent
application of the law, rather than on the
proclivities of individual court members.
Attorneys, trial courts, and the public have
the right to know that a point of law, once
settled, will remain the settled law of the
state and not be overturned every time the
composition of the court changes. Our
fidelity to the doctrine of stare decisis need
not be absolute, but we should not abandon
our prior decisions without a compelling
reason to do so. No compelling reason has
been shown herein and, as a result, I believe
the majority opinion is a breach of that
fidelity.
... In Kleypas, in a 4 to 3 decision, all seven
justices agreed the Kansas death penalty law
was constitutional, either as construed in a
very minor respect (majority) or as written
(dissent). To now strike down the Kansas
death penalty law is, in my opinion, wholly
inappropriate and unjustified, and I dissent
therefrom.
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"A Major Death Penalty Case? Maybe Not"
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
May 31, 2005
The somewhat confused procedural history
of Kansas' death penalty law has followed it
to the Supreme Court, so the Justices'
agreement on Tuesday to hear an appeal by
the state may not lead to a significant
pronouncement on a key constitutional
question. That question is whether a "tie" in
a jury's death penalty findings goes to the
state, or to the individual on trial. But that is
not the only issue the Court will be hearing.
The Court's only order Tuesday granting
review of a new case involves Kansas'
capital punishment law, enacted in 1994. It
specifies that, if the jury finds aggravating
and mitigating circumstances to be equally
balanced, a death sentence must be
imposed-in other words, a "tie" goes to the
state.
The Kansas Supreme Court, in a 4-3
decision in 2001 in the case of State v.
Kleypas, ruled that this weighing equation
would violate the Eighth Amendment ban on
cruel and unusual punishment (and the
Fourteenth Amendment). "Fundamental
fairness," the state court said then, "requires
that a tie goes to the defendant when life or
death is at issue."
However, the state court at that time did not
strike down the law as written. Rather, it
said, the law could be construed in such a
way as to uphold the intent of the legislature
to have a death sentence that would satisfy
the Constitution. So, it construed the law at
that time to mean that aggravating
circumstances must outweigh mitigating
factors for a death penalty to be imposed.
When a new case, involving convicted
murderer Michael Lee Marsh II of Wichita,
reached the state court last year, the
tribunal-in another 4-3 vote-struck down
the law. Rejecting an argument by the
dissenters that the Supreme Court had
already implicitly decided that such an
"equipoise" provision would be valid, the
majority said the Court had issued no such
ruling.
The majority went on to say that it had been
wrong in failing to strike down the law in
2001 in order to save its constitutionality.
"The avoidance doctrine is applied
appropriately only when a statute is
ambiguous, vague, or overbroad. . . . The
court's function is to interpret legislation,
not rewrite."
Taking the case on to the Supreme Court,
the state of Kansas raised a single question:
"Does it violate the Constitution for a state
capital-sentencing statute to provide for the
imposition of the death penalty when the
sentencing jury determines that the
mitigating and aggravating evidence is in
equipoise?"
But, in granting review, the Court added two
questions of its own-and, depending upon
the answers, either query could lead to a
decision without the Justices resolving the
"equipoise" question.
The two new issues are: "Does this Court
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have jurisdiction to review the judgment of
the Kansas Supreme Court under 28 USC
1257, as construed by Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn (1975)?" and "Was the
Kansas Supreme Court's judgment
adequately supported by a ground
independent of federal law?"
On the central constitutional question, the
state's appeal argues that the ruling
"resurrects a conflict in constitutional
interpretation that this Court resolved in
Walton v. Arizona [1990]." It argues that
the state and federal courts are divided on
the issue. (The Supreme Court itself
overruled Walton in 2002, but on other
grounds in Ring v. Arizona.)
The new case is Kansas v. Marsh (04-
1170). It will come up for argument in the
new Term starting in October.
The case involves a multiple murder in
1996, during a planned robbery. Michael
Marsh was convicted of capital murder,
first-degree murder, aggravated arson and
aggravated burglary. In the capital
sentencing phase, the jury was instructed
that a tie between aggravating and
mitigating circumstances must lead to a
death sentence. The jury agreed
unanimously on that sentence.
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"Death on the Docket: Kansas Death Penalty
Draws High Court's Interest"
Wichita Eagle (Kansas)
June 1, 2005
Ron Sylvester
Kansas death penalty supporters may get
their day in front of the U.S. Supreme Court,
but they'll first have to show they have good
reason to be there. In a case tangled with
legal complexities, the Supreme Court on
Tuesday agreed to consider the appeal of
Michael Marsh, convicted of murder. The
case could also affect the fate of seven other
men under death sentences at the state
prison at El Dorado.
The justices, however, said they first would
consider whether they even have authority to
review the decision handed down late last
year by the Kansas Supreme Court. That
sets up a legal gauntlet of sorts that Kansas
Attorney General Phill Kline has to clear
before he gets to make his arguments in
favor of capital punishment.
The state's highest court ruled 4-3 in
December that the Kansas law is
unconstitutional because it tips justice in
favor of state execution and away from the
rights of the individual.
That's a claim that went unchallenged by the
state during its arguments in Marsh's appeal.
Kline said he understood why then-Attorney
General Carla Stovall relied instead on a
2001 decision in the case of Gary Kleypas.
In that case, the court said the law was
unconstitutional. But the justices ruled that
District Courts could fix the problem by
instructing the jury to let life outweigh
death.
"The state simply said we're not going to
argue that," Kline said during a news
conference. "It's already been decided in
Kleypas. There needs to be a re-sentencing
of Mr. Marsh with that jury instruction
present."
That's one view.
"In fact, they conceded that it was
unconstitutional," said Rebecca Woodman,
the state's chief public defender in handling
capital murder appeals.
Because the state didn't make a challenge to
that contention in Marsh, it could prevent
the U.S. Supreme Court from taking up the
death penalty arguments.
It's similar to not making an objection
during trial. The issue that wasn't objected
to cannot then be brought up on appeal by
the losing side.
"They cannot hear it if the issue is not
preserved," Woodman said.
Said Kline: "Our position is since the court
raised that issue, we have the right to bring it
before the (U.S.) Supreme Court at this
time."
Four other people have been sentenced to
death under the Kleypas guidelines. Those
include Jonathan and Reginald Carr,
convicted in Wichita's notorious 2001
quadruple homicide. If the Kansas Supreme
Court's ruling stands, those death penalties
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could be erased in favor of life in prison.
Only a jury can impose a death sentence,
and crucial to those deliberations are the
weighing of factors that make the murder
more deserving of execution.
During the penalty phase of a capital murder
trial, the state presents what it calls
aggravating factors-reasons the law says
qualifies the defendant for the death penalty.
These include killing during a rape, killing
to eliminate witnesses or killing with
unusual cruelty.
The jury may also consider reasons to let a
judge hand down a life prison sentence.
These are called mitigating factors. They
may range from age to the capacity to
understand the crime. They might even
include trauma suffered by the defendant at
the hands of the eventual victim-such as a
case of domestic violence where the battered
spouse retaliates with deadly violence.
Kansas law says that when aggravating
factors equal mitigating factors, jurors
should choose death. But the Kansas
Supreme Court ruled that a tie should go to
life. Otherwise, the court said, the law
violates the due process guarantees in the
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment in the Eighth Amendment.
In its decision, the state's high court noted
that Stovall warned lawmakers the wording
skirted the Constitution before legislators
passed it in 1994.
Three years after the Kleypas decision, with
three new members sitting on the bench, the
majority of the state's high court decided the
jury instruction that Kleypas prescribed
wasn't enough.
"They decided the court could not rewrite it
to mean the exact opposite of what it says,"
Woodman said.
The nation's highest court will also consider
when it can step in and look at what a state
supreme court rules.
"Being able to prevail before the United
States Supreme Court, when you have a
lower, or a Kansas Supreme Court decision,
in opposition, is a difficult chore," Kline
said.
Either way, death penalty proponents must
get past those questions first.
"It's one strike and you're out," said Richard
Ney, a Wichita lawyer and death penalty
opponent.
Ney also pointed out that it could be six
months before the U.S. Supreme Court hears
arguments. It could be several more months
before the ruling comes.
In the meantime, the death penalty in Kansas
remains on hold. Appeals will be
postponed. Cases currently going through
the system will be subject to the same
suspect law on appeal.
Executions will be delayed for years, Ney
said, while expenses of bringing the cases
pile up.
"You're looking at a 10-year-old law, where
you haven't had one case make it past the
first appeal," Ney said, "And we haven't
even gotten to the big time of appeals yet.
All of these cases will end up going to the
federal district courts and the appellate
courts."
It could be many years before Kansas
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actually sees a death sentence carried out.
New Jersey, which passed its capital
punishment law a dozen years before
Kansas, has yet to put any convict to death.
The last execution in Kansas came by
hanging in 1965.
Prosecutors in Sedgwick County, the state's
most aggressive in seeking the death
penalty, said they are undeterred.
"We never stop trying to ensure that the
rightful sentence imposed is inflicted," said
Kevin O'Connor, chief litigator for the
Sedgwick County district attorney's office.
When talking about any capital murder case,
O'Connor said, the accused is only part of
the case.
"It's important to remember the people that
they killed, who were killed in horrible
ways," he said. "We will never forget those
individuals."
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"Kansas Justices Rule Death Penalty Unconstitutional"
Kansas City Star
December 18, 2004
Tony Rizzo and David Klepper
In a decision that could spare the lives of
some of Kansas' most infamous killers, the
state Supreme Court ruled Friday that the
state's death penalty law is unconstitutional.
Convicted Johnson County serial killer John
E. Robinson Sr. is one of those sentenced to
death whose case is affected by the 4-3
decision in the Sedgwick County case of
Michael L. Marsh II.
A total of seven men in Kansas could have
their death sentences invalidated by the
ruling, authorities said.
And it could prevent prosecutors from
seeking death sentences in pending capital
murder cases such as the recently filed case
against Benjamin Appleby, who is charged
in the death of Leawood, Kan., teenager Ali
Kemp.
Sedgwick County District Attorney Nola
Foulston and Kansas Attorney General Phill
Kline both said they will ask the U.S.
Supreme Court to review Friday's decision
that invalidates Kansas' 10-year-old law.
Kline said he is asking Johnson County
District Attorney Paul Morrison to assist
with the appeal.
"This is an enormously significant decision
that, unless overturned by the United States
Supreme Court, will invalidate every death
sentence given in Kansas," Foulston said in
a written statement.
The decision authored by Justice Donald
Allegrucci makes it clear that the technical
flaw in the law cited by the majority is an
issue that must be addressed by the Kansas
Legislature, which could re-write it "to pass
constitutional muster."
"The court is just saying there is a
constitutional problem with the death
penalty, and the Legislature needs to fix it,"
said Kansas state Sen. John Vratil, a
Republican and chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
The offending section of the law, according
to the majority, has to do with the way jurors
are instructed to decide if a death sentence
or life in prison is imposed.
The Kansas law as written requires jurors to
vote for death if the "aggravating factors"
offered by prosecutors and the "mitigating
factors" offered by the defense balance each
other out, the justices said.
In essence the fact that a tie goes to the
state or prosecution-renders the law
unconstitutional, the court said.
The three dissenting justices disagreed, and
argued that the U.S. Supreme Court has
already "implicitly approved" the Kansas
law by upholding an Arizona law that is
"functionally identical" to the one in Kansas.
Friday's decision involved the appeal of
Michael Marsh II of Wichita, who was
sentenced to die for the June 1996 deaths of
Marry Ane Pusch, 21, and Marry Elizabeth
Pusch, who was 19 months old.
The ruling overturned the court's own 2001
ruling in the case of Gary Wayne Kleypas,
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who was sentenced to death for the 1996
killing of Carrie Williams in Pittsburg, Kan.
That decision, again a 4-3 split, also pointed
out what they called the unconstitutional
nature of the way mitigating and aggravating
factors are weighed by juries. But the court
upheld his conviction, ordered a new
sentencing hearing, and provided alternative
language to instruct jurors in a constitutional
way.
Foulston said prosecutors have relied on that
decision ever since in pursuing capital cases.
But with Friday's decision, the court's
majority determined that it was the job of
the Legislature, not the court, to correct the
constitutional problems.
Besides Allegrucci, the justices voting in the
majority were Marla Luckert, Robert
Gernon and Carol Beier. The dissenting
justices were Robert Davis, Lawton Nuss
and Chief Justice Kay McFarland.
The Legislature will likely discuss
remedying the death penalty statute when it
reconvenes Jan. 10, Vratil said.
But legislators opposed to the death penalty
could block the changes.
"Drafting the fix will be relatively easy.
Passing that fix may be another question,"
Vratil said. "In the six years I've been in the
Senate, we haven't had a vote on the death
penalty. I can easily imagine that there is a
significant amount of legislators who oppose
the death penalty."
Kansas City lawyer Sean O'Brien, a capital
litigation specialist who defended Robinson
in his Johnson County trial, called the
court's ruling a sound legal decision that
corrects an earlier decision of the court.
"They're doing what they should have done
in the first place," O'Brien said.
He said Kansas is now back to "square one"
and has the chance to re-evaluate whether
having a death penalty is worth the
tremendous cost of prosecuting such cases.
The current capital murder law in Kansas
pertains to cases of premeditated first-degree
murder where seven special circumstances
are involved. They include murders
committed during a sexual assault,
kidnapping of a child, and killing of a police
officer or corrections officer.
Trials are conducted in two phases. If a
defendant is convicted of capital murder
then the same jury is asked to consider either
a sentence of death by lethal injection or life
in prison.
Prosecutors present aggravating factors such
as the defendant's previous convictions for
violent crimes or the cruel manner in which
the crime occurred. The defense presents
mitigating factors such as the lack of
criminal history, the age of the defendant or
the presence of emotional or mental
problems at the time of the crime.
Jurors must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that at least one aggravating factor exists. If
the aggravating factors are not outweighed
by the mitigating factors, then a death
sentence is called for.
That wording, taken at face value, implies
that if the factors are equal in the minds of
jurors, then death is still the penalty.
In its Kleypas ruling, the court suggested
that if the instruction instead read that a
sentence of death shall be imposed if the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors, then it would be constitutional.
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Former Attorney General Carla Stovall
foresaw the problem in 1995 when she
suggested to the Legislature that the
language be adopted to prevent the problem
pointed out by the Supreme Court.
The fact that the Legislature chose to word
the law the way it did despite the attorney
general's advice shows its intent, according
to the majority decision Friday.
It's an issue that has never been directly
addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court,
according to the majority.
Besides Robinson, Marsh and Kleypas, the
four other men affected directly by the
decision are Gavin Scott, Douglas Belt and
brothers Jonathan and Reginald Carr. All
four of those cases were prosecuted in
Sedgwick County.
Prosecutors are also concerned that pending
cases such as that of Appleby and Errik
Harris, charged with killing four persons in
Kansas City, Kan., in Wyandotte County
could be affected.
Both Morrison and Wyandotte County
District Attorney-elect Jerry Gorman, said
they were assessing the possibilities.
Both are concerned that even if the
Legislature fixes the problem, if Friday's
decision is upheld, it could preclude seeking
a death sentence in either case because the
prosecutors would have to rely on the law
that was in place at the time the crimes
occurred.
O'Brien said that the cases of Robinson and
the others currently sentenced to death will
now be sent back to trial courts for re-
sentencing without the possibility of death.
The only issue will now be if they receive
life sentences with no chance of parole for
40 years or 50 years, depending on the law
in place at the time of their crimes.
Kline said it will likely be five to six months
before the U.S. Supreme Court announces
whether it will hear the appeal. He knows
the U.S. Supreme Court typically hears only
a fraction of the requested appeals.
"We're very hopeful they will hear it," Kline
said. "But I can't predict."
Kline said the ruling has the effect of
"thwarting the administration of justice" and
"wreaking emotional havoc" on the families
of victims. He said he felt the ruling was
based on the personal opinions of recently
appointed justices, rather than law.
"Courts are supposed to act differently than
Legislatures," he said, and "not base their
decisions on personal prejudices or
predilections."
Kline said the 2001 Kleypas ruling appeared
to indicate the changes suggested by Stovall
in 1995 weren't necessary. But if the
Legislature had heeded Stovall's advice,
Kline said, "we would not be facing this
today."
Until the U.S. Supreme Court decides if it
will hear the appeal, Kline said his office
will continue to prosecute capital cases as it
had before the ruling.
Janie Williams of Parsons, Kan., said she
wasn't sure if her reaction to Friday's ruling
could be printed in a family newspaper.
Kleypas was convicted and sentenced to
death in the murder of Williams' daughter,
Carrie. The Kansas Supreme Court ordered
a new sentencing hearing for Kleypas in
2001, and the Williams family has been
waiting for three years for court action.
"You live in limbo," she said. "It always
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seems like it's the victim's family that gets
penalized."
She was unhappy not only about the
decision, but about its timing, as well. "I'm
not very happy that they did this just before
Christmas," she said. "It affects my kids, it
affects my grandkids, it affects her (Carrie's)
friends. It's kind of spineless of them to do
it right before Christmas."
The Kansas Coalition Against the Death
Penalty released a statement applauding
Friday's decision.
The group said it thought it would be a
"colossal mistake" for the Legislature to
"fix" the flawed statute.
"The people of Kansas can be safe without a
death penalty," the group stated.
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"Court Unlikely to Make More Historic Moves"
USA Today
March 2, 2005
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court's new ban on executing
those who were juveniles at the time of their
crimes is a logical sequel to a 2002 ruling in
which the justices barred executions of the
mentally retarded. The rulings are the mark
of a court that wants to reserve the death
penalty for the nation's worst killers and that
is concerned about how the sentence has
been used in some cases.
The court's trepidation comes during a new
era of scrutiny for the death penalty. About
a dozen inmates have been released from
death rows with the help of DNA testing
since 1994, and the pace of executions
nationwide has slowed amid concerns that
some death row inmates might be wrongly
executed.
So does all this mean that the Supreme
Court-which banned the death penalty in
1972, then re-instated it four years later-
could be headed for another historic shift on
capital punishment?
Not likely.
The nine justices on today's court repeatedly
have endorsed the idea of capital
punishment. Unlike in previous decades,
when then-justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall dissented from every
decision allowing capital punishment, no
justice on the current court opposes the
death penalty on ideological grounds.
Instead, the often-heated debate over the
death penalty among the current justices has
focused on who should be subject to the
ultimate punishment and whether state
procedures are fair.
Writing for the majority in Tuesday's 5-4
ruling, Justice Anthony Kennedy said that
criminals younger than 18 cannot be treated
the same as adults. "Differences between
juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate
that juvenile offenders cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst
offenders," he wrote, citing juveniles'
immaturity and susceptibility to peer
pressure. That rationale, which removes 70
juveniles from death rows nationwide, could
have ramifications for many more juvenile
defendants.
"The trends in the states have been to both
punish and sentence juvenile offenders more
and more like adults," Northwestern
University law professor Steven Drizin says.
"This reminds everybody that there are
significant differences."
Tuesday's case involved Christopher
Simmons, who in 1993 was a 17-year-old
high school junior when he orchestrated the
abduction and murder of Shirley Crook.
Simmons and a friend wrapped Crook's face
in duct tape, bound her hands and feet with
electrical wire and threw her from a bridge
while she was still alive. She drowned in
the waters below.
At Simmons' trial, testimony indicated that
he had planned the crime and then had
bragged about it afterward. He was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
In 2003, however, Missouri's Supreme Court
ruled that juvenile executions should be
480
considered unconstitutional. The court cited
the U.S. Supreme Court's 2002 decision that
found there was a new national consensus
against executing the mentally retarded,
The Missouri judges said a similar
consensus had developed against executing
juvenile offenders. They noted that 18 of
the 38 states with the death penalty barred
such executions and that 12 other states
banned all executions.
Affirming that decision Tuesday, the
Kennedy-led majority said there was a new
consensus against such executions. The
courts consideration of whether a
punishment is "cruel and unusual" requires it
to look at "evolving standards of decency"
and therefore national consensus.
Another key question for the justices was
whether the death penalty is "proportionate"
to juvenile crimes. On that question, the
majority said no. It noted the USA was
virtually alone in sanctioning executions of
juvenile offenders. Kennedy said that "the
United States now stands alone in a world
that has turned its face against the juvenile
death penalty."
That echoed the argument by Washington
lawyer Seth Waxman, who represented
Simmons. "The death penalty has to be
reserved for the worst of the worst," he said.
Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon, who
had appealed the Simmons case to the
justices, said, "We respect the decision of
the court. . . . There has never been any
question about (Simmons') guilt . . . and this
decision confirms that he will spend the rest
of his life in prison."
Alabama Attorney General Troy King said
that for murder victims' sake, he was
"deeply disappointed" in the ruling.
He said it failed "to recognize that the
removal of this deterrent from prosecutors . .
. will likely lead to more tragedy, more
brutality and to more victims."
One of the killers who could be indirectly
affected by the ruling is Lee Boyd Malvo,
who was convicted in two of the 10 sniper
slayings in the Washington area in 2002 and
sentenced to life in prison.
Malvo, who was 17 at
crimes, could have faced
in other trials. Now, there
him again.
the time of the
the death penalty
is no reason to try
Dissenting from Tuesday's decision were
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas. They said they
did not believe there was a genuine national
consensus against the juvenile executions.
Scalia angrily said the court's majority had
substituted its own views for a legislative
consensus.
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"Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence"
New York Times
March 4, 2005
Robert Weisberg
Both the result and the reasoning of the
Supreme Court's decision this week in
Roper v. Simmons were heartening to
opponents of capital punishment. Not only
did the court outlaw the death penalty for
those who kill before they turn 18, but its
analysis could easily lead to additional
constitutional constraints on capital
punishment.
Yet it is doubtful that the court will follow
the national trend of skepticism about the
death penalty any further. More likely, the
case is the last exhausted gasp of a very
strange jurisprudence that the court will now
be happy to put to rest.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and
unusual punishments," but for much of its
history the United States has allowed the
death penalty. In 1958, the court ruled that
"evolving standards of decency" should
define what constitutes "cruel and unusual,"
and since then it has been forced to confront
the legality of capital punishment in various
types of cases. Could the death penalty be
imposed for nonfatal crimes? When the
defendant did not kill intentionally or at
least in a manner exhibiting "extreme
indifference to human life"?
In answering these kinds of questions (in
both of these cases, the response was no),
the court committed itself to a challenging
set of tasks. First, it would examine the
patterns of state laws or court decisions to
determine by a rough empiricism whether
the death penalty in a particular category has
become cruel by virtue of being literally
unusual. Of course, this approach raises the
perfectly reasonable question of how the
scope of the Bill of Rights, which was
designed to limit the powers of legislative
majorities, could depend in part on the
decisions of those very majorities.
Next, the court would consult various other
sources for evidence of some sort of moral
consensus. In doing so, the court would
refer to philosophical or moral principles or
political attitudes outside the realm of law
altogether-and even to international
expressions of moral value. This strategy
provokes the (again perfectly reasonable)
complaint that unelected jurists are now
acting like pollsters, assessing the public's
moral values. Or, worse, they are becoming
arbiters of moral value themselves.
Three years ago the court used this
approach, looking at trends among the states
as well as the scientific consensus on the
definition and significance of retardation, to
strike down executions of the mentally
retarded. And this week the court
reconsidered how this test applies to the
question of age. In 1988, it ruled that
defendants who killed before their 16th
birthday could not be executed; now the age
is 18.
As in earlier cases, the court looked at trends
among the states and at legal, scientific and
philosophical understandings about when
people are mature enough to forfeit their
lives for their crimes. What was notable
was how candid the court was about two
factors that influenced its judgment: the
justices' own notions about the morality of
executing young killers, and the
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international condemnation of executing
people for crimes committed when they
were juveniles.
Justice Antonin Scalia was practically
apoplectic in his exasperated dissent. "This
is no way to run a legal system," he wrote,
denouncing this latest round of trend-
spotting as irrational and unreliable. And
indeed, the change in attitudes toward age
has been far less evident than the change in
attitudes toward retardation.
Given Justice Scalia's analytic dexterity and
rhetorical brilliance, his dissent is utterly
convincing. But it is also completely beside
the point. In Roper, the court exposed its
somewhat intellectually embarrassing
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. But it
did so in order to overcome the greater
embarrassment of one last specific,
egregious category of capital punishment.
Having noted that only the United States and
Somalia had refused to ratify a United
Nations convention barring the execution of
juvenile criminals, the court's decision
comes down to this: on matters of criminal
punishment, the United States "now stands
alone in a world that has turned its face
against the juvenile death penalty." Justice
Scalia scorns the court's deference to "the
so-called international community" and self-
appointed role as the "authoritative
conscience of the nation." Yet instead of
denying the charge, the court revels in it.
At any rate, there is little prospect of more
tortured Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Executing the mentally ill? The universal
availability of some kind of "not guilty by
reason of insanity" verdict, and the
established constitutional rule that states
cannot execute someone "presently insane,"
mean that this category need not be litigated.
Executing those under 21? In Roper, the
court was unusually categorical: "The age
of 18 is the point where society draws the
line for many purposes between childhood
and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at
which the line for death eligibility ought to
rest."
Of course, America retains its outlier status,
at least compared with most democratic
nations, as a nation that allows the death
penalty at all. And the court may issue some
further decisions fine-tuning procedures or
standards of proof for the use of the death
penalty, or requiring enhanced guarantees of
adequate representation for capital
defendants. It would probably take a truly
horrifying event, like a post-execution
exoneration through DNA evidence, to sway
public opinion so much against the death
penalty that the court would consider
declaring the practice itself unconstitutional.
For now, opponents of capital punishment
can hope that state-legislated improvements
in criminal procedure and technology, along
with political constraints, will address their
concerns about wrongful executions. That
way, the court will be spared the
awkwardness of returning to the cruel and
unusual task of assessing America's
evolving standards of decency.
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"Dying in the Wrong Way"
Legal Times
March 7, 2005
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
The idea of putting a person to death for a
murder committed at age 17 or younger
strikes many of us as grotesque. So it may
seem fitting that five Supreme Court justices
held on March 1 that juvenile executions
violate "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing
society"-the touchstone since 1958 for
determining whether punishments are
unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual."
Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion
gives six cogent-sounding reasons for this
judgment:
[1] The trend in state legislatures has been
toward ending juvenile executions.
[2] Only six states have executed someone
convicted as a juvenile since 1989.
[3] Juveniles are less calculating than adults
and thus less likely to be deterred by fear of
death.
[4] Their crimes tend to be less "morally
reprehensible" and less indicative of
"irretrievably depraved character" because
juveniles are less mature and have a less-
developed sense of moral responsibility.
[5] Emphasizing the Court's assertion three
years ago that "in the end, our own judgment
will be brought to bear on the question of
the acceptability of the death penalty under
the Eighth Amendment," Kennedy declares
his personal view, joined by four others, that
juvenile executions should be banned.
[6] "The United States now stands alone in a
world that has turned its face against the
juvenile death penalty," with all other
nations having officially ended the practice.
A Bogus Consensus
All of this is good enough to convince me
that we should end juvenile executions. So
why did four justices dissent in the case,
Roper v. Simmons? Because they were right
to oppose ending juvenile executions by
judicial fiat. The dissenters shred each of
the majority's six arguments:
[1] A trend that 20 of the 38 death-penalty
states have declined to join is far from the
national "consensus"-the traditional
measure of "evolving standards of
decency"-that Kennedy claims. Indeed,
just 16 years ago, the Court upheld the death
penalty for 16- and 17-year-old murderers in
Stanford v. Kentucky. While four more state
legislatures have ended juvenile executions
since then, for a total of 18, that's not even a
majority of the 38, let alone a "consensus."
Kennedy pads his bogus "consensus" by
adding to these 18 states the 12 others that
have entirely abolished the death penalty.
But none of the 12 suggested that juvenile
killers should be ineligible for the maximum
penalty faced by adult killers.
[2] The number of juvenile executions has
held steady or even gone up since Stanford.
And their infrequency reflects only the facts
that most murderers are adults and that
capital juries are instructed to consider youth
as a mitigating factor.
[3] The defendant in this very case,
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Christopher Simmons, showed how
calculating a juvenile killer can be. He told
friends he wanted to murder someone;
planned to break into a house, tie up his
victim, and throw her off a bridge; and
assured accomplices that they "could get
away with it" because they were juveniles-
a prediction now partially validated by the
Court. On entering his victim's bedroom
and recognizing her, Simmons bound and
gagged her with duct tape, took her to a
bridge, tied her hands and feet with
electrical wire, and threw her into the
Meramec River.
[4] As further evidence of his moral
depravity, Simmons bragged to friends that
he had killed "because the bitch seen my
face." His lawyer, stressing that under state
law Simmons was too young to drink, serve
on a jury, or see certain movies, argued that
he did not deserve death. The jury
disagreed.
Some of the mental health experts who
successfully urged the Court to find that
juveniles lack the moral reasoning ability to
be held responsible for murder have made
inconsistent arguments in past cases. When
the issue was whether minors should have
access to abortion without parental
involvement, the American Psychological
Association asserted that girls as young as
14 "develop abilities similar to adults in
reasoning about moral dilemmas."
[5] It is presumptuous and anti-democratic
for five life-tenured lawyers to appoint
themselves the nation's moral conscience
and to look inward-rather than to elected
representatives, voters, juries, or the
Constitution itself-to discern the nation's
"evolving standards of decency."
Especially when the justices' own moral
consciences are so malleable. The same
Kennedy who authored Simmons had joined
Justice Antonin Scalia's 1989 ruling that
nothing in the Constitution forbids juvenile
executions. As Scalia stresses, Kennedy's
explanation for this reversal is "not, mind
you, that this Court's decision 15 years ago
was wrong, but that the Constitution has
changed." This brand of "interpretation"
mocks Alexander Hamilton's injunction in
The Federalist No. 78 that the judiciary
should be "bound down by strict rules and
precedents, which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them."
[6] One key to understanding the Court's
reliance on international and foreign law,
laid out in amicus briefs by the European
Union and several countries, may be the
justices' summer sojourns to glittering
international conferences. They may be
embarrassed by their foreign friends'
concern that America seems so indifferent to
world opinion-so barbaric, even.
I might be embarrassed too. But should the
meaning of our Constitution be
determined-and should democratic
governance be set aside-by what Scalia
calls "the subjective views of five members
of this Court and like-minded foreigners"?
And if international standards are to be our
guide, what of the facts that-by decree of
the Supreme Court-the United States alone
broadly bars prosecutors from using illegally
seized evidence; is one of only six countries
to allow abortion on demand until the fetus
is viable; and is quite exceptional in
requiring strict separation of church and
state?
What of the fact that the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which the Court cites approvingly for its ban
on executing juveniles, also bans sentencing
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them to life without parole-a penalty that
the states authorize and that Kennedy cited
with approval? By the way, the United
States has refused to ratify that convention.
Public Support
The subjectivity of the justices'
"independent judgment" is also underscored
by Kennedy's side debate with Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's separate dissent.
She agrees with the majority's interpretative
method, its internationalist bent, and its
2002 precedent in Atkins v. Virginia [which
she joined] banning execution of mentally
retarded murderers.
But 16- and 17-year-old murderers should
not enjoy the same constitutional protection,
O'Connor asserts in Simmons, while
suggesting that she would welcome a
statutory ban. Why? Because there is
"continuing public support" for juvenile
executions and because "at least some 17-
year-olds" may deserve death. Yet Kennedy
stresses that the impropriety of the juvenile
death penalty "gained wide recognition
earlier than the impropriety of executing the
mentally retarded."
Scalia's "purely originalist approach" [as he
describes it] has its own problems. Scalia
would uphold any punishment deemed
constitutional at the time of the Framers,
leaving it to elected officials to discern
"evolving standards of decency." That
would make the Eighth Amendment a dead
letter. When it was adopted, children as
young as 7 could be executed, among other
punishments now universally deemed
barbaric.
So the Court must draw a line somewhere to
designate how young is too young for the
death penalty. In 1988, it drew a more
defensible line in Thompson v. Oklahoma,
holding that killers 15 years old and younger
should not be executed.
But in its impatience with 20 states' current
unwillingness to draw their own legal lines
where it [or I] would like, the current Court
majority has assumed the power to act
essentially as a continuing constitutional
convention.
"It seems inevitable," editorialized the New
York Times, "that, one day, Americans will
look back on this latest narrowing of the
categories of people eligible for execution as
another intermediate step toward the Court's
entire rejection of the death penalty."
Oh, good. I don't like the death penalty,
either. And if the voters in the 38 death
penalty states remain too benighted to do the
right thing themselves, what standing do
they have to second-guess the "evolving
standards of decency" decreed by five moral
guardians and the world's greatest
newspaper?
486
"Justice a Scattered Force of Reason"
The Times Union
March 6, 2005
George Will
WASHINGTON-In 1992, before
delivering the Supreme Court's ruling in an
abortion case, Justice Anthony Kennedy,
who has a penchant for self-dramatization,
stood with a journalist observing rival
groups of demonstrators and mused:
"Sometimes you don't know if you're Caesar
about to cross the Rubicon or Captain Queeg
cutting your own tow line."
Or perhaps you are a would-be legislator, a
dilettante sociologist and freelance moralist,
disguised as a judge.
Last Tuesday, Kennedy played those three
roles when, in yet another 5-4 decision, the
court declared it unconstitutional to execute
people who murder when under 18. Such
executions, it said, violate the Eighth
Amendment proscription of "cruel and
unusual" punishments because . . . well,
Kennedy's opinion, in which justices
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
David Souter and John Paul Stevens joined,
is a tossed salad of reasons why those five
think the court had a duty to do what state
legislatures have the rightful power and,
arguably, the moral responsibility to do.
Although the court rendered an opposite
decision just 16 years ago, Kennedy says the
nation's "evolving standards of decency"
now rank such executions as cruel and
unusual. One proof of this, he says, is: Of
the 38 states that have capital punishment,
18 bar executions of those who murder
before age 18, five more than in 1989. So
he constructs a "national consensus" against
capital punishment of juvenile offenders by
adding a minority of the states with capital
punishment to the 12 states that have
decided "that the death penalty is
inappropriate for all offenders."
But "inappropriate" is not a synonym for
"unconstitutional." Kennedy simply
assumes that those 12 states must consider
all capital punishment unconstitutional, not
just wrong or ineffective or more trouble
than it is worth-three descriptions that are
not synonymous with "unconstitutional."
While discussing America's "evolving
standards of decency," Kennedy announces:
"It is proper that we acknowledge the
overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty."
Why is that proper when construing the U.S.
Constitution? He is remarkably unclear
about that. He says two international
conventions forbid executions of people
who committed their crimes as juveniles.
That, he thinks, somehow illuminates the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
Kennedy, self-appointed discerner of the
national consensus on penology, evidently
considers it unimportant that the United
States attached to one of the conventions
language reserving the right "to impose
capital punishment . . . for crimes committed
by persons below eighteen years of age."
The United States never ratified the other
convention Kennedy cites. In his extra-
judicial capacity as roving moralist,
Kennedy sniffily disapproves of that
nonratification as evidence that America is
committing the cardinal sin of being out of
step with "the world community."
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Kennedy the sociologist says "any parent
knows" and "scientific and sociological
studies" show that people under 18 show a
"lack of maturity" and an "underdeveloped
sense of responsibility" and susceptibility to
"negative influences" and a weak aptitude
for "cost-benefit analysis." All this means,
he says, that young offenders "cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst
offenders." Well. Is it gauche to interrupt
Kennedy's seminar on adolescence with
some perhaps pertinent details?
The 17-year-old in the case the court was
considering bragged about planning to do
what he then did: He broke into a woman's
home, put duct tape over her eyes and
mouth, wrapped her head in a towel, bound
her limbs with electrical wire, then threw her
off a railroad trestle into a river where,
helpless, she drowned.
Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Justices
William Rehnquist and Clarence Thomas
(Justice Sandra Day O'Connor dissented
separately), deplores "the new reality that, to
the extent that our Eighth Amendment
decisions constitute something more than a
show of hands on the current Justices'
current personal views about penology, they
purport to be nothing more than a snapshot
of American public opinion at a particular
point in time (with the time frames now
shortened to a mere 15 years)."
Kennedy occupies the seat that 52 Senate
Democrats prevented Robert Bork from
filling in 1987. That episode accelerated the
descent into the scorched-earth partisanship
that was raging in the Senate Judiciary
Committee at the very moment Tuesday
morning that Kennedy was presenting the
court majority's policy preference as a
constitutional imperative. The committee's
Democrats were browbeating another
appellate court nominee, foreshadowing
another filibuster.
The Democrats' standard complaint is that
nominees are out of the jurisprudential
"mainstream." If Kennedy represents the
mainstream, it is time to change the shape of
the river. His opinion is an intellectual train
wreck, but useful as a timely warning about
what happens when judicial offices are filled
with injudicious people.
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"Kennedy Reversal Swings Court against Juvenile Death Penalty"
Washington Post
March 7, 2005
Charles Lane
In banning capital punishment for juvenile
offenders last week, the Supreme Court once
again demonstrated its pivotal role in
domestic and, indeed, world affairs.
The 5 to 4 ruling swept aside laws in 20
states that permitted juries to sentence 16- or
17-year-old murderers to death, thus ending
the United States' status as the last country
on Earth that sanctioned the execution of
those who commit crimes when they are
younger than 18.
And, to a large extent, this result was due to
a remarkable evolution by a single justice:
Anthony M. Kennedy.
It is sometimes said that justices "grow in
office," producing opinions and casting
votes on the court that confound the
expectations of those who appointed them.
Kennedy, 68, a 1988 appointee of President
Ronald Reagan, has shown his
unpredictability in the past. He changed his
mind in the middle of a crucial 1992 case,
casting a fifth vote to uphold Roe v. Wade;
he disappointed conservatives again with a
landmark pro-gay-rights opinion in 2003.
Liberals gnashed their teeth when Kennedy
flirted with permitting the Florida recount to
continue in 2000-before casting a fifth vote
to shut it down and propel George W. Bush
into the White House.
But it is not often that a member of the court
reconsiders his past views on a major issue
as thoroughly as Kennedy did last week,
when he supplied the court's four-justice
liberal bloc the fifth vote it needed to abolish
the death penalty for juveniles.
In 1989, during his first full term, Kennedy
voted with a five-justice majority to uphold
the death penalty for juvenile offenders. In
that case, Stanford v. Kentucky, he joined an
opinion by fellow Reagan appointee
Antonin Scalia.
Reaching the opposite result in last week's
case, Roper v. Simmons, Kennedy, writing
for the majority, argued that times have
changed. The number of states that either
have no capital punishment or do not allow
it for offenders under 18 had reached 30-
evidence, Kennedy wrote, of "a national
consensus" against the juvenile death
penalty that had emerged since Stanford.
But his opinion also repudiated the legal
reasoning he embraced in Scalia's opinion
16 years ago.
For example, the 1989 opinion calculated
"national consensus" differently, excluding
non-death-penalty states from the count; last
week, Kennedy wrote that Stanford was
wrong about that.
In 1989, Scalia, with Kennedy's support,
wrote there was "no relevance" to laws that
set 18 or more as the legal age for adult
activities such as drinking and voting-and
that it was "absurd" to consider them.
Last week, Kennedy appended to his
opinion a list of state laws setting the age for
voting, jury service or marriage without
parental consent at 18 or above. "The age of
18 is the point where society draws the line
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for many purposes between childhood and
adulthood," Kennedy wrote. "It is, we
conclude, the age at which the line for death
eligibility ought to rest."
In 1989, Kennedy agreed with Scalia in
brushing aside scientific studies on the
relative immaturity of adolescents. Such
data could not prove capital punishment fails
to deter all 16- and 17-year-olds, or that
juveniles are inherently less morally
blameworthy than adults; judgments about
deterrence and blameworthiness should be
left up to legislatures and juries, the Scalia-
Kennedy opinion said.
Last week, though, Kennedy cited "scientific
and sociological studies" for the proposition
that "it would be misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult."
The weighing of such factors could not be
left up to juries, Kennedy wrote, because
there is "an unacceptable likelihood" that
jurors would be "overpower[ed]" by the
brutal details of some teenage crimes.
Kennedy had joined Scalia in 1989 in
"emphatically rejecting" the suggestion that
the court could apply its "own informed
judgment" to the question of whether death
is too harsh a punishment for any juvenile
crime. Last week, he wrote that that part of
Stanford had been "inconsistent with prior . .
. decisions."
And, although he had joined Scalia in 1989
in "rejecting the contention . . . that the
sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant," this time Kennedy wrote that "it is
proper that we acknowledge the
overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty."
Not surprisingly, Scalia's dissent in Roper
last week took aim at Kennedy, albeit
without attacking him by name.
"The votes in today's case demonstrate that
the offending of selected lawyers' moral
sentiments is not a predictable basis for
law-much less a democratic one," he
noted.
Invoking the motto that adorns the court's
main entrance, Scalia, 68, added: "What
kind of Equal Justice under Law is it that-
without so much as a 'Sorry about that'-
gives as the basis for sparing one person
from execution arguments explicitly rejected
in refusing to spare another?"
But Justice John Paul Stevens, the only
member of the court's current liberal bloc
who was on the bench in 1989, and who has
now lived to see his dissent in Stanford
become the law of the land, fired back in
defense of Kennedy.
Stevens, 84, wrote that if Scalia's view of
the Bill of Rights-that its meaning was
fixed by the common-law standards of
1791-were to prevail, there would be
nothing unconstitutional about the execution
of a 7-year-old child.
"[T]hat our understanding of the
Constitution does change from time to time
has been settled since John Marshall
breathed life into its text," Stevens wrote.
490
Maryland v. Blake
(04-0373)
Ruling Below: (Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218, 849 A.2d 410 (2004), cert granted 125 S. Ct.
1823; 161 L. Ed. 2d 722; 73 U.S.L.W. 3619).
Leeander Blake invoked his Miranda right to counsel while in police custody after having been
arrested for murder. A police officer gave Blake a list of charges against him, which wrongly
indicated that Blake would face the death penalty. The officer then stated that Blake probably
wanted to talk, after which Blake waived his right to counsel and made several incriminating
statements. The trial court suppressed those statements, holding that the officer's actions were
the functional equivalent of interrogation and a violation of Blake's Miranda rights. On appeal,
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals agreed with the state's claim that the officer was merely
commenting on the seriousness of the charges. The Maryland Court of Appeals then reversed,
reinstating the trial court's ruling suppressing the statements. The officer's remark was directed
at Blake, was likely to elicit a response, and therefore amounted to an illegal interrogation.
Question Presented: Whether comments regarding talking to the police made to a defendant in
police custody who had previously invoked his Miranda right to counsel constitute an illegal
interrogation, even if the defendant later waived his right to counsel.
Leeander Jerome BLAKE,
V.
STATE of Maryland
Court of Appeals of Maryland
Decided May 12, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
RAKER, J.:
This case is an interlocutory appeal filed by
the State from an Order in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County granting Leeander
Jerome Blake's motion to suppress his
incriminating statements on the grounds that
the police elicited his statements in violation
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US. 477
(1981). The Court of Special Appeals
disagreed with the Circuit Court, and in an
unreported opinion, reversed. This Court
granted Blake's petition for writ of certiorari
to consider the single question of whether
the police actions in question constituted the
functional equivalent of interrogation
following petitioner's invocation of his
Miranda rights, thereby violating petitioner's
right against compelled self-incrimination.
We shall hold that the police actions
constituted the functional equivalent of
interrogation, thereby violating petitioner's
rights, and, under the circumstances
presented herein, the trial court properly
suppressed petitioner's statements.
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I.
Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury
for Anne Arundel County for the offenses of
first degree murder, second degree murder,
and manslaughter. . . . Straughan Lee
Griffin, a resident of Annapolis, was shot
and killed in front of his home on September
19, 2002. His assailants shot him in the
head, stole his automobile, and ran over his
body as they fled from the scene.
Petitioner filed an omnibus pre-trial motion
to suppress all evidence seized by the State.
We focus here on his motion to suppress his
incriminating statements....
On October 25, 2002, Terrence Tolbert was
arrested in connection with the murder of
Straughan Lee Griffin. Tolbert implicated
petitioner in the crime. Between 4:30 and
5:00 a.m. on the following day, the Anne
Arundel County police arrested petitioner at
his home. Petitioner was wearing boxer
shorts and a tank top and no shoes. He was
handcuffed and transported by uniformed
officers to the Annapolis Police Department.
The police took petitioner to a room
identified as an "intake room" or "booking
room." Detective William Johns, the lead
detective, advised petitioner of his rights
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. Petitioner
invoked his right to counsel, indicating he
did not wish to speak with the police officers
without an attorney, and after signing the
police advice of rights form, he then was
placed in a holding cell at approximately
5:25 a.m.
At 6:00 a.m., Detective Johns, accompanied
by uniformed Officer Curtis Reese, went to
petitioner's cell and gave him a copy of the
arrest warrant and statement of charges,
Detective Johns explained the charges to
petitioner and told him that they were
serious charges, and that he needed to read
the document carefully and make sure he
understood it.
The statement . . . was a District Court of
Maryland computer print-out listing the
charges. The statement of charges indicated
that petitioner was charged with first degree
murder, second degree murder, armed
robbery, armed carjacking, and use of a
handgun in a crime of violence. The penalty
stated on the document for the offense of
first degree murder was, in all capital letters,
"DEATH." Petitioner's date of birth,
reflected on the statement of charges, was
June 1, 1985; he was seventeen years of age.
As a person under the age of eighteen years
at the time of the offense, petitioner was not
eligible for the death penalty.
Detective Johns testified that after he handed
petitioner the charging document and turned
to leave, Officer Reese, apparently having
followed Detective Johns to the cell block
area, appeared and said, in a tone Detective
Johns characterized as loud and
confrontational, "I bet you want to talk now,
huh!" Detective Johns said that he was
surprised by Officer Reese's statement, that
it was unexpected, and that Detective Johns
said, very loudly within petitioner's hearing,
"No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He
already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk
to him now." Detective Johns testified that
he was concerned that "Officer Reese's
outburst would violate Mr. Blake's request
for counsel prior to being questioned" and,
as a result, he told Officer Reese that
petitioner had asked for an attorney and they
could not reinitiate any kind of conversation
with him.
Petitioner remained in the cell block,
wearing only his boxer shorts and t-shirt.
Approximately one-half hour after the
earlier contact, Detective Johns went back to
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petitioner's cell to give petitioner his
clothing. . . . Petitioner then said, "I can still
talk to you?" Detective Johns responded:
"Are you saying that you want to talk to me
now?" Petitioner responded "yes."
Detective Johns left the cell area and
returned after a few minutes. He told
petitioner that he would have to read him his
rights again and that he would be back in a
few minutes. Petitioner then was taken back
to the intake room, was re-advised of his
Miranda rights, which he waived, and
agreed to provide a statement in the absence
of an attorney.
Petitioner made certain incriminating
statements to Detective Johns as he
explained his involvement in the events of
September 19, 2002. ...
Petitioner testified at the hearing on the
motion to suppress. He testified that . . . the
detective initiated the conversation again,
stating: "Mr. Blake, do you wish to still talk
to me?" In response, petitioner said, "May I
still talk to you?" The detective allegedly
responded, "Yes." Petitioner denied first
asking Detective Johns if he could talk to
him.
In response to a question asking petitioner
what caused him to speak to Detective Johns
after he had invoked his Miranda rights,
petitioner stated:
"First, it was what Officer
Reese said to me, 'I bet you
want to talk now, huh!' I was
scared, cold. Never went
through nothing like this. And I
saw my charges and I saw I was
facing death."
The Circuit Court granted petitioner's
motion to suppress his statements. Judge
Pamela North [noted] that petitioner had
invoked his right to counsel and that
pursuant to Miranda, no further
interrogation could ensue. Judge North
found the following:
I believe the State's argument
misses the mark when it focuses
on what Johns intended or did
not intend. Reese is also a
police officer. He constitutes
State action. And he clearly
intended that the Defendant
make a statement.
So the question is how do we
know what Reese intended.
Well, let's analyze the remark
he made. Defendant is handed
a statement of charges
indicating to him, a seventeen-
year-old, indicating to him for
the first time that he is being
charged with murder and he can
get the death penalty.
Reese's statement was, 'I bet
you want to talk now, huh!'
This is not a vague appeal to
Defendant's conscience like the
remarks were in Brewer versus
Williams. First, the statement
itself suggests he should want to
talk. And the word, 'now,' that
is, 'I bet you want to talk now'
clearly refers Defendant to what
has just been handed to him. In
other words, look at those
charges, look at that penalty,
and I'll bet you will want to
talk.
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It is a statement made
specifically for the purpose of
getting Mr. Blake to talk. In
fact, Mr. Blake's question is in
direct response to Reese's
previous statement. The police
left the cellblock area
immediately after Reese made
that statement....
Is there any possible
interpretation of that statement
that it is, as the State has urged
the Court to find, simply an
innocent offhanded comment
not meant or expected to elicit
an incriminating response? I
don't think so. Examples of
innocent offhanded comments
not likely to elicit an
incriminating response would
be, quote, 'Here are some
clothing for you.' Or, 'Please
move away from the door so I
can unlock it.' Or, 'Do you
need a drink of water?'
United States versus Walker
instructs courts to look at the
context in which the statement
is made. Once again, the
context is the statement was
made to a seventeen-year-old
with no Miranda or
interrogation experience, who
was still in a chilly cell in his
underwear with no shoes on,
without a parent present or
available, just as he is being
handed papers advising him he
is charged with murder and can
get death. . . . That statement,
under these circumstances, was
enough to make an adult repeat
offender squirm, not alone a
seventeen-year-old.
There was no lengthy period of
time as we see in some cases to
break the chain of events and to
prove attenuation. In any event,
viewing the evidence under the
totality of the circumstances,
the Defendant did invoke his
right to counsel.
He was thereafter interrogated
by police in violation of
Miranda and Edwards. The
State must prove his subsequent
... waiver was not the result of
the previous coercive unlawful
police conduct. And they have
not met that heavy burden."
The trial court . . . granted Blake's motion to
suppress as to any and all statements he
made at the Annapolis police department
and at the Maryland State Police Barracks.
The State noted a timely appeal to the Court
of Special Appeals. A divided intermediate
appellate court, in an unreported opinion,
reversed the judgment. We granted
petitioner's writ of certiorari to answer the
following question: "Did the police actions
in question constitute the functional
equivalent of interrogation?"
II.
There is no dispute in this case that
petitioner was in custody and had invoked
his right to counsel. The first question is
whether the statement of Officer Reese
constituted "police-initiated custodial
interrogation" in contravention of Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Petitioner argues that Officer Reese's
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comment, made in conjunction with
Detective Johns's passing to petitioner a
copy of the statement of charges which
incorrectly informed him he was facing the
death penalty, was the functional equivalent
of interrogation. He maintains that the
comment was made specifically for the
purpose of getting petitioner to talk and the
officer knew or should have known that,
under the circumstances, the comment was
likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Petitioner argues that his subsequent
statements were suppressed properly
because they were a product of the unlawful
police-initiated interrogation which violated
Edwards.
The State's argument is that Officer Reese's
remark to petitioner was not interrogation-
that petitioner initiated contact with the
police after he read the charging documents
and then voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights before making incriminating
statements. The State contends that Officer
Reese's remark was not the functional
equivalent of interrogation-that it was
nothing more than a comment on the
seriousness of the charges and, in a sense, a
rhetorical question. Even if Officer Reese's
remark is viewed as interrogatory or as an
invitation to talk, the State maintains that
Detective Johns removed any alleged taint
from the remark when he admonished
Officer Reese immediately that they could
not talk to petitioner because he had invoked
his right to counsel.
III.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
dictates that when a suspect is taken into
custody, the person is entitled to certain
procedural safeguards before law
enforcement officers may interrogate that
person. Those rights include the right to
consult with an attorney. Once a suspect
asks to speak with an attorney, that person
may not be interrogated further until either
counsel has been made available or until the
suspect validly waives the earlier request for
an attorney. ... Under the rule developed in
Edwards, "an accused . . . having expressed
his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations
with the police." The Supreme Court held
that once a suspect has invoked his right to
counsel, the police may not make a
subsequent attempt to elicit a waiver and
then a statement by re-advising him of his
Miranda rights. A constitutionally valid
statement may be obtained by the police in
two ways: if the suspect initiates further
conversation with the police or if an attorney
has been made available to the suspect.
Smith v. Illinois, 469 US. 91, 94-95 (1984).
Following a suspect's request for counsel, a
valid waiver of that right cannot be
established by showing only that the accused
responded to further police-initiated
interrogation. The burden is on the State to
prove that, after invoking his or her right to
counsel, the accused initiated . further
discussion with the police. If we find that
petitioner did not initiate further discussions
with the police, following Edwards, we do
not consider whether he subsequently
waived his right to counsel.
Interrogation means more than direct,
explicit questioning and includes the
functional equivalent of interrogation. The
Supreme Court, in Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 US 291 (1980), set out the test for
establishing when a suspect, who is in
custody and has invoked the right to counsel
but does not yet have the assistance of
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counsel, has been subjected
"interrogation." The Court stated:
to
"The Miranda safeguards come
into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either
express questioning or its
functional equivalent. That is to
say, the term 'interrogation'
under Miranda refers not only
to express questioning, but also
to any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the
police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the
suspect."
Although the test of whether the police
should know their words or actions are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response is an objective one, the intent of
the police is not irrelevant. If a police
officer acts with a purpose of getting a
suspect to talk, it follows that the officer has
reason to know that his or her conduct was
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. We focus on the defendant's
perspective rather than on the police
officer's intent. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S.
520, 528 (1987).
"Interrogation," as used in Miranda, has
been further explicated in Innis, as follows:
. . . [T]he Miranda safeguards
were designed to vest a suspect
in custody with an added
measure of protection against
coercive police practices,
without regard to objective
proof of the underlying intent of
the police. A practice that the
police should know is
reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response from a
suspect thus amounts to
interrogation. But, since the
police surely cannot be held
accountable for the
unforeseeable results of their
words or actions, the definition
of interrogation can extend only
to words or actions on the part
of police officers that they
should have known were
reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response."
The State maintains that petitioner's rights
under Miranda and Edwards were not
violated because the police were presenting
petitioner merely with the charging
document, a duty they were mandated to
perform under Maryland law. The State
characterizes Officer Reese's comment as
nothing more than a comment on the
seriousness of the charges and as a rhetorical
question, concluding that his comment does
not constitute interrogation. The answer to
this argument depends upon the answer to
the question as to whether, under Innis, the
police officers engaged in activities which
they should have known were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.
No one disputes here that once petitioner
invoked his Miranda rights, there was no
express questioning.
The Circuit Court found that the comment of
Officer Reese amounted to the functional
equivalent of interrogation. We agree.
Petitioner clearly and unequivocally invoked
his right to counsel under Miranda.
Thereafter, within a very short period of
time, Detective Johns gave petitioner the
charging document listing the penalty to
which petitioner was subjected as
"DEATH." Officer Reese initiated
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communication with petitioner when he said
to him, "I bet you want to talk now, huh!"
Whether the remark made by Officer Reese
was the functional equivalent of
interrogation depends in part on whether the
officer's comment was directed towards
petitioner and was reasonably likely to elicit
a response.
It is undisputed that Officer Reese's
comment was directed towards petitioner.
The remaining question is whether the
comment was reasonably likely to elicit a
response. Officer Reese made his comment
to petitioner when Detective Johns gave
petitioner the charging document advising
him that he was subject to the death penalty;
any reasonable officer had to know that his
comment was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. When the charging
document was given to petitioner,
containing a false statement of the law with
respect to the penalty of death, it was
accompanied by an officer's statement which
served no legitimate purpose other than to
encourage petitioner to speak. Detective
Johns's reaction supports this conclusion.
Merely presenting an accused with a
charging document, without more, is not the
functional equivalent of interrogation. . . .
In Maryland, when a defendant is arrested
without a warrant, a copy of the charging
document must be served on the defendant
promptly after it is filed. In the instant case,
the officers' conduct does not fall into the
category of fulfilling a legal duty and merely
serving a charging document upon a
defendant. Instead, we have an
interrogatory type statement by an officer
concomitant with the serving of a document
containing the most egregious misstatement
as to the penalty for the offense.
The State argues that even if Officer Reese's
statement was interrogation, the detective
told petitioner that they could not talk to
him, and it was petitioner who reinitiated
interrogation, and then knowingly and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The
State maintains that if the suspect reinitiates
contact with the police, and then waives his
rights, police questioning may then
commence.
Relying on Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S.
1039, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405
(1983), the State argues that petitioner's
question, "Can I still talk to you?" is strong
evidence that petitioner initiated the further
contact with the police....
The law is clear that a suspect may validly
waive Miranda rights, but once the right to
counsel has been invoked, additional
safeguards are necessary....
In Bradshaw, the Court found that the
accused in fact initiated the conversation and
that there was no violation of the Edwards
rule. In assessing whether the accused
initiated the interrogation, the Court
observed that the accused's question, "Well,
what is going to happen to me now?",
although ambiguous, was, "in the ordinary
dictionary sense of that word," initiation.
Nonetheless, the Court stated:
"While we doubt that it would
be desirable to build a
superstructure of legal
refinements around the word
'initiate' in this context, there
are undoubtedly situations
where a bare inquiry by either a
defendant or by a police officer
should not be held to 'initiate'
any conversation or dialogue.
There are some inquiries, such
497
as a request for a drink of water
or a request to use a telephone,
that are so routine that they
cannot be fairly said to
represent a desire on the part of
an accused to open up a more
generalized discussion relating
directly or indirectly to the
investigation . . , .
Although ambiguous, the
respondents question in this
case as to what was going to
happen to him evinced a
willingness and a desire for a
generalized discussion about the
investigation; it was not merely
a necessary inquiry arising out
of the incidents of the custodial
relationship. It could
reasonably have been
interpreted by the officer as
relating generally to the
investigation. That the police
officer so understood it is
apparent from the fact that he
immediately reminded the
accused that 'you do not have to
talk to me,' and only after the
accused told him that he
'understood' did they have a
generalized conversation. On
these facts we believe that there
was not a violation of the
Edwards rule."
One court concluded that "initiation" by a
defendant "occurs when the defendant
evinces 'a willingness and a desire for a
generalized discussion about the
investigation"' (quoting Bradshaw).
In finding that petitioner's question was "in
direct response to" Officer Reese's coercive
statement, Judge North found that the police
reinitiated the contact. The court also found
that petitioner "initiated a conversation with
[Detective] Johns after he [was] interrogated
without counsel twenty-eight minutes
earlier. . . ."
We agree with Judge North that petitioner
did not initiate further contact with the
police and that the police violated the
Edwards rule. Although petitioner's
question to Detective Johns, "I can still talk
to you?" might be considered an "initiation"
of contact with the officers in the "dictionary
sense" of the word as used in Bradshaw, it
could hardly be said that, under the
circumstances, petitioner initiated the
contact as that term is contemplated in the
legal sense. Petitioner had requested
counsel; he had been given a document that
told him he was subject to the death penalty,
when legally he was not; he was seventeen
years of age; he had not consulted with
counsel; he was in a cold holding cell with
little clothing; an officer had suggested in a
confrontational tone that petitioner might
want to talk; and the misstatement as to the
potential penalty as one of "DEATH" had
never been corrected. There was no break in
custody or adequate lapse in time sufficient
to vitiate the coercive effect of the
impermissive interrogation.
We reject the State's argument that, even if
Officer Reese interrogated petitioner in
violation of Miranda and Edwards,
Detective Johns somehow cured the
violation by declaring in a loud voice: "No,
he doesn't want to talk to us. He already
asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him
now. . . ." The break in time from Officer
Reese's improper interrogation to petitioner's
inquiry was very short, indicating that the
latter was a continuation of the former.
The record supports the Circuit Court's
finding that petitioner's question was in
direct response to Officer Reese's unlawful
498
interrogation and was the product of
impermissive interrogation. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that petitioner
did not "initiate" conversation with the
police.
We hold that all statements made by
petitioner after he invoked his Miranda
rights are inadmissible and the motion to
suppress the statements was properly
granted.
Reversed.
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"Maryland Case Could Cut Suspects' Rights;
Supreme Court to Hear Appeal"
Washington Post
April 20, 2005
Ray Rivera
DEATH PENALTY, the charge read.
"I bet you want to talk now, huh?" an officer
told the cold, tired 17-year-old accused of a
brutal carjacking and murder in downtown
Annapolis.
A half-hour later, the defendant did, telling
police he was there but wasn't the gunman.
More than two years later, some legal
experts believe that the case of Leeander
Jerome Blake may give the U.S. Supreme
Court a chance to reexamine the decision
that has governed police interrogations for
more than two decades: Edwards v.
Arizona.
A descendant of the landmark 1966 Miranda
decision that forced officers to read suspects
their rights, the court's 1981 ruling in
Edwards went further, dictating that once a
defendant invokes those rights and asks for
an attorney, all interrogation must stop until
an attorney is present.
Defendants who change their mind must do
so voluntarily and must initiate the
conversation with police.
The high court agreed Monday to hear the
Blake case to consider whether the
Maryland Court of Appeals was correct last
year when it threw out Blake's statement to
police and ordered him freed.
The question before the court: When police
officers violate Edwards, can they take
corrective action to ensure that the
defendant's
intact?
constitutional rights remain
"If the court is very lenient in treating this, it
could create a significant hole in the
protection Miranda provides," said
Georgetown University law professor David
Cole. "If they were to too broadly construe
the concept of suspects' initiating
conversations, it could create an end run
around Miranda rights."
Law enforcement officials said a court
ruling could provide needed guidance on
Miranda and Edwards rules and help them
preserve a case even after committing what
they consider minor violations of
defendants' rights.
"I think it would be a signal from the
Supreme Court that there has to be some
common sense in reviewing cases like this,
that minor errors should not always result in
the suppression of evidence," said Bill
Johnson, executive director of the National
Association of Police Organizations.
"Especially when steps are taken to correct
the error."
Blake and co-defendant Terrence Tolbert
were charged in the Sept. 19, 2002,
carjacking and killing of Straughan Lee
Griffin outside his home in the historic
district of Annapolis.
The crime shocked the city's residents.
There hadn't been a murder in the brick-
lined historic district since the 1960s.
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Tolbert was arrested Oct. 25, 2002. Police
roused Blake from his residence at an
Annapolis public housing complex at 5 a.m.
the following day. Still in his underwear, he
was taken to the Annapolis Police
Department and read his Miranda rights.
Blake said he didn't want to speak without
an attorney and was placed in a holding cell.
Nearly a half-hour later, a detective and an
officer gave Blake a statement of the
charges and told him to read the document
carefully. The charges stated, in large print
and in capital letters, that he faced the death
penalty. This was not true. Juveniles in
Maryland are not subject to the death
penalty.
"I bet you want to talk now, huh?" Officer
Curtis Reese said, according to court
records.
"No, he doesn't want to talk to us," Detective
William Johns said, upset and shoving
Reese out of the room. "He already asked
for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now."
After about another half-hour, Johns
returned to the cell, this time with clothes
for Blake,
"I can still talk to you?" Blake asked.
Johns asked Blake whether he wanted to
talk. Blake said yes.
The suspect was read his Miranda rights
again and gave a statement that he was at the
scene of the crime but that Tolbert did the
killing and driving. Tolbert was convicted
and sentenced to life in prison.
But Blake went free after the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that there had been a
violation of Edwards.
Prosecutors won a victory Monday when the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the matter.
State Attorney General J. Joseph Curran Jr.,
who took the case to the high court, argued
that even if Blake's rights were violated, the
detective took proper actions to correct any
influence the violation might have had on
Blake. Moreover, Blake had nearly a half-
hour to think about the charges and decide
whether to give a statement, Curran said.
"The limited issue is whether there can be a
curative action. Even assuming there was
improper interrogation, can that be
corrected?" Curran said.
Blake's attorney, Kenneth Ravenell, said his
client's statement was not given voluntarily.
"Our position is what caused the defendant
to choose to speak to the police was an
illegal police interrogation," he said.
The high court has never -ruled whether
Edwards allows for "curative measures,"
Curran said. Lower courts have issued
conflicting opinions.
Some law experts believe the case could
provide the high court a chance to scale back
Edwards and Miranda protections. Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice
Antonin Scalia in particular are longtime
critics of the opinions.
"If you don't like Edwards and you want to
reverse it, then maybe this is the case you do
it with," said Mark Graber, a constitutional
law professor at the University of Maryland.
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"Dropped Murder Charges Spark Ire"
The Capital (Annapolis, MD)
May 13, 2004
Brian M. Schleter
Friends of Annapolis carjacking and murder
victim Straughan Lee Griffin yesterday
struggled to come to terms with a court
ruling that forces prosecutors to dismiss
charges against one of two suspects in a
crime that stunned the city's Historic
District.
A year and a half after police charged
Leeander Blake, 18, and Terrence Tolbert,
21, with murder for allegedly shooting Mr.
Griffin in the head outside his Historic
District home, there still hasn't been a trial.
Yesterday's ruling by the Court of Appeals
means Mr. Blake can never be brought to
trial, even if new evidence implicating him
surfaces.
"It's difficult to point fingers because all
along the way things have gone the way we
didn't want to see them (go)," said Laura
Townsend, a friend of Mr. Griffin. "It
seems like the scales of justice weigh too
heavily on the side of the defendant."
Greg Gerner, Mr. Griffin's business partner
at Performance A/V, which coordinates
visual effects for concerts and conventions,
said the court's ruling in Mr. Blake's case
has shaken his faith in the justice system.
"I'm more than a little upset at the handling
of the case-that it would allow one of the
two to basically walk away," he said. "For
all his family and friends to not have a sense
of justice, it really leaves you feeling
empty."
Linda Griffin, Mr. Griffin's sister, declined
to comment on behalf of the family.
In a unanimous ruling, the Court of Appeals
held yesterday that statements Mr. Blake
made acknowledging his role in the murder
were coerced by police and are not
admissable because he had already asked to
talk to a lawyer.
State's Attorney Frank R. Weathersbee said
this morning that he and the Attorney
General's Office are considering filing a
petition with the U.S. Supreme Court
seeking a review of yesterday's ruling by the
Maryland Court of Appeals.
Mr. Blake will remain incarcerated until the
Circuit Court receives the official mandate
from the Court of Appeals, a process that
could take up to three weeks, prosecutors
said.
Mr. Blake was wearing boxer shorts, a tank
top and no shoes when police arrested him at
his Robinwood home on a cold October
morning and took him in for questioning.
He invoked his right to remain silent and
was put in a holding cell. A half-hour later
Detective William Johns, accompanied by
Officer Curtis Reese, returned with papers
charging Mr. Blake with first-degree
murder. The papers said he could face the
death penalty, which was not correct
because of his age.
As they left, Officer Reese said in a loud
tone, "I bet you want to talk now, huh?"
Detective Johns rebuked him and they left.
But 28 minutes later Mr. Blake changed his
mind and agreed to talk to the detective.
He gave a statement, the contents of which
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have not been made public, before taking a
police polygraph test, after which he made
additional statements.
Officer Reese denied making the statement
in court.
Mr. Blake's attorney, Kenneth Ravenell,
argued that the comment was intended to get
Mr. Blake to talk and so the statements
should be thrown out. Circuit Court Judge
Pamela L. North agreed, saying she
suspected Detective Johns and Officer Reese
had employed a "good cop, bad cop"
routine.
Later, another judge threw out statements
given by Mr. Tolbert.
Rather than go to trial without them,
prosecutors decided to appeal both rulings
after consulting with the Griffin family and
the Attorney General's Office.
It was an all-or-nothing gamble because the
law required the defendants to be set free. It
also forces prosecutors to dismiss the
indictment if they lose.
The Court of Appeals has since reversed the
finding in Mr. Tolbert's case. A trial is set
for Sept. 21.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed
Judge North and Mr. Blake was
reincarcerated. But the Court of Appeals
upheld her ruling that the comment
amounted to an interrogation.
"We hold that all statements made by
petitioner after he invoked his Miranda
rights are inadmissible and the motion to
suppress the statement was properly
granted," the court said.
This year the General Assembly passed a
bill giving judges discretion to release
defendants in future cases. Gov. Robert L.
Ehrlich Jr. is expected to sign it May 26.
Legislation to eliminate the automatic
dismissal provision failed to pass.
State's Attorney Frank R. Weathersbee said
yesterday that he was not second-guessing
his decision to make the appeal.
"I'm convinced we made the right decision.
It was a tough case for the court," he said.
A spokesman for Annapolis police said the
handling of the arrests has not resulted in
any changes in department procedures.
"We looked at it and we don't see it as a
policy matter," Officer Hal Dalton said.
"Our view has been Officer Reese made an
inadvertent, off-the-cuff remark. . . . The
lesson is be careful what you say and
eliminate such remarks."
Officers annually receive one to two hours
of training on changes in the law from
county prosecutors, he said. Unlike the
courts, which hold onto cases for months
before making rulings, police officers must
make on-the-spot legal determinations when
searching a suspect, conducting an interview
or using deadly force.
"It's a hazard of the trade," he said. "We
have to decide in a split second and it's
reviewed over and over for years ad
nauseum."
Officer Reese resigned before internal
affairs investigators completed a report on
the incident, Officer Dalton said.
"It's frustrating. We feel like we had our
man. We proved it substantially and the
confession was the icing on the cake," he
said.
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"Murder Links 3 Lives Tragically"
The Capital (Annapolis, MD)
December 29, 2002
Brian Haynes
It was nearly midnight when the phone rang,
and Neal Griffin could tell by the tone in his
mother's voice that something was wrong.
She told him to come over-right away.
As he drove to his parents' house, Mr.
Griffin figured his 78-year-old father had
died, but when he walked in, his father was
alive and well.
With him were grim-faced police officers
and a chaplain.
His mother, Virginia Griffin, broke the
news.
"It's Lee," she said. "They shot Lee."
Hours before on Sept. 19, Straughan Lee
Griffin, a successful entrepreneur and
popular member of the Eastport Yacht Club,
had been shot, then run over by his own Jeep
Cherokee in a carjacking outside his home
in the Historic District of Annapolis.
"It was incomprehensible," Neal Griffin said
from his Portsmouth, Va., home. "It's still
incomprehensible."
And to many, it's just as bewildering why
two teen-agers showed up in the charming
brick-paved cul-de-sac where Lee Griffin
had lived to commit such a shocking act of
violence.
The questions surrounding the reasons and
the final moments of Lee Griffin's life might
have to wait until the suspects go to trial.
Confused friends and relatives only know
for sure that the lives of Lee Griffin, 5 1,
Leeander Jerome Blake, 17, and Terrence
Tolbert, 19, were forever linked by a single
night, a single moment, a single gunshot.
Now relatives and friends of a beloved man
struggle through the grief, and two teen-
agers who survived one of the city's
roughest neighborhoods face the biggest
fight of their young lives.
"Three lives have been lost," Neal Griffin
said. "Three mothers have lost their sons."
Growing up near Portsmouth, Lee Griffin
idolized the Rolling Stones and the Grateful
Dead. Two decades later, he was touring
with them.
In between, the second of Virginia and
Straughan "Jack" Griffin's four children
graduated from the College of William and
Mary and got into the business of setting up
and running large video screens for concerts
and conventions.
He used that experience
Performance AN, which he
into an industry leader.
to co-found
helped build
In 1997, Lee Griffin's dream job helped him
buy his $290,000 dream house in the tiny
neighborhood tucked between the State
House and the Naval Academy.
He was so proud of his three-story home that
he ordered a vanity license plate with "I
CMB" in honor of his address at 1
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Cumberland Court.
The move to Annapolis also signaled a shift
in Lee Griffin's personal life, his brother
said.
"He just sank so much time into" building
his business, Neal Griffin said. "Now he
was putting more time into people."
The man with the crooked smile made quick
friends in his new hometown and its
maritime community. When he wasn't
traveling, he was dining with friends
downtown or taking them out on his 27-foot
sailboat named after the Grateful Dead song
"Box of Rain."
On the night he was killed, Lee Griffin was
just yards from his house. Two young
African Americans surprised him near his
Cherokee, and seconds later he lay dead in
the street.
"It's a dramatic, horrible loss," said Anne
Herrington, one of Mr. Griffin's closest
friends.
"Sometimes it's like it's not even real. It's
like he's on a business trip and he'll call
back."
Mr. Tolbert and Mr. Blake grew up just a
few doors from each other in Robinwood, a
rough neighborhood where drug dealing and
violence seem to lurk on every corner.
Unlike many of his peers in the public
housing neighborhood, Mr. Tolbert
graduated from Annapolis High School, and
Mr. Blake, a junior, was a good student and
seemed destined to graduate.
"I don't want the court to look at my friends
as animals," said Russell Tinker. "They are
not species of animals. They are two people
who come from good, loving families."
But police and prosecutors say they are
killers. After their arrests Oct. 26, both were
indicted on first-degree murder charges.
They have been held at the Jennifer Road
Detention Center awaiting trial.
The arrests weren't the first for either teen.
Mr. Blake had been arrested twice this year
on drug distribution charges, according to
published reports. The outcomes of those
cases are sealed because he was charged as a
juvenile.
Lawanda Pierce, his mother, told a judge
during her son's bail review that he always
went to school and was a well-behaved
child.
She declined to be interviewed after the
hearing and wasn't available for comment.
Neal Griffin, who watched from the
courtroom audience, felt sympathy for the
single mother.
"Probably one of her worst nightmares is
that the projects could eat one of her kids,"
he said. "And it just did."
Mr. Tolbert's past is also sprinkled with
criminal run-ins. His juvenile record
includes burglary, theft and reckless
endangerment.
His adult record includes a September
conviction for gambling and a pending
October case on charges of second-degree
assault, disorderly conduct and resisting
arrest.
In an August case that's also pending, Mr.
Tolbert was charged with driving under the
influence after county police pulled him
over him in Odenton.
He failed a field sobriety test and was
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carrying a container of suspected PCP,
according to charging documents.
Hardship came to Mr. Tolbert long before
then.
As an 8-year-old in 1991, he was jolted by
13,000 volts of electricity after reaching into
an open transformer box near his home.
Doctors had to amputate his right arm.
But the accident didn't seem to slow him
down, and he was soon riding a bike and
playing computer games again, people who
knew him said.
Mr. Tolbert and his mother, Juanita Johns,
sued the Annapolis Housing Authority and
Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. seeking $25
million. A judge dismissed their case
against BGE, but the housing authority paid
a $200,000 settlement, half of which was set
aside in a trust fund for Mr. Tolbert.
Ms. Johns couldn't be reached for comment.
Over the years, the family tapped into the
fund to pay for things like a new computer, a
flight to his grandmother's home in Chicago
and a senior trip to DisneyWorld with his
high school class.
When the money was released to Mr.
Tolbert in January, the fund still held more
than $150,000, court records show.
When the arrests came down, conflicting
feelings swept through the community of
sailors and friends who had known Lee
Griffin.
Some wanted quick retribution. Others, like
Ms. Herrington, took a milder stance.
"Most people want them to die," she said. "I
don't quite feel that way. . . . It's not just
about vengeance. It's about justice."
Neal Griffin said his family shares that
feeling and trusts that the court system will
impose a suitable punishment. He said his
family is not focusing anger and hatred on
the two teens because that won't bring his
brother back or change the culture that
creates violent youths.
Since the slaying, Neal Griffin has put his
support behind a group of his brother's
friends who started a sailing program for at-
risk youths.
The program, called Box of Rain, will build
self-esteem, teamwork and other life skills
for children living in the city's poorest
neighborhoods.
Larry Griffin, a community activist and
friend of Lee Griffin, hopes the sailing
program will help to bridge the gap in a city
where many African Americans living in
poverty feel left out.
"It's two different cities," he said.
On one side of the city, luxury yachts line
City Dock and shoppers spend freely in
Main Street stores. On the other side,
parents struggle to make ends meet and keep
their children away from the drugs and
violence that surround them.
Robert Eades, a community activist who
watched Mr. Tolbert grow up, thought he
would be one of the few to make it out.
"When you see young children caught up in
this whirlpool . . . it just saddens me," Mr.
Eades said. "Who are we going to save? It
looks like we can't save nobody sometimes."
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Georgia v. Randolph
(04-1067)
Ruling Below: (State v. Randolph, 278 Ga. 614, 604 S.E.2d 835, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep.
3586 (2004), cert granted 125 S. Ct. 1840; 161 L. Ed. 2d 722; 73 U.S.L.W. 3619).
Scott Randolph arrived home to find that his wife had contacted police and consented to a
warrantless search of their home. He disagreed with his wife's decision and asked the police to
stop. Over his objection, the police began to search their home and found Randolph's drugs.
After his arrest, Randolph moved to have the evidence suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search
under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court refused to suppress the evidence, but on appeal the
Georgia Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court reversed that ruling, holding that the
police were required to obtain Randolph's consent because he was present and able to object.
Question Presented: Can police search a home without a warrant when one co-habitant
consents but the other co-habitant is present and does not consent?
The STATE of Georgia
V.
Scott Fitz RANDOLPH.
Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided November 8, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
BENHAM, J:
The Court of Appeals granted an
interlocutory appeal to review the trial
court's denial of defendant Scott Fitz
Randolph's motion to suppress evidence
seized from his home in a warrantless search
conducted by law enforcement officers
pursuant to permission given by Randolph's
wife in Randolph's presence after Randolph
had refused to give the officers permission
to search. The Court of Appeals determined
the motion to suppress should have been
granted. We granted the State's petition for
a writ of certiorari to decide whether an
occupant may give valid consent to search
common areas of a premises shared by
another occupant who is present and objects
to the search.
Inasmuch as we are faced with a situation in
which two persons have equal use and
control of the premises to be searched, we
conclude the consent to conduct a
warrantless search of a residence given by
one occupant is not valid in the face of the
refusal of another occupant who is
physically present at the scene to permit a
warrantless search. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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The Fourth Amendment [to the
U. S. Constitution] generally
prohibits the warrantless entry
of a person's home, whether to
make an arrest or to search for
specific objects. The
prohibition does not apply,
however, to situations in which
voluntary consent has been
obtained, either from the
individual whose property is
searched, or from a third party
who possesses common
authority over the premises.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 US. 177, 181
(1990). In U.S. v. Matlock, the U. S.
Supreme Court noted a clear indication in
case law that "the consent of one who
possesses common authority over premises
or effects is valid as against the absent,
nonconsenting person with whom that
authority is shared." Both this Court and the
Court of Appeals of Georgia have rejected
legal challenges to warrantless searches
conducted with the consent of a person who
shared with the defendant common control
and authority over the area searched. The
basis for the decisions in these cases was the
recognition that "any of the co-inhabitants
has the right to permit the inspection in his
own right and that the others have assumed
the risk that one of their number might
permit the common area to be searched."
U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. at I71.
[However, i]n neither Matlock nor any of the
Georgia cases . . . were law enforcement
officers faced with the physical presence of
joint occupants, with one consenting to the
search and the other objecting. While one
co-inhabitant may have assumed the risk
that a second co-inhabitant will consent to a
search of common areas in the absence of
the first co-inhabitant, the risk assumed by
joint occupancy goes no further-the risk "is
merely an inability to control access to the
premises during one's absence." 3 LaFave,
Search and Seizure, § 8.3 (d), p. 731 (3rd ed.
1996). While a co-inhabitant has authority
to consent to a search of joint premises, "a
present, objecting party should not have his
constitutional rights ignored [due to a]
property interest shared with another." Silva
v. State, 344 So2d 559, 562 (Fla. 1977).
We agree with the Supreme Court of
Washington, which concluded in State v.
Leach, 113 Wash.2d 735, 744 (1989):
Where the police have obtained
consent to search from an
individual possessing, at best,
equal control over the premises,
that consent remains valid
against a cohabitant, who also
possesses equal control, only
while the cohabitant is absent.
However, should the cohabitant
be present and able to object,
the police must also obtain the
cohabitant's consent. Any other
rule exalts expediency over an
individual's Fourth Amendment
guaranties,
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals which reversed the trial
court's denial of Randolph's motion to
suppress.
Affirmed.
HUNSTEIN, J., Dissenting:
We granted certiorari in this case in order to
address the admissibility of evidence seized
during a warrantless search where a person
with shared authority to grant consent to
search does so despite the objection of the
subject of the search. Ignoring the nearly
uniform interpretation of United States v.
Matlock, 415 US. 164 (II) (1974), that the
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third-party consent rule applies even when a
present subject of the search objects, the
majority has chosen to follow a ruling that
expresses the minority view on this issue.
Because I believe the rule announced in
State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735 (Wash.
1989), that any co-occupant's opposition to
the search can vitiate the express consent of
another co-occupant with common authority
over the premises, represents an unjustified
break with Georgia case law, I must dissent.
The majority acknowledges that consent is a
well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, see
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (II)
(1990), and that a warrantless search without
probable cause does not violate the Fourth
Amendment if the authorities have obtained
the voluntary consent of a person authorized
to grant such consent. It also acknowledges
that Georgia has long relied on the Matlock
rule by correctly stating that our courts have
consistently "rejected legal challenges to
warrantless searches conducted with the
consent of a person who shared with the
defendant common control and authority
over the area searched." Nevertheless, even
though the facts of this case clearly establish
the authority of Randolph's wife to consent
to a search of their shared home and
bedroom and that Randolph as the joint
occupant of the home assumed the risk that
his wife would expose their common private
areas to such a search, the majority ignores
the approach sanctioned by numerous
federal and state courts and unpersuasively
cites to only a few cases and a general
treatise on criminal law to conclude that a
challenge to a search is not fully resolved by
proof of effective consent when any co-
occupant is present and protests. In my
opinion the majority's claim of
unconstitutionality of the search based on
express refusal is not more viable than a
claim based on lack of express consent.
Under Matlock the co-occupant that
expressly refuses to give consent to search
does not enjoy a greater expectation of
privacy because in sharing the property the
co-occupant assumed the risk that another
would consent to a search.
I would not hold the express refusal of one
co-occupant to be paramount. Instead, I
would embrace the principles recognized in
Matlock to look not to the defendant's
presence or absence but to whether or not he
assumed the risk that the third party who
possessed common authority over the
premises would permit inspection in his own
right. In my view, Randolph assumed the
risk that because of his diminished
expectation of privacy he had in the home he
shared with his wife, she would "expos[e]
their common private area to such a search,"
and that his opposition to the presence of
police in his home would not override his
wife's consent. I would conclude that even
though Randolph was present and objected,
once Randolph's wife gave valid consent to
the search of the home she shared with
Randolph, that was sufficient to authorize
the search. Accordingly, I would reverse the
Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of
the trial court on this evidentiary issue.
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"U.S. High Court to Tackle Ga. Police Search Case"
Fulton County Daily Report
April 19, 2005
Tony Mauro
What are police supposed to do when they
ask to search a house for drugs and one
occupant says yes while the other says no?
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to answer that question in a Georgia case in
which Scott Fitz Randolph denied police
access to his house, but his wife welcomed
police in and led them to her husband's drug
hiding place. The case is Georgia v.
Randolph, No. 04-1067, and will be argued
in the fall.
Federal and state courts have divided on the
issue, though the brief for Georgia notes that
most federal circuits, the Ist, 5th, 6th, 7th,
9th, 10th, 11th and D.C., have ruled that
warrantless police searches are permissible
in similar circumstances.
Only the state courts of Florida, Minnesota
and Washington state have ruled as
Georgia's Supreme Court did, finding that
allowing the search to take place over the
objection of a resident who was present at
the time violated the Fourth Amendment's
bar on unreasonable searches and seizures.
Randolph, an attorney in Americus, Ga., was
charged with cocaine possession in July
2001, after his wife called police in the
midst of a domestic disturbance. When
police arrived, she told them Randolph was
using cocaine and gave them permission to
search the house. Randolph then arrived
home and repeatedly objected to the search,
but his wife encouraged police to proceed.
Before he went on trial, Randolph succeeded
in having the evidence suppressed as the
fruit of an illegal search. The Georgia Court
of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court
agreed with his position.
"The consent to conduct a warrantless
search of a residence given by one occupant
is not valid in the face of the refusal of
another occupant who is physically present
at the scene," wrote Georgia Supreme Court
Justice Robert Benham last November.
The court found that the closest U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, the 1967 case of
United States v. Matlock, was not relevant
because it upheld the consent of one
occupant who was present when police
arrived, over the refusal of an occupant who
was not present. In Randolph's case,
Benham noted, both people with control
over the house were on hand when the
police asked to search the premises.
Senior Assistant Georgia Attorney General
Paula K. Smith, in her petition to the high
court, said local police had obtained valid
consent from Randolph's wife, and that is all
that is needed because they both have
,common authority over the couple's marital
home."
If the high court upholds the Georgia
Supreme Court ruling, she added, "Georgia
citizens will be left with a rule which, in
application, turns upon the timing of a
request to search."
Richard Thomas, an assistant district
attorney who argued for Georgia in the
courts below, said Monday, "If you or your
wife are there and your wife wants to invite
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her friends in, how can you as her husband
deny that? If she can invite her friends in,
why can't she invite the police in? That's the
point we've been making the whole time."
But Randolph's lawyer Wilbur T. Gamble III
of Dawson, Ga., said the Georgia Supreme
Court ruling should be allowed to stand,
even if it perpetuates a conflict between
courts in different jurisdictions.
"Each state has the inherent right to extend
the protection of one's right to privacy if a
state so chooses," said Gamble.
Gamble also argued that the Constitution's
Fourth Amendment clearly gives Randolph's
interests precedence over his wife's.
Said Gamble: "Which is more important:
the right to be free from an illegal or
unwarranted search of one's property, or the
property right of one to allow a search?"
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"Supreme Court to Consider Police Searches"
Associated Press (AP)
April 19, 2005
Hope Yen
Scott Randolph didn't want police to search
his home after officers showed up to answer
his wife's domestic disturbance call. Mrs.
Randolph had no such reservations.
She not only let them in but led officers to
evidence later used to charge Randolph with
drug possession.
The Supreme Court said Monday it will use
the case to clarify when police can search
homes. The high court previously has said
searches based on a cohabitant's consent are
OK, but it's not clear whether that applies
when another resident is present and objects.
Lower courts are divided on the issue, with
most holding that consent from one person
is sufficient.
Mrs. Randolph called police on July 6, 2001,
to report a disturbance and asked them to
come to their house in Americus, Ga. The
two had separated, but she moved back in
two days earlier with Randolph's consent.
When police arrived, she complained that
Randolph had taken away their son and had
been using cocaine. A few minutes later,
Randolph returned home and told police the
son was at a neighbor's house.
Officers asked to search the couple's home,
but Randolph objected. Mrs. Randolph,
however, consented and led police to the
couple's bedroom where officers saw a straw
with white powder.
Mrs. Randolph later withdrew her consent,
but police obtained a search warrant based
on what officers saw earlier, seized 25
"drug-related' items and charged Scott
Randolph with drug possession. A trial
court upheld the searches, but a Georgia
appeals court reversed it in a ruling the state
Supreme Court affirmed last November.
In siding with Randolph, the courts ruled
police must defer to an objecting occupant's
position when two people have equal use
and control of the home. They said police
could not violate Randolph's privacy rights,
particularly in a case where a feuding wife
had consented over his objections.
"When possible, Georgia courts strive to
promote the sanctity of marriage and to
avoid circumstances that create adversity
between spouses,' the appeals court stated.
"Allowing a wife's consent to search to
override her husband's previous assertion of
his right to privacy threatens domestic
tranquility."
In their Supreme Court filing, Georgia
prosecutors said the ruling "focuses
arbitrarily on the rights of the objecting
occupant, to the detriment of the consenting
occupant who was trying to report a crime
and who had just as much access and control
over the home as her husband."
Randolph counters that states have the
authority to give their citizens privacy rights
that go beyond the U.S. Constitution. A
husband's interest in privacy outweighs the
wife's property right to allow a search, he
argues.
According to court filings, three other states
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also have ruled that all cohabitants present
must consent before police may search a
home. They are Florida, Minnesota and
Washington.
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"Court Restricts Warrantless Searches"
Atlanta Journal-Constitution
November 9, 2004
Bill Rankin
Police cannot enter a home to conduct a
warrantless search if one spouse consents
but the other does not, the Georgia Supreme
Court ruled Monday.
In a 4-3 ruling, the court threw out evidence
of cocaine use by an Americus lawyer
stemming from a July 2001 search of his
home.
Writing for the majority, Justice Robert
Benham said that such an issue-the
presence of joint occupants with one
consenting to a warrantless search and the
other objecting-had never reached the
state's highest court before.
The search occurred after the wife of lawyer
Scott Fitz Randolph called police to report a
domestic disturbance. After police arrived,
Mrs. Randolph accused her husband of
using large amounts of cocaine.
When the police sergeant asked to search the
house, Randolph responded with an
unequivocal no, but his wife consented, the
ruling said. She took the sergeant to an
upstairs bedroom, where he saw a piece of
cut straw on a dresser with some white
residue.
Randolph later was indicted on charges of
cocaine possession. A Sumter County judge
rejected a motion by Randolph's lawyer to
suppress the evidence on the grounds that it
was the fruit of an illegal search. But the
judge allowed Randolph, who has remained
free on bond, to file a pretrial appeal.
Last December, in a 5-2 decision, the
Georgia Court of Appeals found the search
unconstitutional. On Monday, the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed that finding.
"It's the right decision," said Randolph's
lawyer, W.T. Gamble 1II. "One person can't
trump another person's rights. It's different
if only one person is home and consents. But
when you're both there and one of them
objects, that's another story."
Assistant District Attorney Richard Thomas
said the drug case against Randolph is
gutted without evidence from the search.
Thomas said his office is considering an
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Justice Carol Hunstein dissented from
Monday's ruling. "Once Randolph's wife
gave valid consent to the search of the home
she shared with Randolph, that was
sufficient to authorize the search," wrote
Hunstein, who was joined by Justices
George Carley and Harris Hines.
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Hudson v. Michigan
(04-1360)
Ruling Below: (People v. Hudson, 472 Mich. 862, 692 N.W.2d 385 (2005), cert. granted, 125
S. Ct. 2964, 73 U.S.L.W. 3749 (U.S., June 27, 2005) (No. 04-1360)).
This case addresses the proper remedy for a violation of a "knock and announce" statute, which
requires police officers to knock on a door and announce their presence before entering to search
a home. Hudson's home was searched in execution of a search warrant, which turned up drugs
and a firearm. He argues that the evidence should be suppressed because of the police violated
the knock and announce statute. The trial court agreed and dropped the charges. The court of
appeals reversed and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Note: The principle case under consideration is an order of the Michigan Supreme Court
refusing to reconsider its 1999 decision in People v. Stevens. An excerpt from Stevens follows
on pages 517-527.
Question Presented: Does the inevitable discovery doctrine create a per se exception to the
exclusionary rule for evidence seized after a Fourth Amendment "knock and announce"
violation, as the Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court have held, or is evidence
subject to suppression after such violations, as the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the Arkansas
Supreme Court, and the Maryland Court of Appeals have held?
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Booker T. HUDSON, JR. Defendant-Appellant.
Supreme Court of Michigan
472 Mich. 862, 692 N.W.2d 385
Decided January 31, 2005
JUDGES: CAVANAGH, J., would grant
leave to appeal.
OPINION: On order of the Court, the
application for leave to appeal the June 17,
2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals is
considered, and it is DENIED, because we
are not persuaded that the questions
presented should be reviewed by this Court.
CAVANAGH, J., would grant leave to
appeal to reconsider People v Stevens, 460
Mich. 626; 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999).
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PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee
V.
Booker T. HUDSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
Michigan Court of Appeals
2004 WL 1366947 (Mich.App.)
Decided June 17, 2004
[UNPUBLISHED]
NEFF, ZAHRA and MURRAY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Defendant was charged with possession of
less than fifty grams of cocaine with intent
to deliver, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and
possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.
Following a bench trial, he was convicted of
possession of less than twenty-five grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2) (a) (v), and
sentenced to eighteen months' probation.
Defendant appeals his conviction as of right
and we affirm. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that the
evidence, which was seized during the
execution of a search warrant, should have
been suppressed because the police violated
the knock and announce statute, MCL
780.656.
Although the trial court agreed with
defendant's argument and initially dismissed
the charges, this Court reversed and
remanded, ruling that suppression was not
an appropriate remedy as stated in People v.
Vasquez (After Remand), 461 Mich. 235;
602 NW2d 376 (1999), and People v.
Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich. 626; 597
NW2d 53 (1999). People v. Hudson,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered May 1, 2001 (Docket No. 230594).
Our Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
People v. Hudson, 465 Mich. 932; 639
NW2d 255 (2001). Because there has not
been any change in the law or the relevant
facts, this Court cannot, pursuant to the law
of the case doctrine, decide the issue any
differently on this appeal. Grace v. Grace,
253 Mich.App 357, 362-263; 655 NW2d 595
(2002). Moreover, regardless of the
correctness of the decisions in Vasquez and
Stevens, those decisions are binding on this
Court. People v. Beasley, 239 Mich.App
548, 559; 609 NW2d 581 (2000).
Affirmed.
516
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Eugene Charles STEVENS, Defendant-Appellee.
Supreme Court of Michigan
460 Mich. 626; 597 N.W.2d 53
Decided July 20, 1999
Note: The following decision addresses the substance of the question in Hudson v. Michigan,
namely, whether suppression of evidence is an appropriate remedy for the violation of a "knock
and announce" statute.
[Excerpt: Some citations and footnotes omitted]
OPINION:
BRICKLEY, J.
We granted leave in this case to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment requires the
exclusion of evidence obtained under a valid
search warrant, and during a search of
proper scope, because of a violation of the
"knock and announce" principles.... Given
that the evidence would have been
discovered despite any police misconduct
and that excluding the evidence because of
the misconduct puts the prosecution in a
worse position than it would have been
without the police misconduct, we hold that
the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule applies in the present case.
Additionally, we fail to discern any
legislative intent to have the exclusionary
rule apply to violations of our "knock and
announce" statute. Accordingly, the trial
court erred in granting defendant's motion to
suppress.
FACTS
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on August 10,
1994, the police purchased narcotics from
the defendant's female companion. The
police then followed the woman to
defendant's home where she had told a
confidential informant she kept the "stash."
After the police determined that the
defendant was on probation for a controlled
substance conviction, they decided to raid
the house. The police obtained a search
warrant and arrived back at the house at
12:32 a.m. on August 11, 1994, at which
time there were no lights on in the house and
the police did not observe any signs of
activity or hear any footsteps. The officers
knocked on the door repeatedly and
announced in a loud voice that they were
police officers. After an eleven-second wait,
the officers began a forced entry that took an
additional fifteen to eighteen seconds. The
defendant was found sleeping in his
bedroom, which was approximately twenty-
five feet from the front door.
Corporal Alex Ramirez of the Dearborn
Police Department participated in the raid.
He testified that it was the general practice
of the Dearborn Police to wait ten or eleven
seconds before beginning a forced entry.
Additionally, Corporal Ramirez testified
that, when executing a search warrant, the
Dearborn Police Department made no
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distinction between daytime and nighttime
executions relative to the time the officers
wait between the knock and announcement
and forcing entry into the dwelling.
Ramirez also testified that the fact that
defendant was on probation for a controlled
substance conviction made no difference in
how long Ramirez waited before forcing
entry into the house. The trial court found
that this entry violated the knock-and-
announce statute, MCL 780.656; MSA
28.1259(6). Additionally, the trial court
found that the police officers acted
unreasonably in executing the search
warrant and that the defendant's
constitutional guarantee under the Fourth
Amendment had been violated. Therefore,
the subsequent search and seizure of
evidence were constitutionally invalid, and
the exclusionary rule should be applied. The
trial court thus granted the defendant's
motion to suppress.
The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of
Appeals vacated the trial court's order and
remanded the case for reconsideration in
light of Wilson v Arkansas, 514 US. 927;
115 S. Ct. 1914; 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995).
After being denied rehearing by the Court of
Appeals, the defendant appealed to this
Court, arguing that the remand was
inappropriate because the prosecution had
conceded that the present record was
adequate and complete on the question of
the sufficiency of the announced entry. This
Court agreed with the defendant, vacated the
Court of Appeals order, and remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of
the motion to suppress. The prosecutor now
appeals to this Court.
ANALYSIS
I
The prosecutor brings this appeal, arguing
that, while the police officers may have
violated the knock-and-announce statute,
MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6), the Court
of Appeals erred in finding that the
exclusionary rule applies where the police
make a search of proper scope under a valid
warrant.
In deciding to grant the defendant's motion
to suppress, the trial court relied upon
People v Polidori, 190 Mich. App. 673; 476
N. W2d 482 (1991). That Court found:
Although there is no Michigan
case that directly deals with the
sanction that should follow a
violation of the knock-and-
announce statute, we agree with a
number of other jurisdictions that
the requirement that officers
identify themselves and state
their authority and purpose
before entering a private
residence has its roots in the
Fourth Amendment.
Consequently, when the method of entry
violates the knock-and-announce statute, the
exclusionary rule may come into play if the
Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness is also offended. Because
the primary purpose of the constitutional
guarantee is to prevent unreasonable
invasions, if a police officer has a reasonable
cause to enter a dwelling to make an arrest,
his entry and search are not unreasonable. If
the police officers have a basis to conclude
that evidence will be destroyed or lives will
be endangered by delay, strict compliance
with the statute may be excused. Similarly,
if events indicate that compliance with the
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statutory requirements would be a useless
gesture, the requirement that the police
officers wait for admission may also be
excused.
There is no claim that a search carried out in
compliance with the statute would have
resulted in the destruction of the evidence,
increased the danger to the police officers,
or been a useless gesture. Under these
circumstances, we can only conclude that
the police officers acted unreasonably when
they executed the search warrant. Because
there was no evidence introduced at the
suppression hearing to justify the
simultaneous forced entry of defendants
home, we can find no reason to excuse the
police officers from complying with the
requirements of our knock-and-announce
statute.
In affirming the trial court in the present
case, the Court of Appeals relied on People
v Asher, 203 Mich. App. 621, 624; 513
N. W2d 144 (1994), in holding that "if the
method of entry violates the knock-and-
announce statute, the exclusionary rule must
apply."
II
We first consider whether police officers'
violation of the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights requires exclusion of the
evidence. The introduction into evidence of
materials seized and observations made
during an unlawful search is prohibited by
the exclusionary rule. Additionally, the
exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction
into evidence of materials and testimony that
are the products or indirect results of an
illegal search, the so-called "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine. Wong Sun v
United States, 371 US 471; 83 S. Ct. 407, 9
L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).
... US Const, Am IV, provides:
The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protects
citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The federal constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures
have been extended to state proceedings
through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Under the
circumstances of this case, art 1, § 11 of the
Michigan Constitution is to be construed as
providing the same protection as that of its
federal counterpart. Therefore, defendant's
motion to suppress implicates his federal
constitutional rights.
III
In determining whether exclusion is proper,
a court must "evaluate the circumstances of
this case in the light of the policy served by
the exclusionary rule. . . ." Brown v Illinois,
422 US. 590, 604; 95 S. Ct. 2254; 45 L. Ed
2d 416 (1975). "'The rule is calculated to
prevent, not repair. Its purpose is to deter
to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available
way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it. . . . Despite its broad deterrent
purpose, the exclusionary rule has never
been interpreted to proscribe the use of
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illegally seized evidence in all proceedings
or against all persons."' Id. at 599-600
(citations omitted).
The exclusionary rule has its limitations ...
as a tool of judicial control. . . . [In] some
contexts the rule is ineffective as a deterrent.
... Proper adjudication of cases in which the
exclusionary rule is invoked demands a
constant awareness of these limitations....
[A] rigid and unthinking application of the .
. . rule . .. may exact a high toll in human
injury and frustration of efforts to prevent
crime. [Terry v Ohio, supra 392 US. 1, 13-
15.]
As stated by this Court:
The exclusionary rule forbids the use of
direct and indirect evidence acquired from
governmental misconduct, such as evidence
from an illegal police search.
Three exceptions to the exclusionary rule
have emerged: the independent source
exception, the attenuation exception, and the
inevitable discovery exception. [People v
LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich. 496,
508-509; 556 N. W2d 498 (1996) (citations
omitted).]
In Nix v Williams, the United States
Supreme Court considered whether there is
an exception to the exclusionary rule for
evidence that inevitably would have been
discovered regardless of the constitutional
violation. In explaining the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule, the Court
stated:
The core rationale consistently advanced by
this Court for extending the exclusionary
rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful
police conduct has been that this admittedly
drastic and socially costly course is needed
to deter police from violations of
constitutional and statutory protections.
This Court has accepted the argument that
the way to ensure such protections is to
exclude evidence seized as a result of such
violations notwithstanding the high social
cost of letting persons obviously guilty go
unpunished for their crimes. On this
rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in
a better position than it would have been in
if no illegality had transpired.
By contrast, the derivative evidence analysis
ensures that the prosecution is not put in a
worse position simply because of some
earlier police error or misconduct. Nix v
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-443; 104 S. Ct
2501; 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984).
The inevitable discovery exception generally
permits admission of tainted evidence when
the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would
have been revealed in the absence of police
misconduct. "If the prosecution can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful
means . . . then the deterrence rationale has
so little basis that the evidence should be
received." Id. at 444. If the evidence would
have been inevitably obtained, then there is
no rational basis for excluding the evidence
from the jury. In fact, suppression of the
evidence would undermine the adversary
system by putting the prosecution in a worse
position than it would have been in had there
been no police misconduct. Id. at 447
The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit set forth the following factors
in applying the inevitable discovery
doctrine:
There are three basic concerns which surface
in an inevitable discovery analysis: are the
legal means truly independent; are both the
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use of the legal means and the discovery by
that means truly inevitable; and does the
application of the inevitable discovery
exception either provide an incentive for
police misconduct or significantly weaken
fourth amendment protection? [United
States v Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744 (CA 1,
1986).]
* * *
While the [United States Supreme] Court
either declined or found no need to address
the issue whether a possible Fourth
Amendment violation required suppression
of the evidence in both Wilson and Ramirez,
it is quite clear from the Court's statements
that there has to be a causal relationship
between the violation and the seizing of the
evidence to warrant the sanction of
suppression.
IV
The Fourth Amendment must be applied
under a standard of reasonableness. Ker v
California, 374 US. 23; 83 S. Ct. 1623; 10
L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963). "In some
circumstances an officer's unannounced
entry into a home [notwithstanding a valid
search warrant] might be unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." Wilson,
supra at 934. "The general touchstone of
reasonableness which governs Fourth
Amendment analysis governs the method of
execution of the warrant." United States v
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 118 S. Ct. 992 at 996,
140 L. Ed 2d 191.
"The Fourth Amendment 'has never been
interpreted to proscribe the introduction of
illegally seized evidence in all proceedings
or against all persons."' United States v
Leon, 468 US. 897, 906; 104 S. Ct. 3405;
82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). Repeatedly, the
United States Supreme Court has
emphasized "that the State's use of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment does not itself violate the
Constitution." Pennsylvania Bd of
Probation & Parole v Scott, 524 US. 357,
118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019; 141 L. Ed 2d 344
(1998).
The Court has stressed that the "prime
purpose" of the exclusionary rule "is to deter
future unlawful police conduct and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Application of the
exclusionary rule "is neither intended nor
able to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's
rights which he has already suffered."'
Rather, the rule "operates as 'a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved."'
[Illinois v Krull, 480 US. 340, 347; 107 S.
Ct. 1160; 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987)(citations
omitted).]
As [a judicially created remedy], the rule
does not "proscribe the introduction of
illegally seized evidence in all proceedings
or against all persons," but applies only in
contexts "where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served". . . .
Moreover, because the rule is prudential
rather than constitutionally mandated, we
have held it to be applicable only where its
deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial
societal costs." [Scott, supra, 118 S. Ct.
2019.]
The exclusionary rule is not meant to put the
prosecution in a worse position than if the
police officers' improper conduct had not
occurred, but, rather, it is to prevent the
prosecutor from being in a better position
because of that conduct. Nix, supra at 443.
Significant disincentives to obtaining
evidence illegally-including the possibility
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of departmental discipline and civil
liability-also lessen the likelihood that the
ultimate or inevitable discovery exception
will promote police misconduct. . . . In
these circumstances, the societal costs of the
exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible
benefits to deterrence that a good-faith
requirement might produce. [Id. at 446.]
The Nix Court was addressing whether the
prosecution must prove the absence of bad
faith when seeking to invoke the inevitable
discovery exception. The existence of both
state and federal disincentives for police
misconduct, other than exclusion of
evidence, is also applicable in an analysis of
the inevitable discovery exception for
violations of the "knock and announce"
requirement.
MCL 780.657; MSA 28.1259(7) provides:
Any person who in executing a search
warrant, wilfully exceeds his authority or
exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall
be fined not more than $ 1,000.00 or
imprisoned not more than 1 year.
Additionally, 42 USC 1983 allows civil
remedies when the knock-and-announce
principles have been violated. In Aponte
Matos v Toledo Davila, 135 F.3d 182 (CA
1, 1998), the plaintiffs brought a 42 USC
1983 action against police officers who
searched the plaintiffs' home for violation of
plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights by
failing to knock and announce before
breaking down the door with an ax. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit found the officers immune because
the search took place before the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Wilson
and was, therefore, reasonable. However,
implicit in the court of appeals analysis is
that subsequent searches that violated
Wilson would fall within the reach of §
1983.
[42 USC 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purpose of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively
to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.]
Admittedly, the exclusionary rule is
sometimes needed to deter police from
violations of constitutional and statutory
protections, even though this may be at a
great cost to society. However, in the
present case, the evidence would have been
discovered despite any police misconduct.
Additionally, there are both state and federal
disincentives to deter police misconduct.
Given that the evidence would have been
inevitably discovered, allowing the evidence
in does not put the prosecution in any better
position than it would be in had the police
adhered to the knock-and-announce
requirement. However, excluding the
evidence puts the prosecution in a worse
position than it would have been in had there
been no police misconduct. Therefore, the
inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule should be available to the
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prosecution in the present case.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand this case to the
trial court.
DISSENT: CAVANAGH, J.
While the majority offers a plausible
rationale for its decision, upon closer
scrutiny, acceptance of that rationale
requires (1) a willingness to offer a decision
that is based, entirely, on dicta from cases
which, in fact, did not even approach, much
less decide, the question we are presented
with today, (2) a willingness to make a
substantial departure from the teachings of
the United States Supreme Court on Fourth
Amendment matters, and (3) a willingness
to adopt the prosecutor's artificially divided
view of the factual scenario that typically
underlies this type of case, a view the likes
of which have never been favored by our
nation's Supreme Court. Finding myself
unwilling to make even one, much less
three, of these leaps of "logic," I must
respectfully dissent.
I
. . . [T]his Court has, on numerous
occasions, been compelled to apply
exclusionary sanctions to statutory
violations. Initially, we did so while
addressing a denial of a statutory right to
immediate bail[.] ...
From there, we have seen several instances
in which statutory violations have resulted in
suppression of evidence (i.e., application of
an exclusionary rule). Indeed, this practice
is so apparent as to have drawn both
discussion and criticism from certain judges
and commentators. Likewise, our cases
have been sufficiently clear to draw
academic criticism toward those few
decisions that have purported to hold that an
exclusionary rule can never be applied to a
statutory violation.
Moreover, as was correctly noted below, our
Court of Appeals has for some time held that
the knock and announce rule has its basis in
the Fourth Amendment and that, where the
reasonableness of that mandate is violated,
an exclusionary sanction is appropriate.
See, e.g., People v Polidori, 190 Mich. App.
673; 476 N.W.2d 482 (1991). Given that the
decision in Polidori actually preceded the
Supreme Court's recognition of a Fourth
Amendment basis for the knock and
announce principle, and thus came to rest on
the appropriate, Fourth Amendment based
remedy, I see no reason to turn back the
clock to encompass what has previously
been a minority view below (and a
nonexistent view above). Because the
majority, however, decides the case on the
basis of the constitutional issue, I proceed
onward.
II
The majority offers us what is seemingly
cast as a view offered by some of our federal
circuits, albeit apparently a minority one. In
reality, however, what the majority has done
is to come very close to itself crafting a
conflict among the circuits.
Seeking to bring itself within the confines of
Schueler v Weintrob, 360 Mich. 621, 633-
634; 105 N.W.2d 42 (1960), the majority
aims to demonstrate the absence of a United
States Supreme Court decision, and a
disagreement among the federal circuits, in
order for this Court to adopt the view which
it deems most appropriate. In doing so, the
majority visits on us, by way of the margin,
the teachings of two cases, pronounces them
fit vehicles to attach our state's
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jurisprudence to, and moves on. I fear,
however, the majority has chosen to burden
two most unworthy beasts.
Initially, the majority quotes United States v
Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-717 (CA 7, 1998),
for the admitted dicta that "it is hard to
understand how the discovery of evidence
inside a house could be anything but
'inevitable' once the police arrive with a
warrant . . . ." What might be hard to
understand from that quotation is just how
inapplicable that case is to our situation.
As an initial matter, the question before the
court in Jones was whether evidence that
had been seized by other officers from a
defendant as he exited a residence should
somehow be suppressed on the basis of a
purported subsequent knock and announce
violation that occurred after the seizure of
the evidence. While the court felt the need
to briefly discuss the state of knock and
announce law in the course of its four
paragraph opinion, the most important
sentence followed the one quoted above.
"But because the entry at the front door
played no role in the chain of events leading
to Jones's seizure on the lawn, we, too, can
leave the inevitable-discovery question for
another day." Thus, the Seventh Circuit did
not, in Jones, apply the inevitable discovery
test to a knock and announce violation.
Rather, it reached the conclusion, fairly
obvious from the factual recitation above,
that there was simply no causal link between
the entry and the prior seizure of evidence.
Next we are offered the recent decision of
the Seventh Circuit, United States v
Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030; 1999 WL 356407
(CA 7, 1999). Again, while this case might
make interesting reading, the case itself
pertains to challenges to a warrant for being
overbroad. The court, after finding that the
evidence would have been discovered in any
event . . . did at least apply the inevitable
discovery exception, though in the context
of an overbroad warrant that failed to
address the items to be seized with sufficient
specificity.
The court also addressed another purpose of
the warrant, "that of informing the person
whose premises are to be searched of the
scope of the search, so that he (or, as in this
case, she) can monitor the search while it is
being conducted and make sure it stays
within bounds." It was here that the court
said "the purpose of handing the occupant
(when present) the warrant, like that of the
'knock and announce' rule, is to head off
breaches of the peace by dispelling any
suspicion that the search is illegitimate."
The court found, however, that "this
purpose, whatever its precise relation to the
Fourth Amendment ( Wilson v Arkansas
[514 U.S. 927; 115 S. Ct. 1914; 131 L. Ed
2d 976 (1995)]) suggests that there may be
some, has no relevance to this case;
Stefonek was not present when the search
was conducted."
... It is from this foundation of sand that the
majority builds its decision regarding the
"most appropriate" course to follow here.
III
That said, I turn to the constitutional
question. It can no longer be seriously
disputed that the knock and announce
principle has its roots in the Fourth
Amendment requirement of reasonableness,
and that it forms a part of any inquiry into
such reasonableness:
At the time of the framing, the
common law of search and
seizure recognized a law
enforcement officer's authority to
break open the doors of a
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dwelling, but generally indicated
that he first ought to announce
his presence and authority. In
this case, we hold that this
common-law "knock and
announce" principle forms a part
of the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment.
[Wilson v Arkansas, 514 US. 927, 131 L.
Ed 2d 976, 115 S. Ct. 1914.] Wilson found
our Supreme Court offering an extensive
survey of the origins of knock and announce
principles. ... The Court noted that it had
dealt with knock and announce cases before:
But we have never squarely held
that this principle is an element
of the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment.
We now so hold. Given the
longstanding common-law
endorsement of the practice of
announcement, we have little
doubt that the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment thought that
the method of an officer's entry
into a dwelling was among the
factors to be considered in
assessing the reasonableness of a
search or seizure. Contrary to
the decision below, we hold that
in some circumstances an
officer's unannounced entry into
a home might be unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
[Wilson, 514 US. 927 at 934, 131 L. Ed. 2d
976, 115 S. Ct. 1914.]
Thus, far from being some disposable piece
of mere judge-made limitation on police
activity, or even a statutory requirement, the
basic principle underlying the knock and
announce requirement is indeed embodied in
our constitution. It must follow that
decisions which would curtail this
requirement must be carefully scrutinized
for intrusion upon the basic requirement
embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
The majority ventures forth to focus on
footnote 4 of Wilson, which the majority
would read to indicate that "the Supreme
Court reserved the question whether the
inevitable-discovery exceptions to the
exclusionary rule apply to searches deemed
unreasonable only because officers armed
with a warrant failed to make a proper
announcement at the door." Slip op at 12.
Fortifying the suggestion that the majority
searches to create a question, where in
reality none lies, is the fact that the Court, in
two cases involving violations of knock and
announce principles, ruled in favor of the
application of the exclusionary rule. Miller
v United States, 357 U.S. 301; 78 S. Ct.
1190; 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332 (1958), and Sabbath
v United States, 391 U.S. 585; 88 S. Ct.
1755; 20 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1968). Of course,
the majority could argue, both of these cases
predated the Nix decision, and, thus, were
one to accept the majority's logic, that
subsequent decision undermined the prior
rule. I would suggest however, that, where
Nix did not concern a knock and announce
case (and could, the Court appears to
believe, be arguable toward such a case only
by way of analogy), it would seem more
prudent for us to follow the law as it
currently has been stated by the Court, and
leave it to the advocates to argue for changes
in recognition of subsequent decisions and
"newer" logic.
IV
A
The prosecutor suggests that, where the
police are in possession of a valid warrant,
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and yet are somehow deficient in the manner
of announcing their entry as they execute the
warrant, it is only their entry, not the search
itself, that suffers from a taint of
unreasonableness. In essence, the
prosecutor, and now the majority, are saying
that, where the entry is unlawful or
unreasonable, the remainder of the search is
nonetheless lawful because it occurs
pursuant to a (presumably) lawfully
obtained and valid warrant.
To accept this argument, one must accept
the prosecutor's view of the dichotomy of
the situation. The essence of this argument
is that the search itself is wholly detached
from the execution of the warrant.
Whatever happens during the entry, it does
not affect the basis for the warrant, and,
therefore, the warrant itself remains lawful.
Given the presence of this lawful warrant,
whatever evidence is in dispute would have
been "inevitably" discovered pursuant to the
lawful warrant.
It must be noted as an initial matter that this
argument, quite simply, knows no bounds.
Under a rationale such as this, the evidence
will always have been "inevitably"
discovered. In the majority's view, there is
simply no relationship between the knock
and announce violation and the discovery of
the evidence. That said, it must follow that
there will never be any such relationship, no
matter how severe and unwarranted the
knock and announce violation is.
We are left, by the majority, with a rule
which says that, whatever constitutional
intrusion there might be under Wilson, we
simply ignore it and concern ourselves not
in the least with either sanctioning it or
avoiding encouragement that it might
continue. The true effect of the majority's
decision is simply to do what it cannot do
otherwise, ignore Wilson. The result of the
majority's effort, however, stands on no
firmer ground than would a simple refusal to
accept the constitutional nature of the knock
and announce principle.
** *
B
The Court had little use for [the notion that a
blanket exception to the exclutionary rule
might apply]. "We disagree with the court's
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment
permits a blanket exception to the knock-
and-announce requirement for this entire
category of criminal activity." After noting
that "the question we must resolve is
whether this fact justifies dispensing with
case-by-case evaluation of the manner in
which a search was executed," the Court
answered with a resounding negative. "If a
per se exception were allowed for each
category of criminal investigation that
included a considerable-albeit
hypothetical-risk of danger to officers or
destruction of evidence, the knock-and-
announce element of the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement
would be meaningless."
That per se exception, totally discarding any
case-by-case evaluation is, of course, the
system the majority leaves us with today.
While the majority may well complain that
this dissent "equates" the exclusionary rule
with the Fourth Amendment (not the case, in
fact), one must consider whether the Fourth
Amendment will offer any protection
beyond the parchment it rests on under the
majority's decision.
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DThe majority today has embarked on a path
chosen most unwisely. We are not the first
Court to be offered such a path, but,
unfortunately, appear to be the more
gullible. Interestingly, the very prosecutor
appearing before us offered the Court in
Wilson the same opportunity the majority
accepts today. ...
E
I will conclude with a notion from the
unanimous Court in Richards, yet another
that I fear the majority has passed in the
night, intent as it is in reaching its
destination:
It is always somewhat dangerous
to ground exceptions to
constitutional protections in the
social norms of a given historical
moment. The purpose of the
Fourth Amendment's
requirement of reasonableness "is
to preserve that degree of respect
for the privacy of persons and the
inviolability of their property that
existed when the provision was
adopted-even if a later, less
virtuous age should become
accustomed to considering all
sorts of intrusion 'reasonable."'
Richards, 520 US. 385 at 392, n 4, 137 L.
Ed. 2d 615, 117 S Ct 1416, quoting
Minnesota v Dickerson, 508 US. 366, 380;
113 S. Ct. 2130; 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
"We hold that this common-law 'knock and
announce' principle forms a part of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment," except, says the majority, in
Michigan. Here we need not concern
ourselves with such things, the results being
"inevitable" in any event. ...
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"When Should Fourth Amendment Violations
Lead to Suppression of Evidence?
The Supreme Court Takes a 'Knock and Announce' Case"
FindLaw
July 13, 2005
Sherry F. Colb
The Supreme Court has held, in Wilson v.
Arkansas, that when police enter a home, the
Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires that
they first knock and announce their purpose
to the inhabitants. The reason for the
requirement (which I will call "knock-and-
announce") is to avoid the fear and
unwarranted exposure occasioned by a
surprise search. With a warning, residents
know that they are not about to be robbed,
and they might even have time to throw on a
robe if they are undressed.
On occasion, "countervailing factors" will
permit a no-knock entry into a home. In
Richards v. Wisconsin, however, the Court
specifically rejected an across-the-board
exception to knock-and-announce for felony
drug cases. If whole categories of cases
were permitted to excuse the failure to
knock-and-announce, the Court reasoned,
then there would be little left to the rule.
The Court recently granted review in
Hudson v. Michigan, a case that addresses
the consequences of police violation of
knock-and-announce. Specifically, the
Court will consider whether evidence
obtained after an illegal no-knock home
entry should be admissible, across the board,
on the theory that it would have been
"inevitably discovered" if police had
followed the rules.
The question provides an opportunity for the
Court to consider the rationale behind the
inevitable discovery doctrine, and whether it
applies in the knock-and-announce context.
The Independent Source Doctrine: A
Related Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule
To understand inevitable discovery, it is
useful first to consider a related exception to
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule:
the independent source doctrine.
In its most straightforward form, the
independent source rule stands for an
unremarkable proposition: If the police
violate the Fourth Amendment to perform
one search but conform their conduct to the
demands of the Fourth Amendment in
performing another search, then the fruits of
the legal search do not become inadmissible
by virtue of the illegal one. For two
concededly separate events, this disposition
makes perfect sense.
The independent source doctrine became
more controversial, however, when the
Supreme Court applied it to evidence that
resulted from both a legal search and an
illegal search. In Murray v. United States,
the Court considered what consequences
should follow when police perform an
illegal search and find evidence (which they
leave in place) and then subsequently
perform a legal search of the same premises
and find the same evidence (which they
seize). The Court held that the evidence is
admissible if both the basis for the second
search and the officers' decision to proceed
with the second search existed before-and
independently of-the performance of the
initial, illegal search.
528
Even if an illegal search intervenes, in other
words, evidence ultimately seized during a
legal search can, in some cases, be attributed
to the legal search, and accordingly admitted
into evidence.
Determination of when the legal search and
its results are truly "independent" of the
initial illegality calls for a hypothetical
inquiry into what would have happened if
there had been no intervening illegality.
The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
Inevitable discovery takes the hypothetical
reasoning process of the independent source
doctrine one step further.
In an inevitable discovery case, two things
are always true. First, police have violated
the Fourth Amendment. Second, as a direct
consequence of the Fourth Amendment
violation, police have discovered and seized
evidence incriminating to the person whose
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
Under these circumstances, the exclusionary
rule would ordinarily require the
suppression of the incriminating evidence.
Unlike in the case of independent source, the
evidence here cannot be attributed to a legal
search.
The inevitable discovery doctrine, however,
can nevertheless save the evidence from
suppression. It does so by adding a layer of
hypothetical inquiry to the independent
source scenario.
Inevitable discovery asks the judge to
imagine that the police did not commit the
Fourth Amendment violation-the one that
they did, in fact, commit, and that did
directly lead to the seizure of the evidence.
It then asks whether the evidence that was in
reality obtained through the illegal search
would have ultimately surfaced through
legal police conduct that would have
ultimately occurred if given the chance.
Under Nix v. Williams, if the answer to this
question is yes, then the trial judge will
admit the evidence as though it had actually
been uncovered by that hypothetical, legal
investigation that would eventually have
occurred.
Why Emphasize Causation?
The theory behind the doctrinal emphasis on
causation in both independent source and
inevitable discovery doctrines is this: When
police conduct a search without probable
cause, then the evidence they uncover would
have remained hidden were it not for the
Fourth Amendment violation. It follows
that restoring the way things would have
been if the police had refrained from
violating the Constitution-that is, divesting
the government of its ill-gotten gains-
means suppressing the evidence that was
uncovered as a result of the wrongful search.
The government, on this theory, is not
entitled to obtain evidence that would never
have come to light in the absence of
unconstitutional conduct. The exclusionary
rule enforces this position by keeping the
evidence out of the courtroom.
If, on the other hand, the unlawful search
that took place was not necessary to the
disclosure of the illegal evidence-if, that is,
the evidence either was (independently), or
would have eventually been, discovered and
obtained through entirely legal means-then
the evidence no longer has that same
character as essentially off-limits to the
government.
Another way of putting this is to say that the
point of suppressing evidence is to prevent
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illegal searches and seizures from putting
the government in a better position than it
would have occupied if it had followed the
rules.
When the exclusion of evidence is
understood in this light, inevitable discovery
provides a way of asking whether the
evidence obtained was really destined to
come to light or whether it emerged only by
virtue of police violating the law. Only in
the latter case need the evidence be
suppressed, because only then did the Fourth
Amendment truly contemplate the ultimate
loss of this evidence.
If, on the other hand, the evidence would
have surfaced regardless of the illegal
behavior, then exclusion is inappropriate,
because it would prevent the jury from
considering evidence that was destined to
come to the government's attention.
Not All Cases Fit this "Evidentiary
Destiny" Model: Warrantless Searches
There is, however, a set of Supreme Court
precedents that does not fit this model of
suppression. Decisions involving
warrantless searches notably belong to this
set.
When police carry out a warrantless search
and seizure without an exigency (or other
exception) to justify their failure to obtain a
warrant, the resulting evidence is
suppressed. The Fourth Amendment
requires suppression notwithstanding the
fact that the police misconduct did not
involve the disclosure of evidence that was
destined by the Fourth Amendment to
remain hidden. Indeed, it is precisely the
fact that a warrant would not have prevented
the police from getting the evidence they
needed that eliminates any possible
justification for searching without a warrant.
Had the police conformed their behavior to
the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, then,
they still would have gotten the evidence.
Yet, the law suppresses the evidence
because they did not get a warrant.
The inevitable discovery doctrine could not
sensibly apply to warrantless searches
without obliterating the suppression of
evidence in such cases. What makes
warrantless searches improper is that police
failed to take a required step-intended to
civilize the process-prior to performing a
search. The search itself and its disclosure
of hidden evidence, however, is otherwise
acceptable.
The suppression of the product of a
warrantless search and seizure is
accordingly not-as it would be in the case
of a search without probable cause-an
attempt to approximate what things would
have looked like had police obeyed the law.
It is, instead, a straightforward punishment
for police. who fail to take legally required
steps that would have given them legal
access to the desired evidence.
Knock-and-Announce and Evidentiary
Destiny
The question in Hudson v. Michigan, then,
is where a suppression remedy for knock-
and-announce violations would fit into the
framework above: Would it dislodge
evidence destined to be left hidden, or would
it constitute a punishment for failure to take
a civilizing step?
When courts suppress evidence because
police violate knock-and-announce, it is
virtually always the case that the
circumstances in play would satisfy the
inevitable discovery exception-if this
530
exception applied.
Indeed, suppose that, in a given case, the
inevitable discovery rule is not satisfied, for
a warning and announcement of purpose
would likely have led to the loss of
evidence. In such a case, that very
probability would justify a no-knock entry
and thus remove the police conduct from the
class of constitutional violations altogether.
Police who can show that knocking and
announcing would compromise the search
about to take place (either evidentiarily or
safety-wise) can accordingly dispense with
the requirement.
Another way of saying this is to suggest that
if the inevitable discovery exception to
suppression applies to knock-and-announce,
then the exception will preclude the
suppression of any evidence obtained as a
result of a no-knock entry. The failure to
knock-and-announce will either be legal due
to evanescent evidence (in which case the
evidence should not be suppressed because
there was no Fourth Amendment violation)
or the failure to knock-and-announce will be
illegal but will fall within the inevitable
discovery doctrine and permit admission of
the evidence on that ground.
Should Exclusion or Inevitable Discovery
Govern No-Knock Cases?
So the knock-and-announce requirement is
very much like the warrant requirement: If
the Court wants there ever to be suppression
of evidence, then the inevitable discovery
doctrine cannot apply.
Exclusion will not approximate the way
things would have been if police had
complied with the Fourth Amendment,
because compliance-when legally
required-does not preclude the recovery of
evidence. The purpose of knock-and-
announce, like the purpose of the warrant
requirement, is not to keep things hidden but
rather, to force the police to take steps that
civilize the investigative process.
Warrants ensure that an objective person
makes a cool appraisal of police officers'
basis for a search, and warrant affidavits
provide a record for later review of that
neutral appraisal. Knock-and-announce
ensures that home searches are not quite as
terrifying, humiliating and potentially lethal
as they might otherwise be.
Putting the Government In A Worse
Position
Many would say of both the warrant
requirement and knock-and-announce, that
the exclusionary rule is not appropriately
applied at all. The Supreme Court has said,
in Nix v. Williams, that suppression is not
intended to place the government in a worse
position than it would have occupied if it
had complied with the Constitution. The
suppression of evidence obtained after
violations of either the warrant requirement
or knock-and-announce does exactly that.
But the Supreme Court has applied the
exclusionary rule to warrant violations and
has strongly implied that the exclusionary
rule will apply (and thus will not be subject
to the inevitable discovery exception) in
knock-and-announce cases as well.
In Wilson v. Arkansas, in which the Court
officially recognized that the Fourth
Amendment often requires knock-and-
announce, a majority of the Court sent the
particular case-in which a convicted felon
appealed his conviction-back to the lower
courts. The remand was for a determination
of whether a valid basis for foregoing
knock-and-announce was present, as the
government contended.
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If there were no valid basis, one could
accordingly conclude, the petitioner's
conviction would be reversed. And that
reversal, in turn, could only happen if a
violation of knock-and-announce results in
suppression, notwithstanding the fact that
such suppression deprives the government
of evidence that it would otherwise have
(and thus puts the government in a worse
position than it would have occupied in the
absence of a constitutional violation).
If instead, evidence should be admitted
regardless of whether police violate the
Fourth Amendment when they fail to knock
and announce, the Supreme Court's remand
of Wilson would be inexplicable. The Court
could simply have said "regardless of
whether the police were right to forego
knock-and-announce in this case, the
conviction is affirmed, because no
evidentiary consequences follow from
violation of knock-and-announce." Its
remanding thus strongly suggests that
knock-and-announce will be enforced with
the exclusionary rule and that inevitable
discovery will therefore not apply.
Beyond predicting what the Court will do,
moreover, it seems right to bar application
of inevitable discovery to the knock-and-
announce rule, just as it was right for the
Court to bar its application to warrant
violations.
Absent exclusion, police will have very little
incentive to obtain a warrant. Appearing
before a magistrate takes extra time that
could be spent in the pursuit of other crimes.
And a lawsuit in which the plaintiff proves
that police lacked a warrant (but otherwise
had probable cause) will ordinarily yield
little in damages-certainly not enough to
motivate police to change their behavior or
to tempt plaintiffs to bring such suits in the
first place.
As in the case of warrants, without
application of the exclusionary rule, police
will have little incentive to comply with the
knock-and-announce rule. Surprise-in
many cases-will seem the best strategy for
police in gaining control over premises in
which evidence is present. Like the warrant
process, knocking and announcing results in
a relinquishment of some control over the
investigative process, and police rarely
relinquish control voluntarily.
Furthermore, a lawsuit in which a plaintiff
shows that police searched properly but
failed to say "Police, we have a warrant"
before entering will not likely yield much in
the way of damages. As with warrantless
searches, then, the exclusionary rule-even
in its punitive form-may be necessary to
the effective deterrence of violations.
Justice Frank Murphy once said that "there
is but one alternative to the rule of
exclusion. That is no sanction at all." The
knock-and-announce requirement is one that
civilizes the search process and can prevent
trauma and save lives. Exclusion
accordingly seems vastly superior to no
sanction at all.
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"Supreme Court Agrees to Hear ACLU of Michigan
'Search and Seizure' Case"
June 28, 2005
ACLU of Michigan
DETROIT-On the last day of its term, the
U.S. Supreme Court announced that it will
hear a case brought by the American Civil
Liberties Union of Michigan raising the
question of whether courts should suppress
evidence seized by the police when they
unlawfully enter a home without first
knocking and announcing their presence.
The ACLU is representing the homeowner,
Booker T. Hudson.
"It is undisputed that the police violated the
Fourth Amendment by barging into Mr.
Hudson's home without knocking and
announcing," said David A. Moran, an
Assistant Professor at Wayne State
University Law School and the ACLU
cooperating attorney who will argue the case
before the Court. "The question is whether
evidence should be suppressed in order to
deter the police from violating the knock
and announce requirement."
The ACLU said that Detroit police broke
into Hudson's home without knocking and
announcing, as required by law, in 2000.
Once inside, the police found a small
quantity of drugs and arrested Hudson for
possession, which caused him to be placed
on probation for 18 months. Despite the
knock and announce violation, Hudson's
motion to suppress the evidence found in his
home was denied because of a 1999
Michigan Supreme Court ruling that
evidence found after such a violation was
not subject to suppression.
However, the ACLU noted that in a 1995
U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Justice
Clarence Thomas writing for the Court,
stressed that the knock and announce
requirement protects the dignity of residents
by allowing them a reasonable time to make
themselves presentable before the police
enter, and also protects private property by
allowing a resident an opportunity to open
his or her door instead of having the doors
destroyed by a police battering ram.
"As a result of the Michigan Supreme
Court's ruling, police in Michigan have
virtually no incentive to comply with the
knock and announce requirement," said
Kary Moss, ACLU of Michigan Executive
Director. "The Michigan Supreme Court's
position on this issue encourages police to
violate constitutional rights with impunity."
This issue has been disputed in courts across
the country, but the Michigan Supreme
Court position has been rejected by the
highest state courts in Arkansas and
Maryland and by the Sixth and Eighth
Circuit Courts of Appeal. The Michigan
Supreme Court's holding has been embraced
by only the Seventh Circuit.
The Court agreed to hear Hudson v.
Michigan yesterday as it issued its final
decisions in the 2004 term. Oral arguments
will be held in December or January, and a
decision is expected by June 2006.
Professor Moran also served as the ACLU
of Michigan cooperating attorney in the
Supreme Court case decided last week
guaranteeing poor criminal defendants the
right to a lawyer on appeal.
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"The 'Knock and Announce' Decision"
New York Law Journal
February 17, 2004
Martin A. Schwartz
The Fourth amendment generally requires
police officers executing a search warrant of
a home to knock and announce their
presence before attempting a forcible entry.
How long do the officers have to wait for a
forcible entry to be justified? In United
States v. Banks, the U.S. Supreme Court
recently held that when executing a search
warrant of the home for illegal drugs, a 15-
20 seconds wait before forcibly entering the
premises satisfies the Fourth Amendment.
Justice David H. Souter wrote the
unanimous decision for the Court.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Generally, the existence of a search warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate based upon a
finding of probable cause renders a
government search reasonable. Even when
the police have a properly issued search
warrant, the officers must execute the
warrant in a reasonable manner. This means
that the entry into the home and the search
must be carried out in a reasonable manner.
Common-Law Rule
In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment
incorporates the common-law rule that
generally requires police officers to knock
and announce their presence before entering
a dwelling. The officers must identify
themselves as police officers and state that
they have a search warrant and intend to
search the premises before attempting a
forcible entry. The rule is "justified on the
ground that it protects both citizens and
officers from violence, it protects the
compelling privacy interest a person has in
his home, and it protects against needless
destruction of private property."
The knock and announce rule is not
absolute. In Wilson v. Arkansas, Richards v.
Wisconsin, and United States v. Ramirez, the
Supreme Court recognized that in some
cases the facts and circumstances facing the
officer may justify dispensing with the
knock and announce requirements. "In
order to justify a no-knock entry, the police
must have reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing their presence,
under the particular circumstances, would be
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit
the effective investigation of the crime by,
for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence." Whether reasonable suspicion
justifies a no-knock entry "depends in no
way on whether police must destroy
property in order to enter."
In Richards, the Court held the fact that the
search relates to a felony drug investigation
does not automatically justify an exemption
from the knock and announce rule. Whether
there is justification for dispensing with the
rule depends upon a determination of
whether under the particular circumstances
there is reasonable suspicion that knocking
and announcing would be dangerous, futile
or inhibit effective investigation of crime.
The Court in Richards reasoned that not all
drug cases present these justifications. "For
example, while drug investigation frequently
does pose special risks to officers safety and
the preservation of evidence, not every drug
investigation will pose these risks to a
substantial degree." Further, the reasons
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that might be thought to justify an exception
for drug cases could also be invoked for
other types of crimes. "Armed bank
robbers, for example, are by definition,
likely to have weapons, and the fruits of
their crime may be destroyed without too
much difficulty. If a per se exception were
allowed for each category of criminal
investigation that included a considerable-
albeit hypothetical-risk of danger to
officers or destruction of evidence, the
knock-and-announce element of the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement
would be meaningless."
The issue in Banks was: When the police
are required to knock and announce, how
long do they have to wait before making a
forcible entry? Based upon information that
Mr. Banks was selling cocaine at his
apartment, the police obtained a warrant to
search the apartment. After the officers
arrived on a Wednesday afternoon, the
officers at the front door announced " 'police
search warrant' and rapped hard enough on
the door to be heard by officers at the back
door." "There was no indication whether
anyone was home and after waiting for 15 to
20 seconds with no answer, the officers
broke open the front door with a battering
ram." It turned out that Mr. Banks was in
the shower and claimed to not have heard
anything until the crash of the door.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit had set forth "factors" and described
"categories" of cases to aid in determining
what constitutes a reasonable amount of
time to wait before making a forced entry.
The circuit court held that, given the damage
caused by the officers' forced entry, the 15-
20 second delay was insufficient.
Disagreeing With Circuit Court
In reversing the Circuit Court, the U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed with both the
Circuit Court's approach and its conclusion.
The Supreme Court found that the Circuit
Court's attempt to articulate factors and
categories for determining a reasonable time
officers must wait before making a forcible
entry was inconsistent with the totality of
the circumstances approach.
Reasonableness is a "function of the facts of
the cases so various that no template is
likely to produce sounder results than
examining the totality of the circumstances
in a given case; it is too hard to invent
categories without giving short shrift to
details that turn out to be important in a
given instance, and without inflating
marginal ones." The Supreme Court
couldn't avoid the temptation of pointing out
that in two pre-Banks decisions the Supreme
Court also reversed Ninth Circuit attempts to
impose structure in contravention of the
Supreme Court's totality of the
circumstances approach. The point seems to
be that by now the Ninth Circuit should have
gotten the message that the use of an
"overlay of a categorical scheme on the
general reasonableness analysis threatens to
distort the 'totality of the circumstances'
principle by replacing a stress on revealing
facts with resort to pigeonholes." Totality of
the circumstances means consideration of all
of the facts and circumstances known to the
officer. For example, whether a search is for
illegal drugs as compared to stolen pianos
"tells a lot about the chances of their
respective disposal and its bearing on
reasonable time."
Totality of Circumstances
Although acknowledging that the issue was
a "close one," the Supreme Court in Banks
held that under the totality of the
circumstances, a 15-20 second wait was
reasonable. After 15 or 20 seconds without
a response, the police could fairly suspect
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that the cocaine would be gone if they
waited longer. In reaching this conclusion,
the Supreme Court made the following
points:
1. The evaluation of a reasonable waiting
period depends upon the facts and
circumstances known to the officers. Thus,
the facts that Banks was in the shower and
did not hear the officers were not pertinent
to the evaluation.
2. The critical fact in evaluating the
reasonableness of the waiting period is the
particular exigency claimed, not the
suspect's time to reach the door. In Banks,
the exigency was the opportunity to get rid
of cocaine, which a prudent drug dealer will
keep near a commode or kitchen sink. "The
significant circumstances include the arrival
of the police during the day, when anyone
inside would probably have been up and
around, and the sufficiency of the 15 to 20
seconds for getting to the bathroom or the
kitchen to start flushing cocaine down the
drain." The reference to "during the day"
when the occupants are likely to be awake
suggests that a longer waiting period would
likely apply to searches at night. The Court
in Banks also stated that since the critical
time period is that for disposing of the
drugs, there is no basis for distinguishing
between searches of different types of
abodes, e.g., a mansion, bungalow or
apartment.
3. The need to damage property is a
pertinent factor in assessing the
reasonableness of the waiting period. "[T]he
need to damage property in the course of
getting in is a good reason to require more
patience than it would be reasonable to
expect if the door were open."
Some jurisdictions authorize magistrates to
issue no-knock warrants. The Supreme
Court has not definitively resolved the
constitutionality of these warrants. The
Court in Richards v. Wisconsin stated in
dicta that no-knock warrants seem "entirely
reasonable when sufficient cause to do so
can be demonstrated ahead of time." On the
other hand, the fact that a magistrate denied
a no-knock warrant should not be interpreted
to prohibit an officer from making a no-
knock entry based upon her independent
evaluation of its justification at the time the
warrant is executed.
It should be noted that New York Criminal
Procedure Law § 690.50 provides that a
police officer executing a search warrant
must give notice of authority and purpose
before entry and present a copy of the search
warrant upon request. The statute also
authorizes the issuance of a no-knock
warrant.
Conclusion
What are the remedies for Fourth
Amendment knock and announce
violations? It seems clear that like other
Fourth Amendment violations, a knock-and-
announce violation by state or local officers
could give rise to a § [1983 claim for relief,
and, if by federal officers, to a Bivens claim
for relief. The unresolved issue, left open in
Wilson and in Ramirez, is whether the
exclusionary rule applies to Fourth
Amendment knock-and-announce
violations. The circuits are in conflict on
this issue.
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